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DISASTROUS INTELLIGENCE FROM PORT NATAL AND THE CAPE.

(From the South Australian Register)

The intelligence from the Cape, by way of Launceston, is now.up to the 20th of June, and is of the most exciting and disastrous nature. As our readers are aware, it has been the intention of the Government for some time past to take possession of this settlement on behalf of the British Crown, and an expedition for this purpose was dispatched from the Cape, under the command of Captain Smith, and arrived at Port Natal t on the 4th of May.

From the date of their arrival down to the 16th of May, Captain Smith, on the part of the expedition, and Mr. Pretorius, on the part

of the settlers, had been discussing matters connected with their future course, which was about to lead to a peaceful military occupation by the troops, and an amicable arrangement on the part of the emigrants. On the 17th, however,- the officer in command received a letter, signed, “A Pretorius,” desiring him to evacuate the country forthwith, and this order being folowed up by the plunder of cattle belonging to ier Majesty’s forces, and other annoyances, he deemed it expedient to make a forward movement, and, on the night of the 23rd, he made an advance, taking with him two guns.

Ere the officer in command, however, had ieen able to reach the camp of the enemy, and whilst yet in the bush, a destructive fire was opened upon him, and a terrible conflict ensued between the troops and the emigrant farmers, during which, about fifty of the British troops were killed and wounded. In the course of the

fray, the oxen fastened to the guns became unmanageable, and the troops retreated to their first position, leaving behind them their guns. Wfiere the effects of this conflict will terminate, it is impossible to tell; but it is said to be still the determination of the emigrant farmers to resist the military occupation of the settlement by the British. Immediately upon the arrival of the news at Cape Town, Sir George Napier is said to have proceeded in person to Simon’s Town, and obtained from the Admiral of the station the disposal of the Southampton, 50 gun frigate, which was to sail from Simon’s Bay, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Cliocter, with an expedition of four hundred men.

Below will be found the fullest particulars of ;he affray, of which our space will admit: —

, Port Natal, Colonial Office, Cape of Good Hope 1 5th June, 1842.

His Excellency the Governor has been pleased to direct the publication of the following disjatch, from the officer commanding her Majesty’s troops at Port Natal, for public information.

By command of his Excellency the Governor. (Signed) J. Moore Craig, Acting Secretary to the Government.

Port Natal, May 25, 1842.

Sir, —It is with feelings of deep regret I have the honor to communicate to you the disastrous result of an attack made by the force under my command, on the emigrant farmers congregated at the Congella Cam at this place. In my, last dispatch, I detailed the various steps taken by the farmers to annoy the troops, and my determination to abstain, if possible, from hostilities, if it could be done without detriment to the honor of the service, in the vain hope of conciliating these misguided people, and smoothing the way to a quiet settlement of their long disturbed position as regards the Government of the Cape. But the receipt of an insolent letter, demanding that the force I commanded should instantly quit Natal, followed up by the removal by armed men of a quantity of cattle belonging to the troops, rendered it absolutely necessary that some steps should be taken in order to prevent a repetition of such outrages. I therefore determined, after mature consideration, to march a force, and attack their camp at the Congella, a place about three miles from our position, where they have been for some time collecting, and set apart the night of the 23d instant, to effect that object. As the road leading to the Congella, from the post the troops now occupy, lies for the most part through thick bush, I thought it best to cross the sands at low water, as by this means I could avoid annoyance from the farmers until within a short distance from their station. Fitting a howitzer, therefore, into a boat, under the superintendence of Lieutenant Wyatt, of the Royal Artillery, and leaving it under charge of a serjeant of the same corps, I gave hiin directions to drop down the channel to within 500 yards of Congella, and await the troops, in order that they miglit form under cover of its fire, aided by that of two six-pounders, which accompanied the force I took with me. This consisted of 1 subaltern and 17 privates, Royal Artillery; 1 subaltern, 1 serjeant, and 7 privates, Royal Sappers; 2 captains, 2 subalterns, 5 serjeants, and 100 rank and file, 27th regiment ; and 2 mounted orderlies of the Cape Rifles.

