DEFENCE OF CANADA.

New Zealand Herald, Volume I, Issue 295, 22 October 1864, Page 6

DEFENCE OF CANADA.

: (From the, Sitlurddy Review.) j frwemay dmw any inference from tlie commercial eg!sla<i-in ot' the last few years, unlimited liability is rcry uncougcuial to the mass of Englishmen, lerlaps our timidity ill that respect may be symptomn:ic of the national old age which is creeping upon Us, iiid which, is removing us equally, fi-pin the. tititerirbing recklessness of America and tlib sehtiinental motives to action \vhieii arb recoghiscd in Gctinany. rhf buihp bf.cUutiou is und'oubtedlyinereasing upon he national slaill. War .is. cqmiiig to bp .regarded >y the nation With much the same horror with which i nervous old lady regards a. dill'erence with a cab--111111 upon the subject of the odd sixpence, and Falilall 's view of the practical advantages;of honour, is jecoming very popular on 'Change. ■ The existence >f such a temper in. the (public wind is quite ehotigh o account for .till! nervousness-Mich is beginning 10 iryvuil |n Parliament and elsewhere upon the sub'e'et of (lie defence of Canada, and which lound expression in Monday night's debate on Mr. Adderley s notion. So long as we can approximately calculate the amount of the liabilities tliat would Tail upon us fwe were involved iii war ? ,wc win lb'oic upon the prospect, not perhaps with equanimity, but still without absolute consternation. The defence of England, for instance, might be a costly undertaking, but the cost would be capable of estimation. A certain number of ships, and a certain number of soldiers, will make us practically safe* But tlie lieaHs 3f Mr. Adderley and of Bomt* other English politicians sink within, tliblii when they think of the defend) of' Canada. .The frontier of Canada extends for ihuny. hundred. miles... tart.of it ia-protected bv lake and,"river, iind upon those watero v.o are prohibited by treaty from stationing a single gun-boat. The Americans, on the contrary, have been at liberty to open what canals they pleased into those lakes, and can at any moment cover them with a naval ioree. The other portion of the frontier of Canada is j what is called an imaginary frontier. It is marked j out by no natural feature of strategic importance. It follows ho river, or mountain, br marsh; fit which a general charged with defending, the country -could make a stiiiid. Such. ,a, frontier could bo held only by an army numbering hundreds of thousands. And certainly it is easy to see from late events that, in case of war, it would assuredly be confronted by an American army of that size. The Confederates have done us the service of trying the ice for us. When they first, armed, the general impression, not only m the Southern States hut over the whole world, was that the North would never fight. In what bloody characters that error has been refuted, and. how nobly tho Confederates have redeemed their first there is no heed to tell. Biit the lesson is written for our instruction as wpll as theirs. .Wo know that we have to deal with a nation whose military passions are carried to the verge of madness, and whoso vast resources are for the time indefinitely multiplied by the reckless prodigality with which tho iesourcus of the future are anticipated. The problem, therefore, to which we have to look forward, in case of any accidental difference with the American Government, is the defence of a frontier to whose needs the military power of France would be scarcely equal, against a vast army of veterans, commanded by generals who at least have that skill which the experience of a desperate. Vq\r ennhot fail to confer. The money we might {jerhnps furnish for su.eli $ task, though it would tax our resources to the utmost, without tho hope even of an approximate reimbursement in the shape of national advantage for such a stupendous outlay. But where are the men to come from ? Can England furnish them 'i And, if not, will Canada condescend to relieve her of tho onerous duty ?

The natural exclamation of most Englishmen, if this question wcie propounded to them, would be to the cfl'ect that, if Canada docs not choose to fight for her own homesteads, she must take the consequences. And any undue delay in making those preparations for fighting which modem Wars require will, for all pi actical purposes, be the same thing as a refusal to fight. If the Canadians decline to insure their property against American invasion, as they probably do against fire, they, must - take their chance of a calamity. Undoubtedly, if they had not made adequate preparations to protect themselves, we should not very willingly assume the liability of paying for (heir defence. Our interest in the matter is of a mi re immediate kind. AVe have detachments of British troops upon their frontier. If an invasion were to take place now, they would be snapped up as neatly as a chess-player takes an unprotected pawn. The Government—partially alive to the danger, but afraid, in official fashion, to commit themselves hastily to the principle of too much precaution—have, it seems,'ordered the troops to abandon the outlying posts, and to concentrate themselves in Montreal and Quebec. But unless the troops can hold their own there, such a measure is only shifting the scene of danger. In reality, it is making the task of an enemy more easy. Instead of having to collect the detachments of British troops along an extended and inhospitable frontier, he-wlil find them collected ready to his hand. In the old days of highway robbery, a Quaker contemplating a journey is related to have asked advice relativo to the precautions which it was expedient to take against the dangers of the road; A practical friend recommended a hi ace of pistols. "Nav," said the Quaker, "but peradventure the men of Belial woiildtake the pistols also." The British detachments that arc stationed along the Canadian frontier are very much in the condition of the Quaker's pistols. For the purposes of defence they are simply useless against the enormous preponderance of force that might be brought against them. But their capture would form an attractive object for a foi av, and they would be only too likely, should the Americans overrun the country, to be carried away along with less valuable plunder. If they are to remain there at all, they must be put into places where the weak have some chance against the strong. In other words, thoy must bo protected by loitifications that are impregnable, so far as the words can bo used, against the appliances of modern warfare. If the Government intends to maintain a force of British troops in Quebec and Montreal, it must fortify those towns. Otherwise it will only be facilitating the task of the American oflieer who may be entrusted with the duty of capturing them. It will simply be enacting the part of the celebrated opossum, and " coming down," to save further trouble.

But then who is to pay for these fortification ? There i- the rub. The defences of the Canadian frontier are mnch in the condition of a- house which lias the misfortune to be the subject of a thancery suit. It falls into ruin because neither suitor is certain that it is his interest or business to repair it. Quebec and Montreal arc remaining unfortified because tho colony and the mother country cannot agree which of them is to bear the burden of the fortifications. Of course, the time will come when this emulous par-imony will cost one or both of them a hundred times the amount of the money over which tliey arc lighting. "Whichever can be induced to undertake the task, however wrongfully he may consider the burden to be cast upon him, will save an enormous interest upon his outlay. To Canada, the secure possession of those two fortresses means simply the security of her most favoured districts from devastation such as that which is now sweeping over Virginia and Tennessee. To Kngland, it means safety from a disaster which would involve her in one of the most desperate, and therefore one of the costliest, wars in which she has ever been engaged. The capture of a British army by Americans would be a disgrace for which it would need, in the eyes of the English people, a series of victories upon -American soil to atone. But, judging from the ordinary operations of English and especially of olticial nature, there is no probability that such prudential considerations will be duly entertained. On the contrary, the home and colonial authorities will probably continue to wrangle over the payment of the expense of fortification until the day arrives when the .Americans will put a stop to the dispute, and will find themselves in a position to undertake (fie labour of that duty for themselves. Tlie plan whieli Mr. Cardwell assures us is under the consideration of the War Ollice may, for auglitwe know, have been devised with the skill of Todtleben. But that H not the difficulty. A good plan for fortifications is an admirable thing ; but in order that the full advantage of its excellencc may be felt, somebody must be found to pay for it.