THE NAVAL FORCES OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

New Zealander, Volume XVIII, Issue 1720, 3 September 1862, Page 9

THE NAVAL FORCES OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

We extract the following comparative estimate of the naval forces of the two nations from a leading article of the London Evening Herald of the 10th June:— Well, then, have we or have we not at present srraaments more than adequate to the maintenance of a proper national policy ? and is it or is it not necessary that wo should continue a lavish expenditure for the sake of increasing our means of perfect defence, or, if the need be forced on us, of aggressive warfare—of such a war to avehge our insulted honour or invaded interests as Russia provoked in 1854, and as America seemed about to provoke last year? We know what our land forces are. We have securely garrisoned all our assailable possessions]; we have at home a reserve force of above two hundred thousand militia and volunteers, and a disposable force of one hundred thousand regulars. For an insular power these forces are surely ample. Our artillery is all but perfect—is probably the best in the world. But our great reliance is on our fleets. We trust never to be forced to fight on our own shores lor the safety of our homes and the honour of our country. We trust never to lose that command of the sea without which we must sink at once from our position of pride and prosperity, cease to be a great power, cease to be the first of commercial nations! How stand we in this all-iraportant respect ? The sufficiency of our naval armaments is entirely a question of comparison. We must be at sea far superior to any foreign power; we shall not, perh«ps,be too strong if we have three ships to two. The only power with which serious comparison is possible in France, She is not, we trust, our most probable enemy, but she is inoontestibly by far the most formidable of our possible enemies. To begin with, then, we know that we have as good an artillery as that of France j that we are superior in gunnery and seamanship; that we can now man our ships in case of need with equal rapidity, and that we have enlisted two seamen to her one. The Economist omits these elements from the comparison, and makes at the same time several curious errors of fact which are somewhat surprising. He adds bur iron-cased ships to our list of the line of battle, and the French to the list of frigates, thereby producing a completely false view of the case. The real comparison of the wooden steam navies of the two countries, “built and building,’’ gives the following results, taken from official tables, the French dated Ist Jan., the English 17th February, 1862 English. French. Line of battle (excluding block ships) 61 . , 37 Screw frigates 44 . . 29 Paddle frigates 9 . . 18 Screw corvettes and sloops • . 72 , . 7 Paddle corvettes and sloops . . S3 . . 9 In smaller vessels we maintain a similar superiority. Only in frigates, therefore, can any increase of our wooden steam navy, or of that part of our navy, however constructed, on which the defence of our fleets in distant waters must depend, be affirmed to be required by the preparations of France. We pass to the more important and somewhat less satisfactory subject of iron-clad vessels. Of these England has 4 built, 11 building. Total 15. France has 4 built. 12 building. Total 16. We do not pretend to consider this statement altogether such as should content us; but it obviously is very different from the extravagantly alarmist asser-i tions of Lord Palmerston, if we are to trust to the returns, we can only reconcile them with the numbers given by the Prime Minister by adding to the French list 21 “ floating batteries" unavailable for real naval warfare, and to our own four “mortar vessels" and seven “floating batteries;’’giving, not 15 to 16, but 26 to 37. In a comparison of naval force these should be left out of view ; and then the result of the comparison is, that, for the present, we are equal to France in iron-plated vessels (even if ours were not, as they are, of superior strength), and incomparably superior in the wooden ships, which, alter all, must bo as yet the chief reliance of either country everywhere except in the Channel. There is, therefore, no need for hurry, no need for alarm, and ample scope for retrenchment. We must, of course, largely increase our iron-plated nary; we may have to arm all our ships with iron ; but we may take time to do it leisurely, efficiently, and economically, without crowding into one or two years the work of leu, the expenditure of a generation, and blunders of a century. This is the conservative policy, as announced by the Conservative leaders, and we think that it effectually vindicates their claims to at least as much of statesman-like capacity as is possessed by their adversaries. And as for administrative ability, be it remembered that it is to Conservative Administrations that we owe the present most efficient condition of our defences. We have to thank Conservative statesmen for our militia, for the’ encouragement which gave the volunteers time to become too strong for Liberal scoffers, for our steam navy, for our iron-clad ships. The sole idea of their sucesssora seems to be to seek popularity by following in their footsteps; and it is well that those who led the way should observe and point out when it is time to pause.