Having previously sent a piquet out to feel the skirts of the wood in front of our position, in order to prevent our movements being discovered ; I put the whole party in motion at 11 p.m, (it being a bright moonlight), and arrived without molestation within nearly 800 yards of the place I proposed to attack. To my great mortification I found that the boat had not dropped down the channel according to my instructions; but, as I considered it imprudent to await the chance of her arrival, I was forced to make the attack without the valuable assistance a discharge of shells and shot from the howitzer would have afforded me. Giving the order to advance, therefore, the troops had just moved to where the termination of a range of mangrove bush opened to a level space in front of the Congella, when a heavy and well-directed fire from the

bush was poured upon them ; upon which they immediately formed and commenced a fire in return, while the two six-pounders were loading. Unfortunately, one of the draught oxen being shot, caused some interruption ; but this being soon got over, a destructive fire from the guns silenced for awhile our opponents; but several more of the oxen becoming bounded, and escaping out of their trektouuis, rushed among the troops, upsetting the limbers, which Caused much delay in reloading, and some confusion in the ranks. This circumstance, added to the partial and at length total silence of the guns, being taken advantage of by the Boors, they again opened a heavy fire (their long pieces carrying much farther than an ordinary musket), a severe loss resulting to the troops in consequence. Finding, therefore, I was not likely to accomplish the purpose for which I had put the detachment in motion, and that the men were falling fast, I thought it expedient to retire ; effecting this object, after Some delay; the partial rising of the tide having rendered the road difficult. The troops, however, reached the camp about two o’clock in tolerable order, leaving behind them, I regret to say, the guns, which the death of the oxen rendered it impossible to remove.

Thinking it probable this partial success of the farmers might induce them to make an immediate attack on the camp, I made such preparations as I thought necessary, and found my suspicions realised shortly afterwards, a large body of them opening a heavy fire on three sides of it. This was met with a spirited resistance on our part, but they did riot finally retire until about an hour before day-break. Such, I regret to inform you, has been the result of this attack, and the consequent loss has been severe, the total in both skirmishes being as detailed in the return enclosed. Our great cause of failure I attribute to the mismanagement of the boat, in which I had placed the howitzer, with the shells of which I had hoped the farmers might have been thrown into confusion, but she dropped down to late to be of any use, and even then took up a position too distant for her fir.e to produce much effect. Among the matters connected with the subject of this report, and awakening the deepest regret, is the death of Lieutenant Wyatt, of the Royal Artillery, who, for the two previous days, had exerted himself much in making necessary arrangements. He was killed early in the action. Of the zealous services of Lonsdale and Lieutenant Tunnard, of the 27th regiment, I was also deprived, both of these officers being severely wounded. In fact, under the trying circumstances in which the detachment was placed, I have only to regret that, with such willingness to perform the duty assigned them, the result should have been so unfortunate.

The loss on the part of the Boors it is difficult to estimate, but I am told it is severe. The whole of this day they have made no movement, but I have to give them the credit of treating, such of the wounded as fell into their hands with great humanity. These, with the bodies of those who fell, they sent to the camp in the course of this afternoon, and to-morrow the sad duty of interring our departed comrades wilT take place.

What steps thefarmers may subsequently take, I cannot at this moment surmise with any degree of certainty; though I think it probable they will again demand that I should quit the territory they call their own within a specific time. I shall of course do what I can to maintain myself in my present position ; but, consi • dering the number of the disaffected, and the means they possess of molesting the troops, I beg to urge the necessity of a speedy reinforcement, as I scarcely consider the troops at present stationed here sufficient for the performance of the duty to which they have been assigned.

I have the honor to be, Sir, Your most obedient humble servant, (Signed) J. C. Smith, Captain 57th Regiment Commanding His Honor Colonel Hare, C.B. and K. H., Lieutenant-Govenor, &c. &c.

Port Natal, 25th May, 1842.

