OUR COLONIAL POLICY IN NORTH AMERICA.

New Zealander, Volume XVIII, Issue 1673, 30 April 1862, Page 6

OUR COLONIAL POLICY IN NORTH AMERICA.

(From the “Saturday Review." An armada of steam-transports is now bearing across the Atlantic eight or ten thousand Imperial troops, with proportionate cargoes ot military stores, for the reinforcement of the British garrisons in North America. Whether their valuable freights are to be locked up awhile in icedrifts on the St. Lawrence, or landed on firm ground at Halifax or St. John’s, depends on contingencies which defy even the calculations of our wisest meteorologists, and are evidently beyond the control of Her Majesty’s Government. But whether the winter passage of our brave soldiers across the ocean is to be ended by a few hours’ railway trip from their landing-place to Quebec, or by a five hundred miles’ march across the frozen morasses of New Brunswick, let us hope that, sooner or later, they may reach safely the heart of that territory which Mr. Seward recently proposed to annex to the Northern States of America.

It may be roughly estimated that eighteen or twenty thousand British troops of all arms, and at least five times that number of local militiamen and volunteers, will shortly be at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief of her Majesty’s forces in British North America. Munitions of war are passing rapidly along the internal lines of communication for the defence of our Canadian cities, which are already arming themselves against any possible aggression. Si pacem vetis, para bellum, is the motto which has apparently been adopted by both the Imperial and Colonial Governments at this eventful crisis ; and whatever may be the final issue of the communication now passing between the Cabinets of London and Washington, England has at all events afforded to the world one unmistakeablo proof of her desire for peace, in her vigorous and prompt preparations for the defence of her Transatlantic empire against the contingencies of war. And though these costly precautions may have been undertaken on the exclusive responsibility of the Executive Government, it may be safely asserted that, in thus reassuring the loyalty and confidence of our North American colonists, they have but anticipated the unanimous instincts of Earliaraent and of the country. The stoutest advocates for economy in our colonial administration, the most ardent admirers of that ancient policy which stimulated colonial self-reliance, will not dispute the responsibility of the parent State for the protection of our distant dependencies against perils directly arising from the results of Imperial policy. During the last session of Parliament, our colonial military expenditure was the subject of a specific investigation by a Committee of the House of Commons. When the reuort of that Committee was presented, five months ago, an invasion of Canada was among the remotest of the probable perils of our colonial empire. It is therefore not unworthy of remark, that while deprecating the unwise policy which has too often fostered and prolonged colonial wars, and affirming broadly the responsibility of all colonial communities for the maintenance of internal order within there respective boundaries, the Committee admit no less distinctly the claims of those communities on Imperial aid in there defence against all external perils occasioned by their dependence on a parent State, which may involve them in its own disputes with other nations of the world. To defend a transatlantic colonial frontier line of three thousand miles, the natural access to which is during half the year closed to our approaches, is doubtless a severe task to a nation which undertakes at the same time to garrison Hindostan with eighty thousand British soldiers, to protect its settlers in New Zealand and South Africa against chronic wars with native races, and to guard its commerce by maintaining naval and military posts in all quarters of the globe. And when it is borne in mind that to our North American colonists have been conceded the full privileges of self government, it may be doubted whether their relations with England, as regards the actual distribution of power, responsibility, and charge, have any parallel in the history of the world. The Imperial responsibility for their defence has nevertheless been undertaken, and cannot without dishonour be evaded. But though no Englishman can desire to escape the burdens which devolve on the citizens of an empire on which,the sun never sets, yet there are seasons—and the present is one of them—when the glaring inconsistencies of our past colonial administration are irresistibly forced on our notice by the pressure on our resources inevitably involved in the fulfilment of our admitted obligations. To ripen to the earliest possible maturity, social and political, the dependencies of our empire, to qualify them for present self-government and eventual independence, is now the universally recognised aim aud object of our colonial policy. If free institutions and Executive Councils responsible to and removable by provincial Legislatures, were all that went to constitute colonial prosperity, Great Britain has certainly done her duty to the full. But Imperial responsibilities of a far more costly and substantial nature are distinctly implied by the whole history of our military administration in North America.

