“What Can We Do About It?”

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXXIII, 15 December 1939, Page 7

“What Can We Do About It?”

ADDRESS TO MASS MEETING AT AUCKLAND SOCIALISATION OBJECTED TO REMEDIES MUST BE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LINES TRUE COALITION OF PARTIES (.Special to “The Mail”) AUCKLAND, 15th December. “The Government is being forced to rely upon a whole family of ‘Radio Uncles’ in its determined and continuous efforts to induce the people to believe that things are not as bad as they seem.” With these words, Mr R. M. Algie, of the New Zealand Freedom Association, opened his address m the Auckland Town Hall last night.

Continuing, Mr Algie said: “Our ‘Uncle* of the Friendly Road’ has now been partnered in a combined double on Sunday evenings by no less a protagonist than the Prime Minister, himself; and. almost nightly throughout the week, we flit from ‘Uncle’ to ‘Uncle’ the tune changing according to the voice, but the purpose being always the same—propaganda, and always more propaganda. Shakespeare might have been tempted to remark that perhaps ‘they do protest too much.’ “If the policy of the Government had been as successful as we were told it would be. then surely there would have been no need for all the broad-

casts. People who are sure of themselves and who are satisfied that all is well, do not fear critcism; still less do they resent it; and when they get it they have no need tc descend to threats and mere personalities. They respond naturally to the finer principles of fair play, and they extend to their opponents a right to use the radio equal to that which they demand for themselves. “This,” said Mr Algie, "the Labour Government has never done. No one would ever say that the use they have made of the radio could ever be described as fair and impartial.” NOT DUE TO WAR CONDITIONS The wrongs of which so many people were complaining, and the difficulties in which the Government now found itself, were not attributable in any real sense to war conditions. They were simply and solely the cumulative result of three years of Government’s policy, and there was no escape from that. The average citizen was as loyal as any member of the Government and just as determined to play his part in the war effort of his country. But he was equally determined not to submit to any further and unnecessary instalments of socialisation, and it was perfectly clear to him that four years of Government policy were a major factor in preventing him from rendering that degree of national service which he would otherwise have been glad and able to give. When the war broke out, however, the Government had to make some most important decisions. Amongst other things, it had to decide whether it would carry on with its attack on individual enterprise and free business or suspend those activities fo. a time and concentrate entirely upon winning the war. What happened? Mr Savage himself had said over the air on a recent Sunday evening that his Government felt that they would have been untrue to their party supporters if they had slackened off in their policy of socialisation. When they passed the Marketing Act, and the Reserve Bank Act, they had demonstrated, without any room for argument, that the war effort of New Zealand was by no means their only aim. At such a time it was right and proper that all sections of the community should be united in one great and determined co-operative effort, but co-operation implied mutual concessions The Government expected co-operation but without any concessions on its part, and those who would like to give the co-operation found that i£ they did so they were expected to assent passively to the terms persisted in by the Government. A REGRETTABLE TRAGEDY It was a tragedy, and a most regrettable one, too, that at a time like the present questions of internal politics could still loom so largely in the forefront of public discussion. The prosecution of this country's part in the war, and the making of every possible provision for our soldiers, were tasks that demanded wholehearted unity on I the part of the people, and a measure I of forebearance on the part of the Govj ernment .There was no reason on earth why, in order to help to win the I war, the people of this country should

