Our Divided Home Front

Northland Age, Volume IX, Issue 68, 4 June 1940, Page 1

Our Divided Home Front

EDITORIAL POINT OF VIEW

A T the opening of Parliament, Mr. Adam Hamilton, speaking as leader of His Majesty’s Opposition, said: “Anything we can do to bring about a united and determined people will be done. We will continue to work with one objective—New Zealand’s maximum effort to help the Mother Country in its hour of need.” And in our hour of need as well, for our defence front is now in France. ivlr. Hamilton voiced then the wish of all but a tiny fraction of our folk. We are now “a united and determined people,” willing 1 if well led to make a maximum effort as our clear duty. But Mr. Hamilton spoke as if it was

War Cabinet of five members whose sole duty was to prosecute war measures with all their might, theoretically the best plan. In that Cabinet the Opposition could and no doubt would claim no more than two members. Say these members were Mr. Coates and Mr. Hamilton—though, curiously enough, the Leader of the Opposition has never been mentioned for inclusion by Cabinet-makers of his own Party. Suppose again that this Cabinet, faced with the difficult problem of financing the war, were to adopt the advice of the Auckland Farmers’ Union Conference, that war expenditure should be met not only by taxation and borrowing the savings of the people, but also and chiefly “by the Reserve Bank being directed to place such sums as are required to the credit of the Government account, and that such sums shall not bear interest nor be repayable.” Supposing —though it is a good deal to suppose —that Mr. Nash took that view, and was suppoi'ted by his present two ministerial colleagues—then the two Opposition members would have to consent or incur the risk and odium of smashing up the Cabinet, which must speak and act as a unit. Mr. Coates might, probably would, protest and agree, since he would be more intent on getting on with the job than in protecting “sound finance,” but Mr. Hamilton, who has all the virtues and all the faults of Mr. Chamberlain, a man of unbending integrity who would rather see the heavens fall than sacrifice principles to expediency, would certainly resist with all his might, since he would regard such a step as leading straight to the financial bottomless pit. Unity is the First Essential That is an extreme example of what is almost certain to take place in a

something yet to be brought about. “All that we can do to bring about.” The people are one in spirit and aim, the politicians unfortunately are not. Unless they soon set about uniting “to work for one objective,” to cease squabbling for power and prestige, to put patriotism—the patriotism that looks only to the country’s grave peril and seeks only to work for it with all our powers and all our possessions—they will bring on themselves the curse of Meroz, who came not to the help of the Lord against the mighty in the day of peril. Loud protestations are not enough; good intentions are not enough—half the mischief in the world is done with the best possible intentions —what the country looks for is self-sacrificing effort in whatever capacity a man can serve best. The Government, following as we usually do, the lead of the Motherland, is securing powers to govern despotically by Order-in-Council instead of Parliament. These powers are neither so drastic nor so farreaching as the British regulations provide, but they may require persons to place themselves, their services and their property at the disposal of the State if the Government deems it necessary for the defence of New Zealand, the maintenance of public order, the efficient prosecution of the war, or for the maintenance of supplies necessary to the life of the community. This may, and probably will, mean the conscription of all the man power and all the resources of the Dominion in whatever way the wisdom of our rulers sees fit. Yet no sensible man denies that in the present emergency it is necessary to give our rulers—whoever they are or whoever they may be in future—these extreme powers and risk the danger of their being misused or abused. Mr. Hamilton approves of the larger powers given, to the British Government as “very essential to get unity and willing submission. But such powers depended on the united will and willing' submission of the people and without that the maximum effort is impossible.” Which is obviously true, and there is little question now and here of the “united will and willing submission of the people”—lf they can trust their leaders to show them the example of “united will and willing submission.” “But,” says Mr. Hamilton, “here we are asked to give them to a Party Cabinet. That is disturbing. Such powers are better taken by the representatives of a united people. The Opposition has no other intention than to help in the war effort.” A United War Cabinet Obviously Mr. Hamilton is pointing out the correct course for the country to follow—if we could be sure of getting a united, whole-hearted and single-minded War Cabinet. But can we? It is a deplorable fact that in spite of protestations—without doubt sincerely meant—from both Parties in the House, there is grave reason to doubt it. In Britain—where the people as a whole are not politically minded, who take their politics not too seriously as a more or less necessary nuisance, but who are quick to respond to statesmanlike leading in times like the present—party feeling can be sunk quickly and completely. Now there “None is for a Party but all are for the State.” We cannot say the same here. Party politics mean much more to us; enter so much more deeply into our industrial and social life, that it is correspondingly more difficult to rise above them, even in an emergency like the present. And unfortunately these differences which are often not so much differences of opinion as differences of principles, firmly and honestly held on both sides—are bound to cause disunity in a composite War Cabinet unless one side is willing to give way to the other. Suppose that we, following again British example, were to constitute a

Coalition Cabinet, unless both Parties are willing to forget what both look upon as fundamental principles for the duration of the war. Are they willing and are their Party supporters willing to let them ? Mr. Hamilton put the price of his support of the present Prime Minister a certain unspecified number of Cabinet seats; he rejects the Government’s proposal for a War Council on which the Opposition would be in a minority. No one who knows Mr. Hamilton would doubt for a moment that patriotism—a disinterested wish to serve the country in office to the utmost of the powers of the leaders of his party—rather than personal ambition dictates his action. (Unfortunately we- cannot say that with the same certainty of some of his colleagues.) Mr. Hamilton has his faults like the rest of humanity, but self-seeking has never been one of them.

Supposing again that the Government, supported by its large majority in Parliament, decided to carry on, as every other Dominion is doing, on its own, what will the Opposition do then ? Will they choke down their sense of injustice, loyally support whatever measures, however much they disapprove of them, that the Government, placed in power by a majority of the people, decide on as necessary ? Unity is essential, says Mr. Hamilton, and so say all of us. One side or the other must give way. The Government, placed in power by the people, have the democratic right to the last word, however unwise it may be of them to exercise it. If the Cabinet holds to its present intention of carrying on as it is it will

be incurring a grave responsibility. But if it does, then what the country will insist on the Opposition having, in deed as well as in word, what Mr. Hamilton says they have, “No other intention than to • help in the war effort.” This does not necessarily exclude helpful criticism, for which the Government—any Government—is all the better for, but it does exclude factious opposition, however well meaning. That, to put it bluntly, will be playing Hitler’s game.