By the maintenance of an average peace establishment of 5000 troops at Imperial cost, by an expenditure of at least two or three millions sterling on North American fortifications, by the gratuitous distribution of arms, accoutrements, aud ammunition for the equipment of provincial corps, we have, of late years, uniformly taught our colonists to rely for there defence on the parent State; and we cannot complain if they have been willing learners of a lesson so welcome, and willing recipients of a political position in which they could enjoy the privileges without bearing the usually correlative burdens of independent States. Yet, without complaining of this state of things as a grievance, we would nevertheless venture to remark that, if it is really worth our while to hold Canada against all comers, it must surely be worth our while to secure a ready access to that colony at all seasons of the year. At the present moment, Montreal, which is only within a few hours by railway from Portland, through the State of Maine, can be only reached from Halifax, by forced marches, in little less than a fortnight. The certain inconvenience and possible disaster likely to arise from this state of things have been admitted by every Colonial Secretary, for the last quarter of a century ; but political and financial obstacles have always impeded the completion of internal communications between the Canadian cities and our own Atlantic seaboard. A railway traversing five hundred miles of territory thinly peopled, and for the most part uncultivated, has not been deemed by capitalists a tempting enterprise for the investment of five millions sterling, even before the discouragements recently sustained by similar but more hopeful undertakings. Finance Ministers at home have not unnaturally hesitated to support, by an Imperial guarantee, a work as to the execution of which colonial opinion was divided. It has been hinted from time to time that a federal union of the North American Provinces might facilitate the accomplishment of these internal communications ; but the rivalries which impeded the selection of a Canadian capital were not very encouraging to any grand projects of colonial amalgamation. One-tenth of the public money which (as Lord Grey informed the Committee of last Session) has been “ absolutely wasted” on colonial fortifications, with which “ the wisest thing we could now do would be to blow them up again,” would have sufficed to complete, for all Imperial purposes, those internal communications of our North American colonies on which engineers have reported, statesmen corresponded, colonists memorialized, without the slightest result, for the last thirty years. And so it comes to pass that the facilities for the defence of a colony which we won by great efforts a centuiy ago, and have since held at vast sacrifice of blood and treasure, largely depend upon the mere chance whether a quarrel between England and her only possible enemy in that quarter of the world may arise in January or July. It has been said, and perhaps truly, that there are but two alternative principles of relationship between colonies and parent States—that of subserviency and dependence, or that of community and partnership. To elevate the former, wherever it exists, to the rank of the latter, is the obvious function of all Imperial Government. Our early North American colonies, before the declaration of Independence, paid the whole cost of their military defence out of their own taxes, and yet provided in addition for the whole expense of their civil government. During the Seven Years’ War they raised, clothed, and fed 25,000 men at the costs of several millions sterling ; and history records more . than one occasion ou which, as at LcwisburgU and j Cape Bretoil, they actually aided Great Britain in her j

colonial conflicts. The were, in fact, partners both in the burdens and the privileges of British citizenship. If the same relation does not subsist between England and her five North American provinces at the present day, it is not colonial loyalty but British policy which has been at fault. The chivalrous sympathy which our late war with Russia called forth in all those provinces, and their vigorous preparations for selfdefence at a time when Imperial interests demanded the temporary withdrawal of a large portion of onr troops, were only a fair sample of the spirit of mutual confidence and co-operation which, though now, perhaps, fitful and evanescent, might undoubtedly, under happier auspices, become the uniform characteristics of onr colonial relationship. If onr North American empire is really to be qualified for that self-defence which has been held to be a natural consequence of self-government, it must be by that consolidation of its powers and resources which may enable Canada and the Lower Provinces to hold their own among the nations of the world. This end can only be attained by an Imperial policy which, steadily aiming at colonial self-reliance, seconds all efforts in that direction by liberally aiding in the development of the resources of all our colonies. It is by fearlessly applying all the means within our power for qualifying oar colonies for eventual independence, that we may hope gradually to relieve the Imperial Treasury of the burden of their defence, and to reap, at no distant day, our own reward in the advancing greatness and prosperity of loyal subjects, converted through the natural process of political growth into the free and friendly allies of the British Empire.