Return of killed, wounded and missing (men and horses) belonging to the detachment under command of Capt. J. C. Smith, 27th Regiment, on the night of the 23rd, and morning of the 24th May, 1842.

Royal Artillery. — Killed.— l subaltern, 3 rank and file. — Wounded. —2 rank and file. Royal Sappers & Miners.— Wounded. — 3 rank and file.

28th Regiment. — Killed.— ls rank and file; 1 bat. horse (Lieutenant Molesworth’s) — Wounded—l Captain, 1 subaltern, 2,serjeants, 23 rank and file ; 1 riding horse (Lieutenant Irwin’s)— Missing —1 rank and file. Cape Mounted Rifles. — Killed — l troop horse .-^-Wounded — 2 troop horses (employed as leader and driver to the guns.) — Missing — 2 rank and file.

Total. — Killed— 1 subaltern, 15 rank and file, 1 bat. and troop horse.— Wounded —1 Captain, 1 subaltern, 2 serjeants, 27 rank and file; 1 riding and 5 troop horses.— Missing —3 ran,k and file.

The Graham'* Town Journal communicates ■ the following letter received from a correspondent, at Port Natal : My last gave you an account of our affairs to the V7th (May), and little did I then think I should have had to inform you so soon of actual collision between the farmers and the troops —that is, between the latter and that portion of the farmers who are known to be men of desperate fortunes, and who arc capable of anything. They had assembled in a force of 300 men, and this, had Captain Smith not been bound down to sutler anything rather than proceed to extremities, he might easily have crushed in its rise or embryo form, for it was 15 days in collecting ; but being tied down bv his instructions, he was obliged to submit to observe an enemy raising a force before his eves, and encamping within shot of the eighteen pounders in his camp.

This forbearance was construed by the Boors into fear, and this idea, added to the evil influence of the Dutch captain, lleuys, brought matters to a most painful issue. On Monday, the 23rd, the first aggressive act was committed by the Boors. They commenced by seizing about sixty oxen, and then moved down upon the camp. On this Captain Smith opened a fire upon them with one eighteen pounder, which he had just mounted, and had not been on its carriage more than three hours. What the precise cfi'ect of this fire was I do not know, as the Boors kept under the shelter rf the hush, and never came out of it.

In. the evenirg, however, a party of them attacked a guard of thirty waggon drivers, who were out with their oxen; but these succeeded in repulsing them, and in driving the cattle safe to the camp.

About an hour the boors retired, and were heard of no more till about midnight; at which time Captain Smith had resolved to attempt to surprise their camp. Accordingly, a little before 12 o’clock at night, he moved off with 100 men, two six-pounders, and a howitzer, taking a route along the margin of the bay. The Boors, however, were apprised of this movement, and took prompt and—it seems by the issue—effectual measures to defeat it. The line of march was through a thicket of mangroves, jutting a considerable way into the bay ; and here the boors lay in ambush, and, on the approach of the troops, opened a destructive fire upon them. The troops armed as quick as possible, and fired with rapidity, but having to contend with sftch great disadvantages, they were thrown into a state of confusion ; and several of the oxen of the guns being shot, these were rendered quite useless in the position they were in. They were abandoned and were captured by the Boors, but which, for want of oxen, they were compelled to leave behind.

The loss or. the part of the English is 12 killed—viz., 1 officer of artillery, 8 soldiers, and 3 waggon drivers and leaders, and about 20 are wounded.

Flushed with this success, the Boors immediately attacked the British camp, and for two hours kept up a most dreadful fire of small arms, but from so great a distance that no harm was done, beyond tearing away the tents. The Boors lost some men, but how many I do not know. Four horses lay dead near the camp, and four others were picked up, as also a number of guns.

Thus the case stands on the 25th, and we know not how it will end.

