AGAINST JAPAN

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 76, 24 October 1941, Page 2

AGAINST JAPAN

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS NETHERLANDS INDIES CO OPERATE SEEKING A FOUR-POWER ALLIANCE London, Sept. 22. It is hardly possible to exaggerate the importance of the Netherlands Indies’ participation in the Anglo-Ameri-can economic measures against Japan. Without Dutch co-operation no scheme designed to deprive Japan of essentia! raw materials could be complete, but the announcement by Dr. 11. J. van Mook, director of Netherlands Indies economic affairs, that the Indies would impose precisely the same restrictions as the United States and Great Britain had a deeper significance The Netherlands Indies thus proved a full partner in the democratic front against aggression in the Far East, writes a special correspondent of “The Times” lately in Batavia Refusal by the Dutch to make any concessions of value to Japan during the economic talks with Mr Kobayashi and Mr Yoshizawa meant that the Japanese mission had to return to Tokio almost empty-handed, and was a good sign. Yet it meant no more than that the Netherlands Indies was fighting its own battle for independence and assisting to restore freedom to the Netherlands by refusing to sell to lapan war materials which might eventually be sent to Germany. Participation in the economic offensive in line with Great Britain and the United States meant that the Indies authorities also took a wider view of their responsibilities and were prepared to run certain admitted risks in carrying them out in co-operation with others. The Netherlands Indies’ attitude needs to be considered in relation to JapaneseDutch relations at the time'the decision was taken. The Dutch have all along been naturally suspicious of Japanese ambitions in the south, but they wanted, if possible, to keep on good terms with Tokio. They felt that half their victory in the economic talks was that Mr Yoshizawa had left Batavia on the most amicable terms with their own negotiations. Dr. van Mook had even been to the docks to see him off, and whatever the Japanese mission may have felt about their own failure they did not utter any harsh words or threats. They parted nominally as good friends who had agreed to differ over a knotty problem. But when the Netherlands Indies Government was informed by the Netherlands Government in London of the proposals for economic action against Japan, it did not hesitate for one moment in agreeing that the Ini dies must take a parallel course. The | Dutch, in the East as much as in j Europe, were until May, 1940, strong advocates of neutrality, and when its ! bankruptcy in the modern world was [ shown them with dramatic and tragic suddenness, their conversion to the j contrary policy of a united front was i remarkably rapid. Perhaps a few old- | fashioned Dutch officials still think in j terms of a neutral Netherlands Empire. : but most are convinced that their I future, and that of their home country : and colonies, depends entirely on the J willingness of the peace-loving nations | to join in opposing Hitler and his Far ! Eastern partners. ! The Dutch wanted to bring French ! Indo-Ch'na, even a Vichy colony, i within the anti-aggression front, and : were prepared to run risks to that end. i It did not prove practicable. The proi posal for an economic campaign j against Japan, above all one in which i the United States would play a full nart, was warmly received in Batavia They are now’ saying in the Indies that the countries which have combined in economic opposition should combine in a military defensive alliance. ABSENCE OF DECLARATION Anglo-Dutch co-operation in the East is now almost as complete as it can be: it lacks ‘only an official declaration. For some reason or other the alliance w'hicn**is quite unambiguous in regard to the European war has never been specifically extended to the Malaysian region. The absence of such a declaration does not seem to have prevented co-operation between Singapore and Batavia, and the Japanese must know ! this. Why not, say the Dutch, make it clear to the world? Believing that diplomatic activity can still be effective in keeping Japan within bounds, the Dutch would like most of all to see ! the establishment of a formal “A.B.C.D. front” in the shape of an alliance between Australia, Britain (in Singapore and Malaya), China, and the Dutch ! East Indies. They know it already exists in effect, but they think it would be useful to put it on record in writing. ! Dutch diplomacy is busy to that end. believing that once such a four-Power ! alliance existed the United States ■ might not be long in adding her sig- ! nature. The Dutch have no mean contribution to make to such an alliance. Netherlands Indies defence forces continue to grow in strength and bear no comparison with what they were a year ! ago. Incidentally, the fact that the | air force is using American-built aircraft of the same types as the Royal Air Force is flying in the Far East notably, Catalina flying-boats and Brewster-Buffalo fighters would greatly facilitate co-ordination in the event of war. The Navy and Army might well take parallel measures sc far as is possible. Although expansion of the Royal Netherlands Navy is restricted to the construction of patrol vessels, minesweepers. and torpedo-boats, the plan for the extension of the Surabaya base is going ahead. On a second visit tc Surabaya I was given some details oi the subsidiary base at Amboina, in the J Moluccas. In this region of the “Greai ! East.” where in the seventeenth cen--1 turn Portuguese. English, and Dutch i adventurers sought the fabulous j wealth of the Spice Islands, may one day be fought battles to decide the ! fate of the Malayan archipelago. Amboina. or Ambon as the Dutch call ! it. is primarily an advance operationa. i base. It has an excellent harbour which can accommodate both warships and flying-boats. Oil and other supplies are held there, and facilities exist for certain repair work. Amboina which is now closed to foreign shipping is actually nearer to Darwin, ir Northern Australia, than to Surabaya: it stands in the path of any naval invasion from the north or from the Japanese mandate islands. ITALIAN GUNS From Surabaya I went to Batavia and on to Bandung, the Army headI quarters. The air service to Singapore ! keeps Army officers well informed about developments within the British Far East Command, and Major-Gen-eral 11. ter Poorten. the Netherlands Indies chief of staff, doubtless made ' -ood use of his time when he visited j Sydney recently to attend the formal ceremony of handing over to the Aus--1 tralian and New Zealand Governmenl I the Dutch liner Oranje for use ns a hospital ship Before returning he ! visited Melbourne with Mr Menzics The Netherlands Indies Army has artil- | lerv workshops and munitions fac- : torv in Bandung. Established ns a repair depot bv Qaendels. when lie waf Governor-General of the Indies early ! last centurv, they are now an import- ! ant centre of munitions production j Guns captured from the Italians in 1 the Middle East have been through ! the shops, and there is a considerable weeklv output of shells for howitzers and coastal batteries and aerial bombs : of various sizes up to half a ton. It is surprising to see how the supposedly 1 "lazv” Indonesians of Java have beer j trained as skilled artisans. Small arms j ammunition also is made here. Although industrial production b i steadily increasing in the Netherlands | Indies, the country is best known as a ' source of rubber, tin, and oil. A good

