CAVALRY IN THE WAR.

North Otago Times, 21 October 1905, Page 2 (Supplement)

CAVALRY IN THE WAR.

! If we turn to *'*! conflict now proacdinor in K.uicht, \ it is found that i ono rospof. it i "ters considerably rain other great irs, particularly hose which have been fought on level ;i'ound. Cavalry has l een conspicuous lot by its absence, hut by its uilor md astonishing incfFecti7eiiess. l'rom /iau-yang northwards both, armies havo lecnpied part of the level plain traversed 'iy the Liau river. The right uf the Russian army and tho. left of tho Japanese havo faced each other for nearly !2 mont'is, in country-ad flat as » billiard table and as suitable for cavalry evolutions as any of the low eouuuies in which the famous leaders of lust century made their reputations. Hero havo 'wen conditions ideal for tho employment of shock tactics; a veritable joustJig ({round where the vaunted Russian o.ivalry might have run a-tilt at the sword-worshipping Japanese. Yet' no single instance has been recorded o! combat between mounted men, and td tho best of my belief none has occurred. Is it, then, that those who advocate the substitution of mounted infantry, for cavalry are in the right; that the lancer, hussar, and dragoon of -pu> lurcsquo memory havo become obsolete in these days of the breoehloading riflo ? Almost it would seem so. But for two important considerations, Iho co-e for mounted infantry might ••'."ell ho deemed as proved. These coni'derations, however, aro of such a u.iture as to lead tho observer to directly opposite conclusions—to conclude 'dually that, cavalry pure and siinplo t» as useful to the army of to-day as it vas to the army of Napoleon's day; nid that it is totally erroneous to supjcse that mounted infantry can be an ■ ffieicnt substitute for cavalry. Hie cause of the ineffectiveness of Japanese cavalry is not far to seek. The men are the most intelligent of tho Japanese soldiers, and their many f«no patrol performances are ovidenoe of tho sound methods in which they have been trained. The weakness lies ill tho poor quality of the horses aud the fact that the Russian-cavalry outnumbers them by six to one. Marked inferiority of force, in all forms of nwiry, is a fatal disadvantage, and i| .'s for this reason that the Japneso have failed to slime in the role .which ex' perienco lias assigned to cavalry. Ilif Russian cavalry, on the other Hand, ij estimated to number 30,000 sabres, j forco of mounted men which, in tin circumstances, ought to have mack Ihi iivos of tho Japaneso commanders gi tho flank of the army a burden tc them, Instead of which, life in tht .rear of the Japaneso front has ton a ,sinecure, a positive dolce far nientft; undisturbed even by the distant flas'i of any of these sabres, Is this a proof that, if the sabres had been rifles, something could have teen accomplished? Very far from it. It is because the Russian cavalry, armed as it is with tho and—shade of Seyd-i litz!—bayonet, is trained to fight only on foot, thereby throwing away its most valuable weapon, mobility, that, it has proved no more effective' in tliq field than a flock of sheep. Tlut Ibe microscopic force of Japanese ■ava'ry has held tho Russian throughout the campaign, an exceedingly remarkable performance when it is remembered how indifferently tho Japanese f.ra Inounted, testifies clearly enough tint there must- bo something futile about the arming and training of tho Ikssians. So far as my information goes, the Russian cavalry west of Mukden never once took the offensive during the battle. Strapped up with rifle and bvonet. thoy are incapable of wielding tho sword; thoir lances, except in tho°caso, of a smalt proportion of the Cossacks, havo beon left in Russia. So it was useless to contemplate old-fashioned cavalry work. But the Japanese coinimmicationg wore an easy mark, a.id it s ono of tho most singular feires o! Russian tactics that they did not avail ihemselves of so glaring an opportunity. Even as mounted infantry they should Siave been able to destroy Nogi's comnuinications. Yet they never made 4 (ingle attempt at interference. Hie deduction; is obvious; cither training or arming must be at fault; When a mounted man dismounts iic sacrifices his mobility, to become a weak infantryman, The Russian cavalry had been trained to fight dismounted, and tho result is that the Russians havo divested themselves of the one arm which, many keen observers believe, might havo availed to turn tho tide in their favour. Tho battle of Mukden '.'.•as a great defeat, though not an overwhelming disaster. At one period tho fesult absolutely hung in the balance, and it is no wild statement to say that, if the Russian cavalry had been armed and trained in orthodox cavalry fashion, and handled in a manner consistent with cavalry tradition, Mukden would havo proved a drawn battle. It is my firm belief—a belief shared with -nuiy others more competent to judge— that, ■ if French, with 10,000 British cavalry, had been given a freo hand early in tho war on the Russian side, there would havo been no necessity for Kuropatkin to retire from his strong position at Liau-yang., And I have 110 lea hesitation in saying that, if the same able commander, with such a cavalry forco as I have mentioned, had been at tached to tho Japanese side at Liauyang or at Mukden, there would be no Russian army in Manchuria to-day. Bn passant it may bo remarked that, :r tho Japanese cavalry had been caplble of pursuit at Mukdon, it would iavo proved a terrible thorn in the already bleeding Russian side, As it was, lie Japaneso were outnumbered, and lonco completely ineffective. The Japanese, inhabiting a hilly county practically dovoid of wide plains, md having comparatively littlo use and '•mall liking for horses, havo restricted ;ho j cavalry arm in their military jrSanisation to tho smallest possible dinensions. Tho war has brought homo !o them tho value of cavalry, and ono >f the very first reforms in *.beir army vill bo the augmentation of the mounted branch of this end, and tor tho rehorsing of their artillery, they liavo recently imported a largo nu:nber dP Australian horses, ready, upon acclimatisation, to bo incorporated in the army now in the field, should the war continuo, Tho Japaneso are an eminently practical people, From tlw weakness in their own cavalry, and from tho consciousness that properlv'landled Russian cavalry could havo hiyed havoc with their dispositions in L-tion and in inaction, thoy have learnt io cavalry lesson, mid they mean td roht by it. It is impossible to obseive ■vents in tlio war, and to dismiss the mestion with Japanese officers and oifi;?i;s of many foreign armies, without oeing forced to the conclusion that tho Japanese are sound in their interpretation of the cavalry lesson—that- genuine •avalry, and plenty of it, is essential t'J in army.—"Times" correspondent.