NEW ZEALAND.

New Zealander, Volume XVII, Issue 1569, 1 May 1861, Page 5

NEW ZEALAND.

[From the “ Times’’ Feb. It.]

No news from New Zealand may be considered good news. So little cun be gained, and so much may be and has been lost, in this inglorious contest; the initiative has been so invariably taken by the natives, and the selection of the theatre of war seems to rest so entirely with them, that wo may well auger favourably from their inaction up to the early part of December, it would be a mistake, however, to regard the victory of Mahoctahi as the probable termination of hostilities. The native body in New Zealand is not highly organized enough to manifest a common vulnerability, and the defeat of the Waikatos, under the circumstances detailed in our last advices, is more likely to produce a new quarrel between themselves and Wirerau Kingi than a settlement of the land question or an abandonment of the King movement. These Maorics have a very cool and deliberate way of breaking the peace. Before Wirenm Tamihana and his adherents virtually repudiated the Queen’s supremacy, and thereby violated the treaty ot Waitanga by proclaiming a native King, they listened patiently enough to the remonstrances ol Bishop Hclwyn and other Europeans whom they trust ed. We now heurof a solemn palavar tobe held at Muungntoalari, which reminds us of tiie correspondence bl Messrs. O’Brien and Martin on the invasion of Ireland, The chief topic of discussion is to be whether it is better to concert a general rising all oyer the Northern Island

and to make a dash at Auckland, or to concentrate all the rebel forces on New Plymouth, attack all General Pratt’s positions simultaneously, and, we presume, tomahawk or drive into the sea all the British settlers in the Taranaki district. “ A night attack on the town is spoken of,” and, if this is considered improbable by those best acquainted with the habits of the natives, it is not because they would be deterred by any motives of fear or humanity, but because they ate still influenced by a superstition, not fully eradicated by the Missionaries, respecting a Maori devil, who makes his rounds at night, and might be displeased by such an enterprise. It is certainly to be lamented that, notwithstanding onr command of the sea, we should ho deprived of our advantage in numbers by the necessity oi keeping at Auckland troops that would enable us to make an overpowering demonstration of force at'l aranaki. ** e find that a transport ship had made a quick passage, and disembarked 500 officers and men of the 14th Regiment , and that the natives were “ considerably impressed” with the rapid arrival of these reinforcements. The English reader might anticipate that they were despatched to the scat of war, and turned to immediate account; that the General forthwith assumed the offensive, advanced by forced marches on the ivbel head-quarters, and cut short the war by a decisive coup de until. We can assure him that nothing of the kind took place. We talk of the “war’ and the “ enemy” in New Zealand as if any single belligerent right or rule of strategy could he safely applied to a scries of affrays resembling a mutiny on a grand scale, or a domestic riot, or the “ private wars” ol the Middle Ages, quite as much as they resemble the ruptures between Sovereign States known to international law. With whom arc we at “war,” and who is our “ enemy?” Is it the Waikatos, or the Taranaki tribes, or the Tauranga and Hauraki nations, who are now reported to be planning a march southward, or the whole body of natives in the Northern Island ? The same imliVidiials at different times, like the ancient German warriors, form part of a peaceful tribe or a warlike band, and chide in the one capacity the penalty for olfences committed in the other. How is it possible to exercise any of the rights of war while the enemy remains tints indefinite ? For instance if the Governor should organize a powerful expedition against the inhabitants of the Waikato valley, he would find whole families engaged in planting ‘potatoes and industrial occupations, and would not only run the risk of punishing the innocent with the guilty—for the Lower Waikatos, at all events, have not yet taken part against us—but would probably rouse to hostility other tribes hitherto friendly. Far worse, as well as far more inconsistent «ith Vlic professions with which we colonized New Zealand, would be the cflcct of recognizing the present conflict its one of race, and encouraging the colonists to defend their farms against the natives in their own way. Yet, if it bo not amenable to the laws of war, or to those rougher and more pitiless methods of dealing which have forced the Red Indians and Australian aborigines to “ recede” before civilization, still less can it he treated as a mere civil sedition, and left to the agency of a police force, or even of a posse comitalus. It is true that New Zealand has been partitioned into counties, hundreds, and parishes, that its .ecclesiastical establishment is overpoweringly strong, and that its moral and spiritual state has olten been favourably contrasted with that of Great Britain ; but, while those of the Connnandinenis which concern the peace of society are so flagrantly violated, there i* constant need not only of the secular arm but of martial law and military force. Here comes the difficulty, if it were justifihlc or possible to deal with every rebel Maori as a traitor or criminal, wc might by degrees intimidate them into submission. As it is, we arecompelled both injustice and policy to adopt the principles ot regular warfare, while our antagonists are a fluctuating' body of marauders, occupying all the strong places of the island, combining or separating and professing friendship or enmity as it may suit them best, and waging war cm the whole European population, wlti owe confine our reprisals to that part of the natives which is actually in arms. As if to increase the perplexities of the Colonial Government, the twofold nature of the casus belli not on 1 v confounds the still open land question with that of Her Majesty’s supremacy, but produce a very inconvenient conflict of authority. It appears that by a rule of the Colonial-office the General in command assumes the sole conduct of military affairs only in case of hosullties with a “ foreign enemy” and we presume that a general Maori insurrection in favour of a native King would fall within the spirit of tins rule. But for the present the Governor retains a paramount control over die forces, and may well he influenced by many other than military considerations in the distribution of them. It is probable that more than one of our disasters have been directly or indirectly due to this divided command. Where the enemy is indefinite, the casus belli indefinite, and the limits of the supreme authority indefinite, we cannot expect much vigour or unity of action. We do not presume to dogmatize on the second and most knotty of these complications, but we still believe, as we have before intimated, that if the agrarian and Imperial questions could be disengaged from each other —the former being reserved lor future peaceful adjudicaiiutt, and the latter isolated as the real issue at stake —a solution of some kind would be greatly facilitated. Had we shown more jealousy for the Queens sovereignty, and less haste in appropriating a desirable block of land, we might never have been placed in our present dilemma. England is too great to stickle fora plot of ground, if it cun be shown that vested interests were not sufficiently;respected in the purchase of it. But, at least, let us make choice between negotiation and serious warfare. A doubtful case may be a good reason for not going to war at all, hut it can be no reason for prosecuting a war languidly, and sacrificing in loss of capital and unproductive expenditure as much as would suffice to buy up all the rights of all the tribes in New Zealand.