Russian Front POSITION IN COMING SPRING

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 77, 17 February 1942, Page 3

Russian Front POSITION IN COMING SPRING

j In several six-vlies he has marie since his ndum from Moscow, Sir . s,! *fford Cripps, lately British Ami bassador to Ihe Soviet Union, who is probably I lie best, informed man on Russian matters outside Ihe Soviet Union today, has stressed the urgent importance of sending all possible material aid so that the Soviet forces may be placed in the best possible position to resist Hie offensive which Hiller and his staff are reported to be preparing for the spring. That such an offensive will he launched has been promised the German people by Hitler himself. When be made his semi-apologetic, semiboasting speech at the end of January he reminded his listeners that there were only a few more weeks of the i Russian winter to run and that the German Army would then resume the offensive with decisive results. He promised them victories, even if he 1 withheld his usual promise of complete victory vvilhin the year. Possible Offensive Strength The well-known United States military writer, Major George Fielding lOliot, recently examined the possible striking power Germany may Ik? in a position to exert when the European campaigning season opens. Germany, lie said, opened the offensive against Russia last summer with a total lighting strength of 300 divisions. Of these about 60 were immobilized on policing duties in occupied countries, 125 were in use for garrison duties along the coastlines of Europe, and a further 55 on garrison and reserve duties in the Reich. This left GO divisions for actual attack duties. In the summer and autumn attacks and in the winter lighting Major Eliot estimates that 50 German divisions have been so handled by the Russians that they have practically ceased to exist and have to be reconstituted with fresh recruits and new equipment. This is no doubt being actively effected, but such troops would not be ready for use as first-line troops on the Russian front in the spring. During the winter Germany, the writer says, has been compelled to call upon garrison and “police” troops to replace those destroyed or withdrawn for rest and relit from the Russian front, and some of those used for the 1941 offensives have also had to be rushed back in endeavours to stem the Russian counter-offepsives. This has reduced the number of fresh effectives originally intended for spring use. The writer comes to the conclusion that Germany has no more than ten divisions oil hand of absolutely fresh shock troops. Panzer Units Major Eliot says he thinks that the majority of the German tanks were withdrawn from the Russian front during the winter for reconstitution and refit. With I lie coming of spring, , he says, these are likely to be little less strong than they were for the 1941 drives. ' In German resistance to Russian counter-attacks Major Eliot has ob- 1 served a stiffier determination in the { southern sectors, and this points, he ' suggests, to a probable intention to , make the main 1942 drive one for the Caucasus and the Middle East. In this the first onslaught of the panzers i is likely to he equally as strong as the J \ first big blows last year. There is i likely to be the difference, however, j that staying power will he much 1 diminished, and the follow-through of ( mechanized supports considerably s weaker. J c The Luftwaffe t r Major Eliot estimates ilie numerical 1 strength of the German Air Force in i first-line planes at the time of the at- | f tack on Russia at 8500, and he does j 1 not think production since will have j £ done any more than replace the losses incurred on all fronts, in- j eluding the Battle of the Atlantic, the Western Front area, and the v Mediterranean. Of the 8500 planes i Germany has thus available, he puls t one-third still ou the Russian from, c one-third engaged in the Mediterranean and other theatres, and one-third in t the Reich on refit. The air position on the Russian front is therefore likely to favour Germany less this year than last, since Russia’s air strength, with Allied help, has improved appreciably. Russia’s Position t By her magnificent counter-offensives ' during the winter Russia has undoubtedly hampered German prepa i n Liens for 1912. Each centre of German resistance eliminated has meant the reduc- , turn of German 1942 offensive potential - ■ by the destruction or capture of boiii personnel and equipment. German re- ' serves are being used up every week i the counter-offensives con (In tie, so that there is every incentive for the Soviet ! to persist in the current attack* to the limit of her power. The more the German reserves can be depicted before I lie j zero hour for Hitler’s offensive strikes, the less vicious that offensive will be when it conn's. While German reserves arc being de- , plcted, Russian armies grow apace. Fresh millions of young men from the | cities and plains in the rear of Hie j battle line are being trained to take I their places in the barrier against Got- ! man victory. But for these equipment ; is needed, and needed swiftly so they can play their part, lirst in withstand* in— the German offensive and later to roll back the defeated armies and complete the disorganization of German military might so ably begun by their hrotlicrs-iti-urms in the winter lighting. This is the explanation of Sir Stafford Cripps’ urgency when lie exhorts the munition-makers of Britain to send every possible item of the weapons of war to Russia at the earliest possible moment.