FINLAND AS A KEYPOINT

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXXIII, 12 January 1940, Page 4

FINLAND AS A KEYPOINT

Military Face of Europe may be Changed

There is a growing conviction in Europe of a direct relationship between the Finnish campaign and the general war between Germany and the Allies. A short time ago, Rumania was thought to be the link whereby the war would be extended to its second and wider phase; but now Finland, through Scandinavia, threatens to have that role forced upon her.

The issue is being hastened to a conclusion by two different sets of factors (writes a military correspondent in the Sydney “Herald”). On the one hand, the help afforded to Finland through the League of Nations is obviously growing; and, in particular, that from Britain and France is becoming more direct. On the other hand, Germany is reported to have sent Sweden a stern Note protesting against any transit of war materials through the Scandinavian countries to Finland.

The fact that Germany has not the faintest right under the rules of war to take such an admonitory stand does not alter the practical position at all. The Finnish war is losing its local character; it is becoming correlated with the wider European struggle; and, willy, nilly, Sweden, as the vanguard of the Soandinavias, is being drawn towards the verge of hostilities. Point is added to the German pressure by the sinking of two more Swedish ships irt particularly brutal circumstances, one by a torpedo, the other by gunfire from a submarine. CONTROL OF THE BALTIC If localism is thus no longer possible in the Finnish war, the general strategical importance of Scandinavia comes to be of great moment. In the first place, control of the Baltic Is involved. Germany and Russia together may immensely strengthen their war machines if they can build up a sealed world around the Baltic. Economically they can aid their schemes for autarchy and be in a better position to withstand a siege. The

it would provide another fighting chance for Germany’s links with the outside world; and it would give her submarines and surface raiders excellent bases, open the whole year round. Murmansk and Petsamo alone would provide these advantages; and it is obvious that (domination of the whole Norwegian coast, with rail communications from the Baltic, would help Germany still more.

A Russian victory in Finland might quite easily permit of joint RussoGerman pressure on the Scandinavian countries with these economic and strategical ends in view; and the Scandinavian kingdoms might find themselves unable to refuse, if they had before them the sight of a Finland overrun because it was not adequately supported from outside.

As against this, it is now clear that Allied military , circles are quite aware of the potentially dangerous strategic results that would follow the annihilation of Finland; and, whatever our theoretical wishes may have been, our experts are realising that the Finnish war is inextricably interwoven with the wider European struggle. If this realisation is given practical expression in the form of sufficient supplier of war material, and If Finland is thereby enabled to hold out, Germany may yet be thwarted of the strategical gains she hopes to win. Thus we have strong military arguments to buttress our emotional support for the embattled Finns in their struggle for liberty. RUSSIA’S ROLE When Russia invaded Poland, It was said in some quarters that she was really acting in Allied interests by keeping Germany in check in the east. Fortunately this erroneous idea proved to be short-lived. The Soviet

iron ore of Sweden is essential to Germany; and so are the wood-pulp and cellulose products, which fire so important for the production of munitions and “substitute-goods” in general. Further, if the Scandinavian markets are taken, away from Britain and France, we will be dealt a blow in that war of exports which is so essential an aspect of the European struggle. If Britain continues to hold a lucrative export market, or is able to enlarge it at the expense of Germany, the result is as important to her as a victory in the field. Britain and Germany are Sweden’s two main customers. Each of them does exactly 80 million kroners’ worth of trade with Sweden every year; and each will gain with every diversion of Swedish trade at the expense of the other. With Norway, Britain has 442 million kroners’ worth of trade, to Germany’s 326 millions, but here again the two countries dominate the trade. In the case of Sweden, every kroner of import trade Captured by Britain has a double significance, because it makes it more difficult for Germany to send manufactured goods with which to pay for the iron oi*e she must import from Swedeh. The purely military results of Russo-German pressure on Scandinavia are even more important. It is not necessary for the relationships between the Allies and Russia to drift imperceptibly into war before these strategical possibilities come into play. They will ; arlsft if Russia defeats Finland and ■ if Russo-German pressure and in- i timidation on Scandinavia grow in . consequence; they will equally : arise if Russia or Germany or ( both are forced to more extreme |* measures by defeats in Finland or by a growing feeling of desperation. OUTFLANKING THE BLOCKADE 3o far, Germany is practical!v hemmed in to the Baltic and Heligoland regions by our naval patrols and our minefields. But domination of the warm-water ports of northern Finland or the Norwegian coast would place in a nos'lion to outflank the present Allied blockade; and there have already been reports that Germany j s negotiating with Russia to obtain bases in the Arctic, just as she was trying to do in 1937 when she sought to cajole rights in Petsamo from the Finns. Such a hold would enable her to menace the outer sea-roads of Britain;

invasion of Finland threw the cold light of military realities on Russian intentions. Since either success or failure in Finland would throw Germany and Russia more closely together, and since the Scandinavian countries must of necessity become increasingly involved, the urgency of every effective form of aid to the Finns becomes the, greater, because the Finns, by preventing the development of strategical conditions unfavourable to us, are fighting our battles as surely as if Finnish levies were on the Lorraine front. The ultimate results of RussoGerman collaboration extend still further. Reactions on the Far East, and thus on the United States are inevitable. Becr.use of this link, the Finnish resistance is rapidly turning two European; wars into a single world war. Even j before this stage emerges, however, a pressure by Russia on India and on the oil wells of Iran may become possible; and it is easy to see how the creation of such voider problems for the Allies would suit Germany’s book at the moment, quite apart frOm the fact that Germany has always viewed the Near and Middle East, the region of the Berlin-Bagdad railway scheme, as the nuclear pivot of world politics. MILITARY KEYPOINTB Whether such wider possibiltles develop depends immediately on the outside help sent to Finland and on the decision of Sweden .and Norway as to how far they will take a stand to aid the Finns and thus themselves. A com- j placently defeatist attitude on Scandin-! avia’s part would immediately convert | the strategical possibilities mentioned I above into practical military realities;! just as a,firm attitude on their part, supported by prompt and adequate' Allied help, might avert the worst} dangers. Whichever way events develop—und it must be emphasised again that they are in no sense predetermined—lt cannot be denied that the interplay of wider forces has forced Finland, and inferentially her neighbour, Sweden, into the unenviable position of being military keypoinls in world affairs. The strategical results of the attempted conquest of Finland have assumed proportions which the rulers of the Kremlin can hardly have envisaged when they ordered their divisions to cross the frontier and stun into submission a neighbour whom they thought incapable of serious military resistance. As it is, the hand-to-hand resistance of fifteen divisions of Finns may change the military face of Europe.