Hitler’s U-Boat Threat POSITION OF EIRE

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXXIII, 12 February 1941, Page 6

Hitler’s U-Boat Threat POSITION OF EIRE

ptf Four speeches made during the last three or four days dealt with varying aspects of one' important subject of the speakers were Germans—r-Grand Admiral Itaeder and, Fuehrer Hitler — one was Mr. De Valera and the fourth was .Mr. Cross, British Minister of i ‘Shipping. There is great significance in the fact that the two Germans, the Irishman and the Englishman were ail concerned with the vital importance in the present struggle of the issues that are being decided on the sea. Germany Worried

Admiral Raeder addressed himself to German shipyard workers. He emphasized the important part they were playing in Germany’s war effort. But it was also clear from the general ; tenor -of his remarks that the Nazi High Command is seriously worried 'about the tremendous hammering that the (R.A.F. has given, to Germany's principal shipbuilding yards and to her U-boat bases on the home and the •French coasts. The frequent heavy [bombings of German ports must have iwrought great havoc in the shipyard* and gravely hampered the U-boat, construction programme. This would explain Admiral Raeder’s exhortation to ,the shipyard workers to stand up to their ordeal. t A good deal of Hitler’s hysterical tirade was devoted to threats of everincreasing violence in the U-boat campaign against British and Allied merchant shipping. It is clear from several passages in his speech that he is genuinely alarmed and worried, not only by Great Britain’s rapidly-growing strength on the sear, in the air and on land, but also by the rapidly-approach-ing reality of immense help from the United States.

U.S. Aid To Britain As in the last war, Germany’s naval and military leaders scoffed at the idear of American aid ever being in time to affect the issue of the struggle, so it has been in this war. In 1917 the German leaders boasted that their “unrestricted submarine campaign” would starve Britain into submission before American assistance could become effective. i But events proved them utterly wrong. ! In the present war Germany started her unrestricted submarine campaign on the very first day, but it was held in check until the collapse of France deprived Britain of the valuable services of tlie French Navy and gave Germany a tremendous advantage in her possession of advanced U-boat and seaplane bases in the Channel and the Bay of Biscay. Hitler’s Threats More than ever, it is apparent that British sea power is the vital and dominant factor in the present struggle. It is to her command of the sea that Britain owes the spectacular military victories achieved in Libya. Hitler and his hordes are powerless to cheek the flowing tide of British successes against Italy across the Mediterranean. Hitler knows little of the sea and ships. He, clearly, has not understood the real meaning of sea power. He now sees it working full time against him and he is afraid of it —hence his hysterical outburst of what his U-boats are going to do. He is going to defeat Britain with his U-boats, which are also to prevent the United States from sending aeroplanes and tanks ami other supplies to help her. Hitler is learning the lesson of sea power too late. Mr. De Valera Speaks

In a broadcast speech, Mr. de Valera said Eire bad “not a moment to lose in preparing for the worst regarding all supplies normally imported. ... In blockading each other the belligerents are blockading us and the results are serious.” Mr. de Valera is learning something about sea power. There is much that he should have realized long ago. As tlie “Economist” recently remarked, when we are fighting for the restoration of rules of international order against an opponent who observes no limits on his actions, must we throw away the whole fight rather j than break a single rule ourselves? i These are questions that torture the ' philosopher. But the common man has no doubts. He knows that if j’ou cnI gage in war you implicitly accept the i doctrine that the end sometimes justifies the means. Our victory is Eire’s only chance of preserving her sovereign independence; in her interest as much as in our own, our job is to win the war and we may not be able to do that if we always keep the rules that Hitler breaks. Mr. Churchill’s reference some months ago to the severe disadvantage imposed on the Royal Navy in its light against the submarine by the lack of the Irish bases that were handed back in 1938 was followed by a quite unnecessarily abusive speech by Mr. de Valera in which he said that the Navy would never, in any circumstances, he allowed to use any of the facilities of Eire and that any attempt to secure a different result could only end in bloodshed. Attitude Of Eire There has never, in the past, been a time when Ireland and her aspirations for national freedom and unity have been without numerous and powerful friends in England; but such ar time has come now if, in this matter, Mr. De Valera speaks, as he appears to, for the Irish people. That, after the repeated demonstrations of what Nazism means and of what happens to small neutrals who come within Hitler’s grasp. Ireland should still prefer to help England’s enemies (for that is what her present attitude amounts to) will be taken as a final proof that reason, forbearance and moderation are out of place in relations between England and Ireland. They must not, howver, take clear thinking with them into the discard. “We cannot afford to he guided by our emotions,” said the “Economist.” “Unlike Mr. De Valera, we are not protected by a powerful neighbour. It would, of course, be easy to say that since Mr. De Valera refuses to assist our convoying work, nothing brought to these islands in British convoys should be released to Ireland. If we did that, Ireland’s econom.v would collapse. “If the ports became a matter of life and death—for Ireland as well as for England—there can be only one way out: we must take them. That would, of course, revive all the old bitterness. But if bitterness there must be, let us have the bitterness and the bases, not the bitterness alone —which is all more'retaliation’ would provoke.” There are, doubtless, many who will agree with the “Economist’s” suggestion, despite Mr. De Valera’s sarcastic rejoinder abou' “scraps of paper.” But Irish ports or no Irish ports, Britain will not be daunted b.v the threats of Hitler and Raeder. (S.D.W.)