BRITAIN REARMS

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXX, 12 March 1936, Page 4

BRITAIN REARMS

BUT IN WHAT FIELDS? ARGUMENTS FOR AIR FORCE THE FEAR OF CHANGE The lolly of giving a lead in dis-arma-ment has at length been recognised, by the Government, which, at the recent General Election, asked for and received a definite mandate to repair the serious deficiencies in our defences, writes Brig-adier-General I’. R. C. Groves, formerly director ol (lying operations at the Air .Ministry, in the ‘‘Daily Mail.” But there is now a grave risk that while attempting to escape from the Scylla of one-sided disarmament we shall be caught by the Charybdis of wrong rearmament. Lor whereas the conditions of modern warfare call for sweeping changes in oar whole defensive system, the military mind —the nation's accepted adviser in matters of defence—is opposed to any such stop. At this juncture wc may well recall Marshall Foeli’s famous dictum: “The military mind always imagines that the next war will be fought on the same lines as the last. That lias never yet been the case, and never will be.” . Our own history, in common with that of Continental States, bears out these truths.

The British Army which took the field in Smith Africa in 1899 still bore the stamp of the Crimea. And although the South African War taught us many valuable lessons, the Army of 1914 •had in several important respects made no progress toward modernisation. For example, the number of machine guns per division in 1914 was still what it was in 1899—namely, 24 LIVES LOST By 1918 this number had increased to 500. hut meanwhile tens of thousands of lives had been sacrificed to the conservatism which for 15 years had discounted this deadly weapon, although its efficiency had been repeatedly demonstrated in foreign wars during that period. In the Great War itself there was no new military innovation but was frowned upon. The classic example was that of the. tank. According to the Germans themselves this weapon was eventually a decisive factor in the Allies’ victory on t lie western front. Yet its introduction was greatly delayed by the opposition of our High Command. The following statement published by Major-General .T. F. C Fuller, who was Chief Staff Officer of the Royal Tank Corps, indicates what that prejudice and conservatism cost this country :

“From July to November, 1917, tanks were not efficiently used, and our casualties per square mile captured averaged 8,222. “.From July to November, 1918, tanks were efficiently used and our casualties per square mile captured averaged 86.” The term “military mind,” in the sense used here, comprises the naval mind.

THE STUBBORN NAVY

Lord Fisher wrote in his hook “Records” : “It is an historical fact that the British Navy stubbornly resists change.” He gave as examples the opposition to the introduction of steam, iron ships, breech-loading guns, the turbine, the torpedo, wireless, and aircraft., Even the'submarine, a weapon which brought us to the very brink of disaster was discounted —witness the facts that no submarine-proof base had been provided in the north, and soon after tjio outbreak of war the Grand Fleet was obliged to take refuge in Lough Swillv, on the north coast of Ireland, while the defences of Seapa Flow were being hurriedly marshalled. In view of these examples of what is really an inherent failing is it surprising that." file naval and military hierarchies have, since the war. systematically discounted and opposed the development of the Royal Air Force, which connotes not only a new weapon but one which lias persistently encroached upon their time-honoured preserves ? Herein lies the root of our decline to the position of a subordinate air Power, and the explanation of the fact that until last year no more than 3s in every £ of our defence expen-

diturc went to the “Air,” 10s to the Navy, and 7s to the Army. PRODIGIOUS PROGRESS Although the Royal Air Force now receives a slightly larger share, the distribution still bears no relation to realities. For not only can the Navy and Army do nothing to preserve us from a. knock-out blow from the skies, hut, in the event of a Continental war, the efficiency dependent upon adequate defence in the air.

Failing such defences our Navy could he quickly immobilised by the destruction of its bases, and our shipping be sunk wholesale in homo waters and in port. And the aerial limitations to naval action automatically involve the Army, for this is dependent upon shipping for conveyance overseas . . In point of fact, each of the major roles of sea itower —home defence, protection of shipping, even co-operation in Imperial defence (as the present situation in the Mediterranean show's) —has been modified, or seriously compromised, by the evolution of the new arm. And the potency and scope of this are constantly increasing. It is not only the intensive expansion of foreign' air fleets-commercial as well as military—that concerns us, hut the prodigious progress in aircraft performance. For example, the latest American bomber has a flying range of 2,000 miles carrying a load of two tons, and there is reason to think that at least one type of bomber on Hie Continent has ;i similar performance.

SIX TIMES AS MANY A single squadron of such aircraft could in one trip drop six times the weieht in bombs dropped in the most destructive rain on London in the Great War. It could strike a far heavier blow than the latest tvne of hattleshin, for whereas the nine 16in guns of a ship of (he Nelson class fire a salvo of 18,4321 b. the air squadron’s salvo of bombs would weigh 53,7601 b. This, of course, does not imply that navies can now he dispensed with ; hut it emphasises both the need for a revaluation of armaments and the jeopardy of our position as sixth or seventh air Power. First and foremost, rearmament should make good this immense disparity in tiie over-riding arm, for this is tlie cardinal need that transcends every other defensive requirement. But no such course is foreshadowed. Our home defence programme provides for no morn than 1,500 first-line aircraft by 1937. This number would not bring us within sight of equality with Hie strongest. European Power ■!' we possessed them to-day.