TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1936 THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXVI, 14 January 1936, Page 4

TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1936 THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE

THOUGH it is too early to say that the London hi aval Conference has failed, it seems clear that the Japanese delegation, by pursuing a policy of its own, is likely to prevent anything like complete success being attained. A recent report of the Conference said, after reference had been made to Japan’s criticisms of the suggestions of France, Britain, and Italy: A further Japanese pronouncement will, it is understood, be made, and the newspapers state that if it indicates that the Japanese delegates will discuss no agreement that does not embody a common upper limit, to which the other delegations are opposed, a critical stage in the Conference may be regarded as approaching. The United States’ delegation is in acicord with proposals of the three European Powers, and though there seems to be some talk of Japan’s withdrawal from the Conference, it is possible that the delegations of the remaining Powers will work out a plan “for the exchange of building programmes.” In that case, it would seem that Britain, the United States, France, and Italy would be brought into close association not only in regard to naval construction, but in relation to naval policy generally, and that Japan would have separated herself from the concert of Naval Powers. For the time being, however, Japan has decided not to withdraw from the Naval Conference unless it considers withdrawal unavoidable.

The Washington Naval Treaty was based on the formula 5—5—3, whereby Britain and the United States were each represented by the figure five, and Japan, France and Italy by the figure three. That meant that Japan’s navy would be throe-fifths the size of the British Navy. Not long ago the Japanese Government declared its intention (so soon as the existing treaty expires at the end of the present year) to create a navy as great as that of the greatest Naval Power. The present Conference, it seems, is being held for the purpose of bringing the Naval Powers into accord as to their building programmes, and to prevent anything like a naval shipbuilding race, when the Washington and London

Treaties expire. Indeed, it is evident that all the great Naval Powers, except Japan, desire to bring about a general reduction of naval armaments—on the understanding that the formula 5 —5—3 be adhered to—but the attitude, which Japan has taken up, threatens to frustrate the objects of the Conference. For it must be realised that in no case will Britain and the United States consent to Japan’s naval equality with themselves. The two Great Powers which speak the same language and see eye-to-eye in regard to so many features of world-poli-tics, will never consent to Japan’s claim to naval equality. There is no BritoAmericati naval agreement, but no doubt the Governments of the two great Eng-lish-speaking nations have discussed Japan’s naval rivalry in all its bearings. Moreover, they are able to maintain their naval supremacy, both individually and collectively, over Japan; but the last thing that they desire is a naval shipbuilding race, such as that which, prior to 1914, existed between Britain and Germany, and was one of the factors which contributed to the breaking out of the Great War. Already there is between Britain and France an understanding which permits the concentration of (lie entire French Navy in the Mediterranean. If the suggested four-Power Conference should bring the three European Naval Powers and the United States into agreement as to the prospective sizes of their navies, they will necessarily come to some understanding as to the attitude which they shall adopt towards the nation in the Far East which determines to frame its naval shipbuilding programme without reference to the agreements reached by the other Naval Powers whose delegates are assembled at London.