Nelson Evening Mail SATURDAY, AUGUST 26, 1939 THE EUROPEAN CRISIS

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXXIII, 26 August 1939, Page 8

Nelson Evening Mail SATURDAY, AUGUST 26, 1939 THE EUROPEAN CRISIS

l THE International situation in . ; Europe dominates all other ; ! political considerations, overi shadows economics, affects trade ; j between various European counj tries and the rest of the world, ! necessitates stupendous expenditure on armaments, and causes distrust and enmity betwixt na- | tions. Europe i 3 a Continent divided against itself. Britain, France, Poland, Turkey, Greece, and several of the minor countries stand together; and on the other 1 hand Germany and Italy, and as many minor countries as they can 1 influence or compel to embrace iheir cause. An English journalist, after visiting Rome, recently wrote thus of the Italian journalists whom he had met, “Day by day they must extol the Axis, which they hate. Day by day | they must pay tribute to the strong ; German character, when every | instinct makes them fear Germany.” Proponents of the Axis | claim for that combination that it is “a compact and homogeneous whole from the Baltic to Libya with 1 50.000,000 men.” In more ways than one that is something of an exaggeration, but still the size and the resources of the Axis are very great. Geographically its countries are contiguous, stretching from the Baltic and North Seas almost to Africa, and j what is more important they almost completely sever the nations

I of the West from Russia, Poland, | the Baltic countries, and Turkey, 1 in the East. Therefore if Germany j should try to dominate Europe again, as she tried in 1914-18, it ! will be seen how greatly she i would rely upon Italy to assist her. A competent authority estimates Italy’s contribution to the combined armies of the Axis as two-and-a-half million men, of | whom, however, only a fraction could be placed in the field at one time. So that, in any case, Italy’s militant effort would be subsidiary to that of Germany, and would i almost certainly be directed and controlled by the Government and military experts of that country. When the Western European bloc is examined it is found to be less homogeneous, more scattered, but very powerful—on land, on the sea, and in the air. Geographically its principal component parts are within supportingdistance of each other, and it possesses command of the principal oceans and seas which are of importance to the civilised world, with perhaps the exception of the Baltic, which would be commanded by Germany, and possibly of the Mediterranean, where Italy is in a strong position. Anglo-French territorial interests are dispersed over the globe. In a clash between the Western Powers and T otalitarian States, the latter would possibly have Japan with them, and though Germany and Italy would not be able to do much in the broad waters of the Atlantic Ocean, the Japanese would be paramount in the North-west Pacific. Participation by Japan, however, seems less likely to-day. The disadvantages of Britain’s geographical position are selfevident: its advantages are not so clear. As a notable British authority has said, “It is true that we are scattered over threequarters of the globe’s surface. But in war that means, since we control the seas, that our supply of food and essential raw materials can never be exhausted.” Germany has been described as a self-contained fortress set in the centre of Europe. Italy on the other hand, is an elongated | peninsula, the shores of which are open to naval and aerial attack, j especially upon the western side. She has been called the prisoner of the Mediterranean. If she were to join Germany in war against the Western Powers, she would have to meet combined fleets of theirs operating in the Mediterranean. Her maritime trade would almost cease. Pier ports, at least those on her western coast, would hardly be operative. It is a question whether she would remain in nossession of the islands of Sardinia and Sicilv. Indeed, Italy’s attachment to Germany would cost her dearly, if the combination were to come into violent contact j with the Western Powers. However, it would seem that the die is ! cast. For weal or for woe Italy is ' chained to Germany’s chariot wheel, and if the Teutons promote strife, the inhabitants of the peninsula must share in it, and bear the consequence. Is it extraordinary, therefore, that the question has been frequently asked, “How strong is the Axis?’’ It is said of a chain that it is no stronger than its j weakest link. Is the Axis any stronger than its weaker part? It probably is, but its weaker part may be a danger, if put to the lest. In the prospective war which may overwhelm Europe, the Italian sees that he would be lied to Germany’s chariot-wheel, and that if the Axis were to lose, Italy would be “an outcast nation without a friend in the world.’’ If she were to break loose from Germany, Italy would always have to be ready to resist t hat country’s revenge, and if Italy remained neutral she would be obliged to deal ultimately with the conquerors. The average Italian opinion is said to be. “Britain is our only hope. Britain is our only friend. If she fails we

! are lost.’’ But what about the ! Axis? Surely it is necessary to discard the old love before taking on a new. While part of the Axis, Italy may possibly be brought into conflict with Britain. That is a thing which the average Italian does not wish: a conflict with BriI tain could bring Italy no possible advantage, and would certainly bring her very definite loss. And | yet her attachment to the Axis I is leading her in that direction. ■ Is that the reason why Signor Mussolini is reported to have apI peared to show a declining interest in the attachment to Germany? Although Italy is stated to have been accelerating her i military preparations in the past few days the Italian Dictator is generally credited with having ( shown less eagerness for possible war than has been displayed by i the aggressive, acquisitive German ! Fuhrer.