DARK DAYS

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 76, 13 September 1941, Page 6

DARK DAYS

INVASION OF BELGIUM AUTHORITATIVE DOCUMENT ISSUED KING’S CONDUCT ABOVE RI PRO AC II 'Rec. 10.2 a.m.) Rugby, Sept. 13. The story of the 18 (lays’ campaign in which the Nazi war 1 machine overran Holland and Belgium has been told from the Belgian point of view in a book is- ' sued by the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This authoritative document is both of immediate and historical interest as it presents clearly the motives and the course of Belgian policy in those critical years 1936 to September, ! 1939, as well as her policy of neutrality after the outbreak of war. | Immediate interest naturally centres in the latter period and the document makes plain that while implementing 1 ' loyally the declaration of neutrality made in September. 1939, the Belgian Government vigorously pursued the task of putting the country in a state j lI of defence. The Belgian army was ' trained to face Germany and an attack from that quarter. The plan of defence consisted of two lines. Firstly,

I an advanced line running from Antwerp along the Albert Canal to a ; | pivotal point at Eben-Emael and thence ' back through Liege to Namur. Se- » j condly, a defensive position construct - i l e l on the model of the Maginot Line ; : I and running from Antwerp through ) j Louvain and Wavre to Namur. The ' ; | plan was to hold the advance line long i i i enough to give British and French > ; troops time to occupy positions in the l I main defensive position and a continui a tion of that position along the Meuse, -j This plan was put into operation when 1 | Hitler invaded Belgium early on the ? ' morning of 10th May. but was dislo- ; ! cated at the outset by brilliant German j f ! actions against advance bridgeheads ) i and the successful use of airborne | troops. KING’S CAPITULATION . i Belgian opinion attributes the King's . capitulation entirely to the Nazi \ break-through at Sedan, and whether ' 4 this also will be the verdict of history ' rr.ust remain undecided until British ' and French reports are available. One of the main features of the o. Belgian documents, which subseo; quent reports are likely to eonci firm, is that the King’s conduct was I above reproach. After the French Commander-in-Chief of the Allied '[ forces had ordered the abandonr ; ment of the advanced line the posip [ tion of the King’s army appeared Y even mure hopeless, and as early as - 20th May he informed the Franco British liaison officers that “isola- ) ' tion might have serious ronsr--1 quences.” e i , On 25th May he informed his troops, .! “whatever may happen I share your ;. | fc.te,” and on 27th May he telegraphed e I to Lord Gort that "the Belgian army L. is losing heart.” and the time was ap1' proaching when it would be unable to l. j continue to fight. The same afternoon - ' the King decided to ask for an arm is- . tice, and communicated the decision ) at once to the British and French miss ; sions. e j Of the King’s personal actions the i document states: "By his defiant alli 1 i L’de in captivity to which he condemned himself, by his refusal to recognise : an accomplished fact, he has shown d | h’mself to be the incarnation of a people which will not accept servie I tude.”—B.O.W.