THE WAR.

Nelson Examiner and New Zealand Chronicle, Volume XIV, Issue 50, 19 September 1855, Page 2

THE WAR.

[From the Argut."] In a late article on the war, we pointed out that, in connection with their operations at Sebastopol, the Allies, now that they had received such large reinforcements, would probably endeavour to intercept the communications of the enemy. And we indicated Kertsch and Kaffa as the probable direction of the new operations, because by acting in that direction they would not only intercept the supplies received by way of the Sea of Azov, but might prevent the egress from the country of the Russian armies; in which case, the latter, being deprived of provisions, would be forced to fight or to surrender. Every step taken in the war gives an illustration of the extent of the Russian preparations for the contest, and of their complete success in concealing; those preparations from the rest of the world. It was not known that there were any granaries or extensive supplies of provisions on the borders of the Sea of Azov. In fact, no one out of Russia appears to have been in any degree acquainted with that sea. It was generally supposed that the chief supplies for the Crimea were sent from Odessa, by way of Perekop, or by small craft hugging the coast. We remember reading a very able article in the Quarterly Review, evidently by Sir Archibald Alison, wherein the Allies were held up to scorn for not destroying Odessa, in which, the writer alleged, were stored the I whole provisions for the Crimean armies. It now appears that but a small part of the supplies for the Crimea could nave come from Odessa, and that, on the contrary, they were all conveyed from the interior of Russia by the river Don, landed and stored in various towns on the Sea of Azov, and conveyed thence, as occasion required, to Simpheropol and Sebastopol. In fact, the land journey from Odessa is so tedious, the roads so bad, and the sea line so closely watched, that it was impossible to convey sufficient supplies from that city. It is stated that for the four or five armies now in the Crimea, that country cannot furnish supplies sufficient for one. The Allies are provided by sea, but the Russians are wholly dependent on supplies by land, and those supplies were almost entirely received by way of the Sea of Azov. Now let us enumerate what the Allies have done. At Kertsch, in the strait leading from the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov, 160,000 sacks of oats, 360,000 sacks of corn, and 100,000 sacks of flour were destroyed by the Russians on the approach of the Allies. The town of Arabat, at the southern point of the tongue of that name, which forms the eastern boundary of the Putrid Sea, and Berdiansk, on the northern coast of the Sea of Azov, were taken, and their fortifications and magazines were destroyed. The Sea of Azov is very shallow, but it was found that twentyfour vessels of the allied force could navigate every part of it, and the flotilla was found to be sufficient to clear that sea of the enemy's ships of war. The whole (except one small steamer), and upwards of 200 merchantmen, were either destroyed by the Russians or were taken ~by the Allies, and upwards of 100 guna were captured.

In addition to this, it is stated that 6,000,000 rations of corn, destined for Sebastopol, were destroyed by the Russians. But this is not all. On looking at the map it will be seen that the tongue of Arabat, east of the Putrid Sea, does not quite touch the shore of the Russian mainland. At that point is a strait communicating between the Putrid Sea and the Sea of Azov. There the Russians had constructed a bridge and fortifications, and, in the neighbourhood is the town of Genitchi, an important depot. Admiral Lyons landed at this town, destroyed the depots of provisions and vessels laden with corn and supplies, demolished the fortifications, and seized upon the straits. There is no doubt that he would also establish a blockade at Taganrog, and-the mouth of the Don, and thus every avenue of access to the Crimea would be shut up, except by way of Perekop. Of course

the next operation would be to close up that neck of land, and then the Russians in the Crimea would, in effect, be prisoners of war. The Times, in commenting on the capture of Genitchi, says —

The bloodless victory at Genitchi has inflicted a more serious blow upon the enemy than the hardfought and dearly-won fields of Alma and Inkermann. We shall soon have invested the Crimea, and when the supplies are cut off, the greater the force of the enemy may be in that country the less able will they be to maintain it there. Our squadron in the Sea of Azov is performing the work of an army. It has not only outflanked the Russians, but cut off their principal base of operations. There is no other spot in Europe which presents such strategetical advantages to the operations of military power, supporting an invasion with a powerful fleet.

While these operations were going on in the northern and eastern coasts of the Crimea, the Allies were equally active in other parts. They appeared to consider that the shutting up of the communication via Perekop was even more important than the siege operations; and of the 200,000 actively engaged at Sebastopol, they had determined to employ 1 30,000 men in an attack upon "the Russians in the field. On the 24th May a French corps d'armSe of 30,000 men had crossed the Tchernaya, and entrenched themselves round the village of Tchergoum. This was a preliminary to a more decisive movement. In the Liverpool Courier of 6th June an extract from a Paris letter is given, which states as follows —

There is no doubt that an army of operation has been organized for some most important expedition, to consist of 60,000 French, 25,000 Turks, under Omar Pasha, a part of the English army, and the whole, of the Sardinian contingent. Almost all the Frenoh cavalry will be attached to this force.

This indicates a force of at least 130,000 men, and it is quite clear its destination was Simpheropol. In conjunction with this plan, Omar Pasha, wbo had received large reinforcements, would advance from Eupatoria. At the same time the Allies would leave 60,000 men at Sebastopol, who were quite able to carry on the operations of the siege. On the other hand it is stated that the Russians expected an immediate reinforcement to the amount of 18,000 men; but if it is true that their total force previously in the Crimea was not more than 140,000, it is quite clear, especially after the loss of the Sea of Azov, and of their communications by the tongue of Arrabat, that they were utterly unable to cope with the Allies. In other directions the prospects of the Russians were not less gloomy. It is evident that their plans had been very seriously frustrated by the insurrection in the Ukraine. That insurrection, indeed, will, in all probability, prove to have been the turning-point of the war, for it prevented them sending sufficient reinforcements to the Crimea, to the Caucasus, and to Georgia. In the latter countries Schamyl and the Turks were acquiring an ascendancy. The Russian forces were rapidly decreasing. They were throwing up entrenchments to defend their position in Georgia — a sure sign of weakness; and as Williams Pasha, an able English general, was at the head of the Turkish army, it is probable that some decisive operations would there be undertaken.

After the destruction of the Russian flotilla, and of their merchantmen on the Sea of Azov, a few vessels of war would be quite sufficient to prevent any operations of the enemy ; and it was considered probable by the Russians themselves that the next enterprise of the allied fleets would be against Odessa, and other ports westward of the Crimea, which it is generally considered ought to have been destroyed at an earlier period, as they formed great and important magazines, and served as bases for the Russian armies. By the latest accounts it would seem highly probable that they would not be much longer spared. Not less important were the impending events in the Baltic. In combination with the fleet, it appears that a French army of 80,000 men was about to proceed through the north of Germany. This proves that the Baltic fleet, the most powerful that ever, put to sea, is to be something more than a mere demonstration, and we may expect ere long to hear of operations in that quarter of a magnitude and of a character perhaps unparalleled in the history of war. It will be observed that all the events detailed in this article occur in the interval preceding the date of the astounding intelligence from the Cape of the fall of the outworks of Sebastopol : and if we add that as a climax to the news of which a summary is now given, we may well consider that the Allied Powers have already attained an immense ascendancy in the contest, and that, should it be continued on the same scale and with equal success, the Allies will, in all probability, be able, even in the present campaign, to humble the pride of our gigantic opponent, and to dictate to him an honourable peace.