Nelson Evening Mail TUESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1936 A STABILISING EFFECT

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXX, 6 October 1936, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail TUESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1936 A STABILISING EFFECT

THE psychology of the nations of the European Continent is to-day very much what it was during the months immediately preceding the outbreak of war in 1914. Then, as now, all of them were armed to the teeth; then, as now, the destiny of peace rested m the hands of Germany, whose people were dominated by the psychology of war. Then, as now, the Government and people of Britain ardently desired peace, but were powerless to enforce it. That is why the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr Neville Chamberlain) said, the other day, that “the state of the world renders it essential (for Britain) to embark on the largest programme of expenditure on the defence of the country ever undertaken in time of peace.” At first thought, that may seem to some to mean that war in Europe is inevitable, but the fact is that a fully-armed Britain is one of the most potent factors for promoting peace, for no one but a lunatic imagines that she would use her strength for the purpose of creating war, and all people of sound judgment know that she desires to be strong in order that she may enforce peace. But what of the other Great Powers of Europe?—do they equally desire peace? Undoubtedly some of them do. France certainly desires peace. There is no reason to doubt

Signor Mussolini when he says he does not wish to disturb the peace of Europe. The Russians, whatever the doctrines of Lenin may be, are on the defensive, both in the Far East and in Europe. What then remains to be considered? Germany. She is the unknown factor. Herr Hitler has said that her territorial expansion should be eastward. He said that before he

was Dictator of Germany, and now that he possesses the power, it is possible that he will seek to put his idea into practice. If he should do so, France would be involved, for she is practically an ally of Russia, and there would be a general conflagration in Europe, as there was in 1914. In such circumstances, what would be Britain’s position? Could she keep out of the conflict? It is difficult to see

how she could. For that reason her Government proposes to be overwhelmingly strong in the air, strong at sea, and to maintain her limited army in the highest state of efficiency. In any case she holds the balance of power as between the Dictators, on the one hand, and the republican Powers —France and Russia—on the other hand; and she has recently indicated clearly that her sympathies are with France. For that reason, if for no other, it is highly probable that the German Dictator will try to curb the militant spirit of his Nazi followers, the more especially as he has full knowledge of the fact that his nation is so situated economically that its primary necessity is peace —at least for a time. But the political machine which ho created, and which so largely gives him his power, may dictate his policy; and the Nazis’ warlike proclivities are proverbial. Hence Britain’s decision to prepare for eventualities, and the outspoken words of her Chancellor of the Exchequer are calculated to have a stabilising effect upon the European situation.