Most of the English families here have sought shelter on hoard the Mazcppa and Pilot, now lying in the bay, as no house in the town is safe from the balls of the contending parties. It should be distinctly understood that the Boors who were friendly to the English interest have not engaged in the war. One, who remained in the rebels’ camp to endeavour to dissuade them from proceeding to extremities, has, I hear, been sent prisoner to Pietermauritzberg. The force of the Boors does not at present amount to more than about 280, or at most 300 men.

We insert the following letter respecting the Great Barrier Island, addressed by Captain Rough, harbour master of Auckland, to the editor of the Auckland Times,

“ Sir, —Having seen, in a paragraph of the last number of the Times, that some interest was excited as to the result of our expedition to the Great Barrier Island, and elsewhere, undertaken by direction of his Excellency the officer administering the Government; I hasten, with great pleasure, to give you a brief description of the places we visited, in the hope that any information regarding the vicinity of this settlement may prove interesting to your readers. “ About twenty miles to the northward of the Waitemata, is the spacious harbour of Mauharangi, accessible and safe for the largest vessels. The shores of the lower parts are bold, wooded, and picturesque, and where the creek becomes narrow at the upper part, there are fine slopes of rich land available for cultivation. From the entrance of Mauharangi to the river Muta Kena, about fifteen miles farther to the northward, several islands face the coast, leaving a deep and smooth water, passage betwixt them and the shore. The northernmost of these islands has a harbour at its western side, where vessels

may, find a good shelter in easterly gales. The river of Muta Kcna is narrow, but deep ; in it the brig Bee was moored close to the rocks, and underwent extensive repairs. At a small bay, near the river, we made diligent examination of the appearance of coal, to which our attention had been particularly directed; but in the opinion of the scientific gentlemen who accompanied me, it is not likely that much coal will be found in that neighbourhood. In the entrance of the channel between the large island; and the main, there is a dangerous rock, visible at halftide, bearing from Point Tukatu Whenoa, S. by W. IW. Leaving Muta Kena, we examined the flat rock, and searched diligently about Point; Rodney and the Little Barrier Island, but found no appearance of any wreck. In the deep bay between Point Rodney and Tukatu Whenoa, we ; found a fine river, accessible for small vessels, which does not appear on the charts. “ The Little Barrier Island is accessible at some points for boats, and fresh water may be obtained from a cascade at the north-western side, but there does not appear to be any anchorage or shelter farther than what is to be obtained from lying under lee of the high cliffs. “ The harbour at the western side of the Great Barrier Island is easily made, by bringing the north end of the Little Barrier to bear about W. by S.; in entering, a very high and remarkable conical cliff must be kept on the right hand. This harbour is very extensive, the most sheltered part appears to be Nagle’s Cove, the first on the left from the entrance, where her Majesty’s ship Tortoise is moored within pistol shot of the shore.

“The copper ore is found in a high cliff on the sea coast, about four miles to the northward of the harbour ; and on examining the other side of the cliff, we found it came quite through, and in considerable quantity. The neighbouring rocks appear to be composed of coarse granite and limestone; and lam inclined to think that much more of the ore may hereafter be found in parts of the island, from which it may be more conveniently removed.

“The commander of her Majesty’s shipTbnfi«se informed me of another fine harbour he had visited, more to the southward, called Port Hobson. The general appearance of the Barrier is hilly and rugged; there are forests of Kauri timber on the hills, and some vallies said to be available for cultivation. I am, Sir, “ Your obedient servant, “ DAVID ROUGH. “ Auckland, 27th Sept., 1842.”

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NZCPNA18421101.2.11

Bibliographic details

New Zealand Colonist and Port Nicholson Advertiser, Volume I, Issue 27, 1 November 1842, Page 3

Word Count
3,188

DISASTROUS INTELLIGENCE FROM PORT NATAL AND THE CAPE. New Zealand Colonist and Port Nicholson Advertiser, Volume I, Issue 27, 1 November 1842, Page 3

DISASTROUS INTELLIGENCE FROM PORT NATAL AND THE CAPE. New Zealand Colonist and Port Nicholson Advertiser, Volume I, Issue 27, 1 November 1842, Page 3

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