KING LEOPOLD

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXXIII, 27 June 1940, Page 3

KING LEOPOLD

CHIEF CONFIDANT ANTI-FRENCH GENERAL TRAGEDY OF BELGIUM LONDON, 31st May. “King Leopold 11. of the Belgians always made on me the impression of j a very sad man,” states Sir Robert j Clive, British Ambassador to Belgium ! from 1937 to 1939, in an article in the • Times”. “He was born, I imagine, with no sense of fun, let alone a sense of ; horn our. j “I have never seen him laugh. I j doubt if he has ever laughed since the ! tragic death of his consort, that gay ! and lovable woman Queen Astrid, in , 1 the summer of 1935. By nature morbid ! ! and introspective, at the same time very i j obstinate and autocratic, yet with an i j intense love of his country, he is to- j (day really an object of pity, j “His temper, never easily controlled, I jat times became violent. No one in his i entourage ever dared to stand up to j j him. He is lacking in geniality, al- j ; though lie has a charming smile and a 1 soft and attractive voice. He was starvi ed of friendship, both of men and of women. The loss of his wife was irreparable. It is to be regretted that he did not marry again. PRINCIPAL AIDE-DE-CAMP “His chief confidant in the last two years has been General van Ovetfstrae-

ten, who was both head of the Ecole Militaire and his principal aide-de-camp. The general was notoriously antiFrench, and shared to the full the King’s policy of neutrality at any price. ; “No one ever questioned King Leo- , pold’s patriotism, however misguided.' He was ardently pro-Belgian. The French maintained he was proGerman. I do not believe this, but he certainly was not pro-French. The so-

called policy of independence which he announced to an astonished world in October, 1936, was inspired by the hope which developed into an obsession, that in this way alone would he be able to save Belgium from the horrors of war.

MAINTAINING A FICTION “This obsession made him blind to other considerations. Equal weight, he felt, must be attached to the German and to the British and French guarantees. The fiction must be maintained that Belgium was as liable to attack from the French as from the Belgian side. No details of the Belgian defence plans could be given to us or to the French for fear of infringing the policy of absolute neutrality. All idea of staff conversations was taboo. “In this attitude of stand-offishness from his former Allies he was aided and abetted by his evil genius, General van Overstraeten. . . . The result of this policy was that, in spite of the definite warning the Belgian Government received on 10th November, when at the very last moment Hitler accepted the advice of his Generals to defer the attack until after the winter, in spite, too, of the ever-increasing danger to Belgium, no staff conversations at all took place between Belgian and Allied staffs before the invasion of Belgium on 10th May.”