REAL POSITION OF THE CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA.

New Zealand Herald, Volume I, Issue 247, 27 August 1864, Page 6

REAL POSITION OF THE CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA.

Willi the present, campaign Secretary Stanton commini red the s\sli 111 of publishing regularly short oflieial bulletins of J lie operations of our armies, for the public bcnclil. By this means the army lelcpnaphs were made (o satisfy the public anxiety for news, and the whole country ivas enabled to see at one view' the general ICMIII of what bail J.ecn done on I lie day before in the widely distant theatres of war. We thought this an excellent measure, and rightly managed, it would have been; but ill the way Secretary Stanton has carried out this system it lias done uo barm. r J hough in many instances A 1 r. iStanton told the stories of the various movements m tlie words of the generals, in others he gave them in words of his own, which were coloured by an over sanguine spirit. Ife staled to the country always a little more than the statements ini.de to him would justify. "Where he gave the general's .own words ho culled out (lie most favourable passages. Public expectation was, as a necessary consequence, raised 100 high, and now that our operations do not go forward so rapidly as lliey did, people contrast, this hitch with the great promise of a lew days ago, and /eel uneasy. Because Grant docs not walk directly into Richmond the people feel disappointed, for from Stanton's despatches they had supposed he would.

We must come down a little; not from any failure ol Grant's promises—lie keeps all his promises ; and he promised to light it out. if it took all the summer, lie will do it, we may be sure. JJul, we must come down from Stanton's rose-coloured views lo Grant's sober reality. We must suppose it possible I hat il may " lake all summer." Apparently the operations n| the campaign are lo be somewhat less active than they have been. General l.ee, having in llio army under his command the last hope of (lie Southern confederacy, has not. risked lhal. hope, lie lias not been foolhardy enough lo risk the salety of his cause ou a second tield fight alter the very doubtful lj.ittie in Ihe Wilderness. Nor is General Grant, less wise than Lee in bis disposition lo economise his chances, lie lights cautiously, us the circumstances require. And thus in their mutual caution the two stratagists have come to a joint dillicult to determine. Lee has hugged his jntrenchments for the last thirty days, and Grant, resolute not to waste his men in storming those iiitreuclnnents where such an operation was not necessary, has forced him out of many strong places by nianuMivres, constantly hoping to compel a battle 011 better terms. But, though he mancruvres Lee out of one position, it does not compel a battle ; for Lee only leaves one to step into another a few miles further on.

In this way they have reached Richmond, which is merely the last fortified position on the line, and the strongest of all. To force Lee out of this by manoeuvre involves an operation not to bo entered upon too hastily. 'I'lie James lliver, and the unknown difliculties on its banks north of Fort Darling, aro very formidable obstacles to tlie continuatijn of tho flanking operations by which Lee was moved out of former places. A movement across that river would bo a very bold one, and General Grant, who is a very bold man, may make it. But if there is any good reason why such a movement cannot be made, then the next stop in the flunking advance is impossible, and the two armies confront one another, with entrenchments between Ihat one army will not relinquish and the other cannot storm. From such a difliculty the only solution is a siege. We do not say that this was from the first a necessary result of Grant's plan. We are well satisfied that it was not, but that tho result would have been much better had Grant hud the exclusive manage-

Mont of our armies. '; His -plan -was to occupy Xce's j attention on the Rapictan with. his main force, while ] separate columns should 'cut the only two lines of' railroad by which Richmond, and consequently Lee's army,.could bo supplied from the Southern States.: He expected tlius to isolate Lee and to defeat hiin ; and lie would unqucßtionablyhavcdone it; ior.Lee's army, not rcinforced and not supplied, would not liarc been able to bold its own in the Into terrible marches and battles, but would havo gone to pieces,' and Richmond and the rebellion would of coursc have fallen, as the result of. the destruction of that, army. Grant's part of tlio plan was magnificently carried out. He engaged Lee, and outmanoonvred liim and'outfouglit him' day after day for thirty days ; but the distress that lie expected the loss of supplies to occasion in Lee's army did not appear. Neither did the severe losses by battle affect Lee's movements, for reinforcements came up. Both tho expeditions to cut off the enemy's supplies had completely failed of their: purpose. Both these expeditions were under the command of political generals. This was the part of the campaign attended to by the President. Butler on the James river, and Sicgel, in the valley of ihe Shenandoah, were beaten with comparative ease. Lee's' army was'supplied witli ordiriaiy regularity, and Beauregard and Breckenridgc reinforced it: And thus, and not through any defect in Grant's plan, resulted the. hard fact that the army that by General Grant's plan ought to have been destroyed before this is, though badly shaken, still a formidable force, in a formidable position, and that" the operations for its destruction must be started anew. •

If Giant passes the James, matters will be once more at hazard with Lee. He will probably be compelled to abandon Bichmond or to assume the offensive to prevent himself from being shut up there. But if Grant should remain nortli of the river, asiege will doubtless begin at once. We havo no knowledge as to how Grant will, in tluit event, approach Bichmond, whether on the north or the east, or whether ho will realise the possibility projected by the Bichmond papers, and approach it on the south side. But these approaches will no doubtbe conducted in view of the circumstances of the case, -which are different from the circumstances of sieges in general. Sieges are generally undertaken for the capture or destruction of a city, and are conducted in view of tlie presence of an army that covers or defends tho city. But the present siege is solely for the destruction of an army, and the existenco of the city is only recognised as it covers and protects that army. Grant does not care for Bichmond in any other wise than as it covers Lee. He lias driven Lee into it just as lie drove Pemberton into Vicksburg, and will have to take or destroy tho city to carry out his purpose against-Lee's army.. If this con only be done by a siege, Grant has 3till hard work to do. Leo's army is well handled, and lights as well as our own, and though it may be inferior in numbers, it has the advantage of works, which more than balances that disparity. We must reinforce Grant to a sufficient degree to put him on a practical equality with Lee in this respect, and it may be that we shall have to employ against the enemy to the fullest extent- the obvious advantage that we possess in respect to mimbers. Doing all that the country can in that way in this summer must end the war; for Lee has drawn every man from the minor posts throughout the South, is lighting with his last force, and cannot continue the contest any longer than that force is ell'icthe. We have the rebellion definitively concentrated in one aimy, and we must destroy that ai my by all the means in our power.