’ dcai ol misapprehension exjsts about .VI oil. There are actually five or six important oil areas stretching from Merlin and Djambi, in Sumatra, to Tarakan. :n Borneo. At Tarakan 'an island) there are only oilfields; the crude oil is shipped elsewhere for refining. Ralik Pa pa n. al.-o in Borneo, has both oilfields and refineries. Much of the Borneo oil is suitable for u-e as ships' bunkers without much refining. The chief oil area in Java is at Tjepoe, which has a refinery, while • Palembang, in the south, is Sumatra • principal oil-producing district. It iat the PI a joe Works of the Bataafsrbe 1 Petroleum Maatschappy <a subsidiary of the Royal Dutch Shell concern) and at the neighbouring works of the Ncderlandscho Koloniale Petroleum Maatschappy (a subsidiary of the Stan dard Oi! Company, of New Jersey) that high octant aviation spirit is produced m plant that at the B P.M establi* ment alone cost about £1.000.000 sterling As was made clear at the time of the Japanese-Dutch economic negotiations, the whole production of thi«. special benzine has been 'old for several years in advance to the Dutch and British Governments, and there • is none to spare for the Japanese. The B.P M. refineries are the biggest and most modern in the East Nearly 8000 , Asiatics and 300 Europeans are pm* [ ployed by the company and Its con- . tractors. ’ IN THE LAST RESORT • Palembang. indirectly protected by ■ the guns and aeroplanes of Singapore, i is an oil-producing area of the greati est value to the British and Dutch deI fence forces. Since the Moesi river. . on the banks of which the city is , built, is unsuitable for ocean-going vesi sels. most of the .oil refined at Palem--1 bang is sent to the small islands of Puiau Samboe and Pulau Bukom. within sight of Singapore. These are stor--1 age and trans-shipment centres and a i direct meeting-place of Anglo-Dutch ‘ and American commercial interests. 1 The Dutch have often declared their intention of blowing up their oil wells and refineries rather than allowing ‘ j them to fall into enemy hands. This - would be done. Although the engineers and technicians at Palembang are cerI tainly not defeatists and take great r pride in the valuable plant they con- : irol, they have drawn up detailed 1 plans for rendering the oilfields and refineries unusuable if any enemy should 1 threaten the district. “It would be ■ the biggest blaze the world has ever ! seen,” a senior oil official declared.