THE NELSON EXAMINER. Wednesday, May 20, 1857.

Nelson Examiner and New Zealand Chronicle, Volume XVI, Issue 15, 20 May 1857, Page 2

THE NELSON EXAMINER. Wednesday, May 20, 1857.

Journals become more necessary a» men become more equa and individualism more to be feared. It would be to underrate their importance to suppose that they serve only to secure liberty: tbey maintain civilization. Dc TocaocviLLt, Of Democracy in America, vol. T.,p,230.

Our Provincial Council has given the first stab to our Democratic Constitution. The suicidal dagger has been driven through the skin and muscles, in the direction of the heart. If the act be completed, or a few more similar thrusts made, the vitals will be pierced — the victim mortally wounded. Luckily, there is yet time — and we trust the hands will not be wanting "to pluck the accursed steel away" before further mischief be done. They have made one of their body an administrator of the Waste Lands. That is, the Legislature has commenced to take upon itself the functions and powers of the Executive. Let them proceed in this direction — continue this assumption, and the system of local self-government, to the extent to which oar present Provincial Constitutions carry it, will in Nelson at all events speedily come to an end. Now, no principle in Constitutions after the British model is more firmly established and less disputed than that the Executive — the governing body — should be responsible to the Legislative body, as the representatives of the whole people. That this check upon those who administer public affairs is useful and wise is universally admitted at present. The object of those who go furthest in their notions of reform, even of the British Constitution, is to increase this check and make it more effectual rather than to diminish or weaken it. And even what is called the Responsible System, par excellence — in which the Executive is required always to maintain a majority of its supporters in the Legislature — that is, in which the Executive is required to represent the Legislative — has been chiefly objected to because th 2 check upon the Executive is still i.iefficient, and often, from the difficulty of finding new meu to supply the places of the Executive turned out, and from other circumstances, becomes practical'y inoperative. So the direct temptation under this system to the governing party to use undue influences to fill the Legislature with creatures of their own, that is, to get rid of the check and restraint of the Legislature upon it, is of course its greatest evil. But why is the Legislative body chosen to be the check upon the governing or Executive body ? Why dc we look to the r len composing the Provincial Council, for instance, to watch over and keep straight in the course of duty the men composing the Government — that is, the

Superintendent, Executive Council, and other officers ? Do we for one moment suppose that the men of the Provincial Council, or of the Legislature in any country, are more virtuous and upright, less liable by nature and disposition to temptation, less open to the influence of selfish or sinister motives, than the men of the Executive Council, or the governing men of that country ? Do we imagine for a moment that Richard Roe, called member for West or East Waimea, is more virtuous and generous and public-spirited than John Doe, called Provincial Secretary or Superintendent or Commissioner of Crown Lands ? If John Doe were to become the member and Richard Roe the Secretary, should we imagine their natures would be changed thereby ? Are the men in the Legislative body always the good and incorruptible men — the men in the Executive body always the wicked, corrupt, and self-seeking? Does our constitutional bolter always and necessarily sift the meal and fine flour into the Legislative sack, the bran and husks into the Executive ? Nobody dreams or pretends this for a moment. Nobody thinks or dreams that the one set of men, as men, are a bit better or worse than the other set. We are not speaking of particular individuals of course. There may frequently be a man or several men in the Legislature, superior to a man or several men in the Executive ; and so there may frequently be a man or several men in the Executive superior to a man or several men in the Legislature. But speaking of the two as bodies of men, does anyone pretend that one is naturally one whit better or worse than the other ? Then why do we take one of these two sets of men, and place it in a position of superiority to the other, making that other responsible to it ; bringing that other before it as before a judicial tribunal to condemn or approve of all the other's proceedings ? Simply and solely, as all our readers of course know, because the j Legislative body, to whom the other is held to be responsible, is not put in a position to be tempted to the errors or misdeeds which the ! position of the other body renders it liable to : because Richard Roe, not being one of the governing body, not. clewing with the public moneys or the public lands, is supposed to be free and uninfluenced by the temptations and motives which might operate upon John Doe, who is one of the governing body, and does deal with the public moneys or public lands. The whole Legislature, like the one legislator, Richard Roe, is supposed to be equally free and uninfluenced and out of the way of temptation to corruption or wrong, and being so, can be set up as a check upon, a guardian over, a tribunal to judge and pronounce upon, the doings of all the John Does of the governing body. But now what strange forgetfulness of all the first principles of constitutional government, is it to put the legislator, the judge, in the same position as the administrator, who has virtually to be tried by him. What a mistake, to subject the judicial body to the same influences and temptations as the persons they sit in judgment upon ; while at the same time you only choose the first for the judicial body simply because they are supposed to be free from those temptations and influences! What an absurd inconsistency ! And yet this is precisely what you do when you make your Legislative councillors Executive officers ; this is precisely the suicidal result towards which you take the first step when you make the Speaker of your Legislature an administrator of your Waste Lands. You are taking away from your tribunal, from the body which sits in judgment upon the administrators of public affairs, the sole, the single quality, upon the presumed possession of which their right to be such a tribunal at all must be grounded. Therefore you are striking at the very roots — you are planting a dagger at the very heart of your Constitution. To have a Legislative body (the tribunal) too much under the influence of the Executive is bad enough ; but to make the Legislative the Executive, is infinitely worse. It is not only weakening, but destroying the tribunal ; it is not only diminishing the responsibility of the Executive, but taking away everything for it to be responsible to. If you take your coachman and harness him along with the horses, who is to check the horses ? Do you think they will not soon be over the precipice all together ? In some countries there are inspectors of fish-markets, to prevent the sale of stale fish. But if they were to allow the inspectors to be dealers in fish, who is to inspect the inspector's fish-baskets ? What becomes of your security for buying nothing but sound soles and mackarel ? If you were to make one of your merchants a Judge of your Supreme Court, himself mixed up with hundreds of the transactions which might have to come before him to be adjudicated upon, would not your chances of impartiality in the administration of justice be [ infinitely lessened ? Were the merchant known to be the highest-minded and most honourable, would you think it a wise proceeding nevertheless ? And yet this is the system our Provincial Council has taken the first great step in introducing. Nor need you think they will stop there. This allowed, they will aim at further

