MISSION TO INDIA

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 77, 29 April 1942, Page 5

MISSION TO INDIA

REASONS FOR FAILURE SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS EXPLAINS DEBATE IN HOUSE OF COMMONS (Rec 9.35 a.in.) London, April 23. Sir Stafford Cripps, opening the d'' bate in the House of Commons on his mission to India, said: “Unfortunately events brought disappointment, but no one in Britain need feel any regret that the Government proposals were put forward or need blame the Government or the Bri tish for failure to reach an agreement, j The moment was a difficult one. Many ; things that might usefully have been discussed or negotiated in more peaceful times could not be dealt with because there was the overriding need to do everything in our power to carry out our duty to defend India against the foreign invader. Owing to events in the Far East theatre of the war, accompanied by highly skilled though grossly misleading propaganda from Axis sources, an atmosphere of AntiBritish sentiment showed itself in certain sections of Indian opinion. With the approach of self-government or Dominion status as a reality, communal differences of view as to the form of government suitable for the future of India tended to become more definitely crystallised. It was the need for clarification of the situation and for consultation with Indian opinion in a favourable direction that impelled Britain to decide that some positive step must be taken quickly. Britain’s objective anc hope was that she might use these very difficulties to bring together all the main leaders of Indian opinion for the double purpose of solving India’s future and reinforcing her defence against the invader. The future is inevitably linked with the present and I am confident n«• mere temporary arrangement could have been reached without some exposition of our future intentions. Had we attempted to deal only with the present we should have immediately been met with a demand for the clarification of the future. I was anxious that there should be no suspicion of Government handpicking of those whom I saw, and consequently I asked the main oganisations themselves to appoint those they wished to meet me. I believe that on the fundamental and vital points of self-government and self-de-termination there was not a single case of disagreement. "I alone was responsible for what was put forward to the Indian leaders in. amplification of the details of the draft declaration.” OPINION DIVIDED Referring to talks with Colonel Johnson! President Roosevelts representative), Sir Stafford Cripps said there was no question of any American intervention, only personal help from a very able American citizen. “I do not believe it would be possible to find in the existing circumstances a fairer solution to the problem than the Government's declaration. There are distinct divisions of opinion among Indians on the question of defence but practically unanimity that the mechanical conduct of the war in India and the control of the fighting force must remain undor the British Commander-in-Chief. Differences of opinion came when the responsibilities of the Government of India apart from those of the British Government were considered. "It was impossible for the Government lo go further with safety, and no risks could be taken at such a moment as the present on so vital and immediate a matter as the defence of India.” Discussing difficulties in the way of acceptance of the draft declaration, Sir Stafford Cripps said although he thought the Congress leaders themselves appreciated that no restriction be imposed on the power of the Indian Union in its future relationship to other States of the British Commonwealth, they were afraid their followers would attach undue importance to the apparent limitations included in the definition of “Dominion.” Words have been accepted as making it perfectly clear that India could in fact leave the British Commonwealth of Nations should the Indian Government under the new constitution decide. DEFENCE PROBLEM Referring to the problem of defence, Sir Stafford Cripps said he took the view, in which the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief agreed, that it would be difficult for representative Indians of the Viceroy's Executive to rouse the peoples of India to their defence unless they could say with justice that at least some part of that defence was the responsibility of representative Indians and so of the Indian people. Various suggestions were made and several formulae tried, until eventually that one was worked out which became the final suggestion. Its object was quite simple—lo allocate to the Commander-in-Chief as war member of the Viceroy’s Executive all those administrative functions in the Government of India vital to the efficient carrying on of the war, while at the same time leaving to representative Indians other functions of the defence member, together with several other important functions. He felt pretty 'lire that had Congress leaders accepted the final draft declaration they would have been able to rally their followers behind them. It was not on this that the final break came. Possession of complete power asked for by Congress and not demanded by any other section in India would have left them in an impossible situation. He was confident that none of the minorities would have accepted such a position, least of all Moslems. It was on that issue that the final break came, followed by rejection, as he expected, by the Moslem League for reasons the precise opposite of those stated by Congress, but all were concerned with the future rather than the present. Sir Stafford Cripps said there was much to be ;<aced on the credit side. Advantage had come from the evidence that Britain desired to give India selfgovernment at the earliest practicable moment and wished her to determine the form it could take. The whole discussion had also served to bring to the front the determination of the Indian people to defend their own country. Many Indian leaders would do their best to arouse the Indian peoples in their own defence and he hoped by cooperation in defence they would be a step nearer to a solution of the problems. UNITY OF OUTLOOK The Secretary of State for India, Mr \mery,- replying to the debate, said he sending of Sir Stafford Cripps to India marked in a peculiar degree the anity of outlook and policy with regard o India which had been reached by .he Government, Parliament and public ipinion.