Recruiting for the Federal Army.— The Moniteur de I' Armee is publishing a series of letters from M. Ferri Pisani, Prince Napoleon’s aide-de-camp, written during his visit to America. The following is well worth reading “We have at this moment at New York the extraordinary spectacle of recruiting in full operation. The great Barnum is the model and the master of all citizens who aspire to the honour of avenging the Federal flag under the title and with the pay of Captain, Colonol, or General. The brigade called the Excelsior, which is really a fine body, had its central recruiting office established in a fine house covered with placards and flags. An immense crowd of people was assembled before the extensive balcony, ornamented with warlike emblems, and in the midst of which was stationed a military band, which delighted the crowd with its bursts of harmony. At intervals, a patriotic speech was delivered, in order t« give the finishing touch to the excitement caused by the music and the sight of the trophies. At a given moment, the speaker gave a sign to the people, and a general rush was made into the office, and the recruiting lists were rapidly covered with signatures. In a general way each corps in course of formation at New York has a recruiting office in the Broadway, an immense street similar to the Boulevards at Paris, and there are, in addition, large tents erected in the public squares. These streets form a little camp through which circulates a curious and serious crowd, for at New York everything is done with gravity, as it is in Paris with mirth. 1 1 is certain that if such a camp were established on the place de la Bastille, it would give rise to much liveliness, and many jokes on the part of the workmen of the Faubourg. What is most amusing is the serious contrast between the gravity of the recruiter and of the recruits, and the style and form of the placards which are exposed by the one and read by the other. These placards, of gigantic size, represent for the most part a soldier of the Union extirminating his enemies, but with exaggerations of attitude, gesture, and expression which would make one think that Cham has been exercising his pencil on them. Underneath comes a patriotic appeal, skilfully mixed up with the particular claims which the commanding officer of the regiment has to public confidence. For instance, we read the following : “ Attention—Young men who are desirous of avenging the honour of their country ! Where will you find a finer regiment than the Lincoln Chasseurs, or the New York Zouaves, &c. All their officers are well versed in war, and the Colonel was a pupil at fhe Military School at West Point.” Very frequently the citizen who raises the regiment only takes the position of Lieutenant-Colonel, leaving that of Colonel vacan t, in order to attract the public by the hope of seeing it filled up by some one from West Point—that is to say, by an officer of the standing army, a pupil of that school. The effect of this on the masses prove that they are possessed of good sense and a certain degree of military instinct. Next comes a recapitulation of the advantages secured by the Republic to the recruits > —6O francs a-month pay ; provisions in abundance ; good uniforms, aod a grant of land at the expiration of the term of service. The principal parts of the placard are always pointed out to public attention by a hand with a finger extended just as we see on a finger-post at cross roads. The size of this indication varies according to the importance of the notice. It follows as a matter of course that the hand which is intended to direct the eye to the 6i> francs a month is a gigantic one. I have seen some half-starved Irishmen fascinated by some of those diabolical hands, at the end of which is seen the enumeration of the different articles of which the rations are composed—bread, wine, meat, vegetables, beer, &c. As may be supposed, there are some examples of unfair competition in those half commercial, half military operations, for after the announcement of the lucrative conditions of the contract we see a kind of nota bene, cautioning the people against other offices which offer advantages which are not sanctioned by Congress, and are, therefore, only visionary. For regiments which are already formed, but only want to complete their number, the placards always state that only a few are required, and we see the words—“ Lose no time, young men ; there are only twenty-five vacancies remaining to be filled up.” As in the sale by auction of clothes the paletot ottered is always the last on hand, but when that is sold many other last ones are discovered. Sometimes enlistments somewhat wholesale are asked for, and wo see a placard with this announcement—“ Wanted, a company of men of good character, commanded by a Captain well versed in the military art. Apply at a certain number in a certain street.” One morning Pat came late to his work, and bis master was scolding him for it. 4 Shure,’ says Pat, 4 1 can leave off sooner to-night to make it up.’ 4 Oh, but you ought to work later, Pat!’ 4 Be the law,’ says’ he, 4 it would niver do to be late twice in one day.’