SELF-RELIANCE A NECESSITY.

Nelson Examiner and New Zealand Chronicle, Volume XXVIII, Issue 38, 12 May 1869, Page 7

SELF-RELIAN CE A NECESSITY.

[From the Nelson Examiner, May I.] Since the very commencement of the war now raging on the East and "West Coasts of the North Island, an influential party in the colony have clamoured unceasingly for an appeal to the British Government to aid us with troops to put down the rebellion. Prom the manner they have spoken, they would have us believe that it was only to ask and to have. The intelligence received by the last mail shows the utter fallacy of this belief. The Government of Great Britain has made up its mind that, come what may, British, troops shall never again be sent to New Zealand to aid the colonists in a war against the natives. The colony has accepted the responsibility of self-government, and conjoined with this must be the responsibility of maintaining peace within its territory. Whether or not these terms are hard under the peculiar circumstances in which the colony stands— the war being in fact a legacy arising out of dealings of the Imperial Government with the Maoris— it is useless now to inquire. It is well, however, when we are disposed to call upon Jupiter instead of putting our own shoulders to the wheels, lo be told that we have ourselves alone to depend upou. Jupiter will not come to our assistance. Now we are assured of this fact, it will be worse than idle to trust longer to a reed. If we are to be saved we must strike fearlessly, and resolute action backed by the support of a united colony will alone see us through our 'troubles. As we never believed in the efficacy of British troops in the warfare we are engaged in, we cannot regret the decision come to by the Home Government. "We have seen the experiment tried, and are suffering now from the consequences of the failure. But we are glad the colony has been saved the humiliation of asking for help and being refused, accompanied as the refusal would probably have been by admonitions which could not but have been irritating. We wish to see no needless ill feeling created towards the British Government, which might rankle and hereafter bring forth seeds of bitterness. If in future the policy of England ia simply to put money in its purse — if mammon worship is to take the place of that chivalrous feeling which so often has caused her to sustain the right and help the oppressed and made her the great nation, she is, though we may lament the change and fear the consequences, we desire to think kindly of her, and that our reverence for the past may in no way be weakened by her present or future action towards ourselves. Now that the last hope is removed of getting British troops to fight our battles with the Maoris, those who have advocated our calling upon England for help will have to re-consider their policy. Two parties, acting upon totally different principles, had joined in this cry. Those who supported it in the North Island were strongly influenced by the recollection of Commissariat expenditure, and the circulation of money which the presence of a regiment of troops created. Ia the South Island, there was a sort of vague expectation that 3,000 or 4,000 British troops would put an end to the war, and save the colony from all further expense concerning it. 'The North Island men must now see the hopelessness of getting another General with a small army sent to New Zealand, and will perhaps recognize the necessity of pursuing the course followed during the last few months in attempting to put down the rebellion. But the efforts of the Government would be more successful if supported by a strong and united public opinion, instead of being railed at incessantly by those who should know better, and who take every opportunity to weaken their hands and destroy confidence in their proceedings. That mistakes may have been committed by the Government no one will question, and Ministers would have been more than human had it been otherwise. They have had a task of the greatest difficulty set them, and no living man placed in their position could have satisfied the opposition arrayed against them — partly by a bitter political antagonism, and partly by a combination of ignorance and prejudice. Called upon suddenly to meet a rising of bloodthirsty savages in two separate districts, the Government found itself without a force fit to encounter the enemy. Men had to be enlisted, to be instructed in the very rudiments of the profession of arms, and, what was far more difficult, to be taught the art of bush-fighting, so that they might cope successfully with the Maoris on their own fighting ground. This, in which Colonel Gould, General Pratt, and General Cameron failed, with unlimited resources to render British soldiers in five years, Colonel Whitmore was expected to make of raw recruits in a less number of months. No allowance is made for the crippled resources of the Colonial Government as compared with those days when two millions sterling were spent by the Eox-Whittaker Ministry, and when the British Treasury honoured the drafts of Commissariat officers without restricting the amounts. With ten thousand soldiers, five thousand Militia and Volunteers, and the crews of four or five ships of war, General Cameron could not subdue the Maoris in

two or three years, yet Ministers are blamed tbat Colonel Whitmore, with a partially trained and inadequate force, has not succeeded in exterminating the cannibal bands on the West and East Coasts in six months. A more unjust and shameless cry never was raised, and coming from those who "would have gone again to England for men to put an end to the savage warfare that has raged in the colony during the last eight months, aud who are acquainted with all our past circumstances, it is disgraceful. But there are politicians in the South Island who appear to think the war is regarded by Ministers as a kind of sport, which they carry on for their amusement. They say, in eft'ect, if tho Government would only abandon the confiscated land and disband its forces the war would at once cease. Those who advocate this course may have a purpose to serve in doing so, but no one who really understands the Maori temper, and who was responsible for his actions, would recommend such a course. I 3 it not akin to dishonesty to advocate proceedings when no responsibility attaches to it, which those who affect to favour them would shrink from putting into force if entrusted with the power ?