usurpations of Executive power. Is it not already whispered, that they contemplate creating arbitrators, one or more out of their own body, to assess all lands to be bought by the runholders ? They will harness, not only their coachman, among their horses, but their guard and passengers too — and all drive headlong without check to the no, to perfectly unrestrained dealings with the public lands, the public offices, and the public moneys. The Legislature acting as the Executive, is literally and thoroughly an irresponsible Executive. Every step towards making the Legislature the Executive, is a step towards utterly irresponsible Government. For it is idle to talk of the responsibility of the members to their constituents. Only at the end of four years need they encounter their constituents, and the latter are too remote from the administration of affairs — have too little opportunity of knowing what is going on, in the ordinary daily business of government, to be any check upon its administrators. Take a member of Council, suppose him desirous of obtaining a certain block of land at a cheap rate — or of enabling a friend to get such a block. He assesses the land — puts a price upon it such as he thinks convenient — buys the land. When the transaction is finished, and the land legally obtained — for it would be legal, the assessors being the legislators, would of course take care to make suitable laws — what is the responsibility to his constituents ? He may resign long before they could even hear of the transaction, if they would ever be likely to hear of it at all. Again — unpaid officials are always irresponsible, more or less. The hold you have upon paid officials is the power you have of taking away their offices and salaries. That alone is an immense check upon them. It is not likely any temptations'would be thrown in their way, any advantages corruptly offered them, which would compensate them for the loss of their annual incomes. But if your legislators administer your affairs, this check is entirely wanting. If you make your Legislature your Executive, we repeat you destroy the very possibility of responsibility. The Legislature is the only established, sound tribunal to which the Executive is to be responsible. Then the whole principle of the relation to be secured between them is clear. Do every thing, adopt every means possible or conceivable, to make your Government responsible to your Legislature ; give your Legislature every conceivable power and influence over the Executive short of becoming the Executive themselves. That is the true limit of the principle. You must keep the two distinct and separate — or the principle is lost. There is no body to make your Government responsible to. We are surprised that our Councillors should have allowed themselves to have been led into such a mistake by any plausibility of argument. We believe that the principle trenched upon is so vital and fundamental, that the General Government (whose opinions however on this subject we know nothing whatever about — never to our knowledge having heard any expression of them on any occasion) will never allow any measure to become law which violates that principle, and introduces an opposite principle into the working of the Constitution, which must, if pursued lead, to its ruin. The Council has already harnessed the coachman to the carriage among the horses. Will the General Government allow him to pull there ? Will they allow the dagger which already has pierced the skin of our Constitution, to remain there ready to be pressed on into its heart ?