have to submit to the permanent socialisation of their economic life. SURRENDER OF LIBERTY If we were expected to do all we could to resist aggression and dictation abroad, why was it necessary that we should have to begin by making a permanent surrender of every liberty we possessed in New Zealand? The Government had attempted to put the people in a most awkward dilemma; either they must submit to socialisation in order the. 1 a maximum war effort might be made, or they must defend their natural rights and be branded as disloyal and seditious obstructionists. But those were false alternatives. The people had a clear legal and constitutional right to present their views to the Government, and they had also a right to ask the Government to remove as. far as possible all those “party” fetters and restrictions which were preventing the people from giving that degree of national service which they /ould otherwise have been able to render. DICTATORSHIP? It was perfectly obvious, continued Mr Algie, that the ill effects of a long continued policy of extravagant and partly unproductive expenditure of public money, and of restriction, regulation and muddling interference with private business and industry were becopiing increasingly clear to an ever-growing number of people. Our political leaders were talking loudly of their belief in democracy and they were just as constantly practising dictatorship. It was idle to say that we were a free people. There was an acid test by which that statement could be measured. We were truly free if the people who were governed had the right to criticise and if the Government was ready to grant redress. It was relatively easy to show that, in New Zealand, neither of these conditions was fully satisfied. The realisation of this fact was forcing people to ask very direct and pertinent questions as .to the nature of their legal and constitutional rights. Could the British Government help in a case of emergency? Had citizens a right to petition the King? Could the Gover-nor-General dismiss his Ministers? Must he dissolve Parliament if they ask him to do so? These and many other similar questions were being put and this search for information showed conclusively that there was a growing uneasiness, a groping for a lead, and a desire for a clear statement as to what the position really was.

THE PEOPLE’S RIGHTS . a democracy, legal power rested with Parliament; political power remained with the electors. In practice this meant that a Ministry, backed by a sufficiently well-drilled majority in the House, could pass any laws, regulations and orders that it thought fit. The people could criticise and protest, if they, were allowed to, but if the Government showed itself to be contemptuous of criticism, and opposed to the granting of popular demands for redress, the elector’s only remedy lay in the use of the ballot-paper; between elections, he might be rendered impotent, or practically so. NO UNCONSTITUTIONAL METHODS All good citizens would at once agree that any form of protest by direct and illegal action was fundamentally wrong in principle and bad in practice. Those who advocated unconstitutional methods were disloyal to their British tradition; they could not expect any better treatment than they were prepared to give; and by pursuing direct and illegal methods they were undermining the very system that gave them security and protection. In any form of community life there were only two clear-cut alternatives, the rule of law on the one hand and the rule of force on the other. No one should have any hesitation in deciding that the former was the right and more desirable objective. The latter led only to anarchy. If, then, a group of citizens considered that they were injuriously affected by the operation of Government policy, the question as to what they could do about it would at once arise. All sorts of very loose ideas were current among members of the community generally, and it was time to re-state in more or less popular language some of the leading constitutional rules applicable to the question. “JUST SILLY” “An irate farmer told me,” said Mr Algie, “that he was going to pour all his milk down the drain for a week.” That, of course, would just be silly and would hurt no one so much as himself. If a group of farmers banded themselves together to do the same kind of thing, they would expose themselves to prosecution under the War Regulations; and public opinion would rightly be against them.

Others had claimed the right to petition the King. They could do so if they wished, but their petition would have to go first to the GovernorGeneral; and when it duly reached His Majesty, he would be guided entirely, or practically so, by the advice given to him by his Ministers in New Zealand. The position would be the same if the petition, were presented to the Governor-General direct; he, too, would have to follow the advice of his Ministers. That was what was meant by “Ministerial Responsibility.” A Ministry which felt that it was out of touch with the wishes of the

people could resign at any time, and it would not follow from this that an election would be held immediately. The House would continue as elected, and the Governor-General would have to seek for other Ministers to act as his advisers. The new Ministry would carry on, but if it felt doubtful about its chances of doing so, it would advise a dissolution and an immediate election. That advice would almost for a certainty be followed by a GovernorGeneral, but it was not possible to lay down a rigid rule that would be followed in all cases. * OTHER ALTERNATIVES Instead of tendering its resignation —which would practically amount to an admission of failure —a Ministry could advise a dissolution. If that advice were given it is more or less certain that a Governor-General would follow it, but here again a rigid rule cannot be laid down. There are circumstances in which it could, and would be refused.

