PASSIVE DEFENCE AT SEA.

North Otago Times, Volume CVI, Issue 13975, 8 September 1917, Page 7

PASSIVE DEFENCE AT SEA.

ALLIES' NAVAL POLICY ■ RECORDED. v BY NOTABLE FRENCH CRITIC. , (From a Review Article by H. W, , ' :/Wilson iu the Daily Mail.)

•, "The! Germans give to- their' operations at sea a character of violent ag- . • gressiveness, while; the Allies content themselves with the employment of means which rather belong to the system of war called 'defensive.''' is the general judgtacnt/passcd on tho naval policy of the Allies by-a Ireiit-h officer of the greatest distinction, Admiral- Dcgouy, in his volume, "La Guerre Navale et 1 'Offensive." Admiral Dcgouy is an able and fair critic.. Though his book has been very harshly censored by the French authorities, so that it has many blank pages, it is nevertheless of extreme importance. In an introduction dealing with the submarine peril lie makC3 a new and valuable point.' He ,asks whclhei it is quite certain that the ships sun.c by the German i submarines are not thope the cargoes of which arc most jointly required by us.. He has f JMi\\ of gentle' sarcasm.for the "bey Wgnity, not to say the partial and acL cidental character," of the blockade < as .practised in the .past, and he urges the. necessity of enforcing a close and effective investment of Germany, cutting off all traffic along the Danish coast and closing all the routes frow. Scandinavia. One of the anti-sub-marine plans which lie discusses is that of a great barrage or mass of obstacles across tiic North Sen, composed, as lie suggests, ol 1 special mines and special nets.

"What is quite certain is that if this barrage proved' effective tlie .Germans mm Id try to destroy it., while the British would endeavour to repulse their attacks. There would lie engagements, first of light ships, then of more and more powerful 'ships, and at last perhaps an en gagoncut between the battleships on" either side." If such a barrage is constructed across the North Sea, lie says, the entrance to the Baltic must also be closed. Examining the Allied operations in detail, he finds at every turn signs of what lie tails "the Colliiigwood method," no', "the Nelson touch." It should be said for those who do not know naval history that Collingwood, though a very brave, noble and devoted oflicer wnn rose to the loftiest heights under Nelson's magnetic, influence, was yet when away from Nelson usually a mediocre and unenterprising commander. . The tirst example of this passivity he finds in the failure to use the Allied submarines' vigorously against the German Fleet on the outbreak of war, before the enemy had had time to take precautions. "Our French seamen, and, above , all, those who man our excellent;, . „ submarines in the Channel and 1 ■[. Straits' of Dover, were not respon Bible for the'decision not to- under-? take this operation, which at the ' outset would have been as fruitful as it would have been easy. The reasons for so surprising a forbearance are ■well known to the well informed. I refrain from stating them, despite the light which the discussion of them would throw on the question of , 'temperaments.' " The Allied Fleets were strong; they were manned by brave men. "What was wanting in this crisis'? "What was it that imposed on our fine squadrons this passive attitude which has been so much criticised that to-day one is weary of speaking of.it 1 ? The opportunities at the outlet were missed." This was because of the tendency of all administrations to become ab sorbed in the monotonous routine of petty tasks: "All clearly marked-out duties are performed (in such,administrations), but.the 'something more' which means nothing to stagnation, bul which is indispensable to progress, receives attention from very few. No initiative .is shown, because it may cause trouble; 110 ideas are to be found, least of all bold ideas; there is not imagination—for what woulo tliey do with it? Entire confidence is placed in 'safe people' who novel think of anything but also never cause any difficulty. There is no en thusiasm except among some few officers. : . . Higher up in the hierarchy people 'carry on.'- No preoccupations as to military policy, no speculations regarding war and it? nobler side, no reflections as to w'l ?. the enemy is likely to do against ut or what we can do against him."

Such is a living admiral's picture o the modern Admiralties outside Gei many, and, lie adds, tliey are dominate!' 1))' a "temperament essentially conservative, anxious for repose, with nothing in it of the offensive spirit.'' The The Allied navies can do everything, lie insists, but tliey must be told what they are wanted to do, or they must at least be asked to act. A second example of the defensive spirit ho iinds in the Allies' air policy 60 far as concerns the protection n* (lifir towns. " Ityis the defensive pur' Mini dimple, a local defensive," and lie -fmiflds us of Napoleon's maxim: "Hi who holds himself on the defensive runs risks without jnaki'ug his enemy tuh them. Only the offensive can give decisive results," Yet another example which he selects is the failure to deal with Zeebrugge. "That Uir bitse of Zeebrugge still exists is matter for astonishment," he, writes. A very important chapter wliich ha* been published in the United State: gives a criticism and analysis of the Battle of Jutland. Admiral Degouy lias the warmest praise for the conduct of Admiral 'Sir David Beatty, present Commandeiviu-Chief of the Grand Fleet: ' . "From the point of view of strategy, or of grand tactics, Ad miral Beatty's resolution to grappl'!. his enemy and unflinchingly maintain his grip, whatever it cost hiny , until the arrival of the main British

lighting forces—this resolution was ' iu pcifoct iioiifoniiity with. tho - principles l of war, and ought to .be praised without any reserve." A point .which fills him with surprise ■ is the inaction of the British sub.marines: "Jellieoe's fleet, it Bcems, did not include groups of submarines. Why / not/ I do not know. Perhaps in England they attribute to submarines too individual a role (i.e., they arc not sufficiently employed in combination with other arms such as battleships and aircraft). And he also asks, "What about aircraft?" though at the date of writing lie could not know, what line since been officially .stated, that the British-Navy possessed seaplanes capable of torpedoing a warship in May, 1916; indeed, had then possessed them for many months. When the British battleships arrived he notes the curious situation which followed: "This pitched battle—for at last the two fleets drew up against one another and deployed methodically in line one against the other—was not in the least like what abstract reasoners had expected. There was no decisive result, nt one another, they suffered more or less injury, they inflicted more or less damage, ami that was all. There was no really offensive stroke. Thefc* was no sensational manccuvre. . . . 'lt is,the fog that was to blame,' ( wc may be told. But the fog did not become thick till night, and nightfall does not come early on May 31 in high latitudes. The result was one unexpected by all the theorists. The less numerous of the two fleets was not only not wiped out but actually stood the shock perfectly. . . . Neither of the adversaries was able to make up his mind to .undertake an offensive after the battle in line, which would have proved beyond queslioii his superiority in moral force. The engagement of May !!1 did not definitely decide the predominance of the British Fleet." The derisive battle at sea, he holds, in fact, has yet to be fought. For on one point Admiral Dcgouv is tolerably certain—that the German Fleet will come out and give battle with all its i force and with new weapons.