A Wellington Citizen on War Pessimists.

Free Lance, Volume XV, Issue 801, 5 November 1915, Page 5

A Wellington Citizen on War Pessimists.

A Stiff Tonic for Journalistic Jeremiahs.

Dear Lance, —Exactly 122 years ago, in 1793, the National Convention was appointed to manage the affairs of the infant French Republic. Every patriot was filled, alnjost to the bursting point, with the new wine of Rousseau's gospel of Equality. Any idea of pre-eminence of position, of privilege, or even of ability, was intolerable. To them this ideal was the embodiment of Truth and Reason by which the world, would be regenerated and saved. The gospel must be spread at all risks by every available force. So, with an empty treasury but with boundless faith in their mission, they olunged into war against the whole of Europe.

Mahan recounts that one of the first acts of the Convention, on the outbreak of war with. England, was to dismiss from the ships of war all the trained gunners. They argued that at was contrary to the prime principles of Equality that any citizen should be considered superior to another. All were equal; why, then, should not all be equally capable of shooting? Such folly is almost incredible! Yet in one form or another, though-jn varying degrees, this doctrine forms the. chief weakness in' all democracies.

■ For instance: A citizen is accused of a crime, or two citizens have a seriousdispute. How' is. the matter 1 settled? A jury of twelve men is empanelled- to try the case. How are they selected ? . Presumably the ends of justice would demand that these men should be chosen as being men of honour, acumen and sound sense. But, no! _ democratic • ideals will not entertain the idea of any inequality among citizens. They are chosen, therefore, at random; and there is nothing to prevent matters of life and death being decided by men. whom you would not trust toi look after a clutch of chickens. Are we then, a century of democracy, much wiser than the mad patriots of _ 1793. These insane theories of Equality _ xnay be pretty playthings in times- of piping peace. They do comparatively little harm, and merely - provoke the smiles of the philosopher; but when the State is in danger, when the enemy is mering at the door, it is a very different thing. Then th-ey_ constitute the very greatest danaer which can beset a democracy.

When ©very petty admiral or general of the street corner considers himself to [have the right and the ability to criticise the management of a campaign, and' to foster amongst his fellow citizens unwarranted emotions of pessimism or optimism, then we see and feel the evils of having built our castle of Equality on the sands of Untruth. There are various kinds of amateur critics; some harmless, some- the reverse. For instance, there is the city clerk, who, with Napoleonic shrucr. folded arms, and heavy frown, informs you that he is ''not satisfied with the British Navy" ; and the excitable " patriot who finds ojitlet for his patriotism by waving flags, anathematising the Kaiser, or practising petty persecutions on our unfortunate prisoners. Few of these carry any weight, and their optimisms and _ pessimisms may be dismissed with a smiile.

The really dangerous critics are those whose opinions carry some . weight, either because they have made great reputations for themselves in some branch of nubile service, or because they are employed by some leading journal, by whose reflected light they shine. Everyone knows the eminence, and ability of men like Milner and Cromer, and, when they condemn the strategy of the waT, we have to take their wordfs seriously. So with Repington and Ashmead Bartlett. They are admirable war correspondents, and must be respected accordingly. But it must not be forgotten that none of the-m is in a position to know anything whatever of the strategy of this vast war. Very few outside the General Staffs of the armies of the Allies can know or can be permitted to know. .They are merely bystanders. They see tricks taken and lost. They can know nothing of the cards held by the players. How foolish, then, it is for even these great men to allow themselves to join in abuse of the players when any trick is lost. Before the game is over, many tracks will be lost or- won. But the party that secures the odd trick will be the winner.

If there is reason to suppose that our commanders are incapable, change them bv all means. But to scream at each slip is as fatal a policy as can be imagined, for it disheartens the fighters and leads to failure. . Can you expect a captain to steer his ship through a dangerous passage, if the stewards and the cooks and other inexperts throng the bridge and offer their useless advice? None of these great men are military experts, nor can they know the strategy of the campaign. It would be foolish, therefore, to allow ourselves to be depressed by their inexpert criticisms.

The worst sort of critics, howeveT, have been the disappointed war correspondents,and especially those connected

with the powerful ring of journals which have fallen under the control of American capital. There has been with them a distinct flavour of spite, and one- cannot help concluding; that they are trying to pay off Kitchener and Joffre for their policy of rigid censorship. They have tried to persuade the public that there was a desire to keep it in the dark, and that a less close censorship would have disclosed nothing material to the enemy. There, too, comes the unwillingness to put trust in the leaders; and here again I repeat: ' 'If the leaders are bad, dismiss them; but if they are good, trust them." Would they have us play our game with our cards exposed for all to seer - "while the more judicious enemy conceals his? -It looks as if they thought more of getting copy than of the safety, of the country—more of profits than of patriotism. There is no doubt that a slack censorship did us great'harm in the Boer war, and it is an interesting fact, mentioned by Berthiei- and Marbot, that Napoleon learnt all he wanted to know of our strategy and of the distribution of our troops from the columns of the London Times, of which he was a constant reader. May I utter a word of warning to those of us who are liable to be led away by the stirring accounts of battles and heroic deeds sent by war correspondents? We must not imagine, because he is a brilliant word painter, or because he was present at any particular battle, that therefore he can set up as a critic of the great war strategy. Probably he has been far too close to the battle to be able to form much idea of even that battle. Battles are nowadays spread over> greai* areas, and the nearer a man is, the more he may know of the actual fighting but the less .of the tactics and strategy. A man may write glibly of holocausts, and hecatombs, and decimations, of hurricanes of shells and tempests of artillery ; he may pile superlative upon superlative, but he is not thereby to be considered an expert critic. It has become the custom lately to speak of the Gallipoli campaign as a faiilure. I submit that, without a knowledge of the causes and facts, no one is in a position to pass an adverse criticism. It is only when history shall have gathered up all the threads, after our victory shall have, been won, and the odd trick garnered in, that anyone will be able to judge fairly and surely. "For God's sake, let us have an end of this tempest of grumbling cablegrams. It fosters a spirit of pessimism, which is just the disease which Germany hoped would attack our democracy, and 01. which she calculated. If we persevere, and go on doggedly and bravely as we are now doing, we- shall assuredly win. We may lose many a trick, but Ave shall win> the rubber all right.—Yours, etc.. G.E.A.