“Another wild but amusing suggestion that has become a little too common of late is that New Zealand should put her affairs in the hands of some sort of Commission or Receivership.” Such a thought, said Mr Algie, was utterly unworthy of us; there was no need for it, and even if there were, the discussion of it, as a serious proposal, would amount to a confession of a lack of courage, and of our moral bankruptcy. People would recoil in shame from such a plan. It was only necessary to add that a proposal of that nature would involve the complete suspension of our Constitution, and, to bring that about, the necessary legislation would have to be passed in the New Zealand and in the Imperial Parliaments. Changes in our Constitution could quite easily ‘be made; radical alterations could readily be effected. But our Parliament could not, acting by itself, and by one of its own Statutes, put itself entirely out of existence.

In popular discussion, much was said about the far-reaching provisions of the Statute of Westminster. It was to be remembered that the important changes made by that Statute had never been introduced into New Zealand and were not part of the law of this country.

Reference was often made to the position of the Governor-General. At one of the recent Dominion Conferences it had been agreed that with certain necessai-y limitations, the Governor of a Dominion would hold a position similar to that held by the King in Great Britain. The Governor had in effect become the personal representative of the King in the Dominion. He was not the servant of the British Government. His appointment was made directly by the King and he could be recalled or removed in a like manner; but, in these matters, the King would be guided by the views and opinions of the New Zealand Ministers, and the British Ministers would no longer have any effective or controlling voice in such questions. SUPREME POWER IN THE MINISTRY The simple truth was, therefore, that for all practical purposes supreme power in this country lay in the hands of the Ministry. So long as they could command a Parliamentary majority, they could do very much as they wished. The only effective control lay in the existence of a well-informed and determined public opinion. The only remedies available must be constitutional ones, and constitutional ones only. That point could not be too strongly emphasised. If any section of the community believed that it was injuriously affected by Government policy, the right thing to do was to marshal the facts, to satisfy itself that they were facts and not merely prejudices, and then to present them in a proper manner to the Government with a request for full redress. No majority had any right to oppress or to dictate to a minority; and if the people who complained of wrongs could show that their wrongs were substantial and properly supported by facts, they had a right to relief. SENSE OF BALANCE AND PERSPECTIVE The position was complicated by the fact that we were at war; but that fact did not give the Government any right to ignore the just complaints of any section of the community. But the existence of a war made it incumbent upon all complainants to keep a proper sense of balance and perspective and to see that the major duty of aiding in the prosecution of that war was kept always in the forefront of all approaches to the Government. From a purely realistic and practical p int of view, the end to aim at would seem to be the securing of a true coalition of political parties for the duration of the war. CONDITIONS OF CO-OPERATION Such a very desirable co-operation could be brought about only if the Government itself was prepared to make certain concessions. If one side was to give up its right to criticise on party lines, the other would have to desist for the time being from introducing the very measures that would give rise to that party criticism. Since the burning political issue at present was the question of socialistic and bureaucratic domination, the Government would have to be prepared to give an assurance that no further and unnecessary steps in that direction would be taken in the meantime, and that such of the ill-effects of that policy as were capable

of a measure of relief would receive immediate and effective attention. If the Government would mak no concessions in this respect, then active co-operation would be impossible. But if active co-operation between political parties could not be secured, that would not justify active resistance. Regard for the sacrifices being made by our soldiers, and a determination to help in our war effort would still have to dominate our thinking and our actions. Failing an actual coalition of parties, there would still remain the right of reasoned approach to the Government If those approaches were made repeatedly and were ignored, or were given no effective consideration, the only remedy left would be to place the facts fairly and in a temperate manner before the public, and to place full reliance upon the constitutional remedy available to all citizens at an election. RIGHT AND JUSTICE “Political power,” concluded Mr Algie, “rests in the end with the people themselves. They get the kind of Government the majority of them want. If their opinions change, they can get rid of it only b; the use or the same means by which they got it. If wrongs of a substantial nature exist, it is the duty of the Governmenl to redress them if it can. If the wrongs are really serious, the good sense of the people will ultimately prevail, and the more serious they are, the sooner the people will see it. A dictatorial attitude on the part of the Government towards the reasonable and just complaints of the governed will have only one result; it may take time, but in the end a people will show a Government what it thinks of those who turn a deaf and unsympathetic ear to those who have right and justice on their side.”