Nelson Evening Mail TUESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1933 JAPAN’S NAVAL POLICY

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXVI, 22 August 1933, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail TUESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1933 JAPAN’S NAVAL POLICY

WHEN a Alinister of War communicates

to the Associated Press the tale of his nation’s warlike proclivities during nearly thirty years, and offers what amount to excuses or apologies for those bellicose activities which have brought on it the disapprobation of the League of Nations, the question will he asked where next such a nation will resort to force. That apprehension is awakened by the expressions of Afr Araki, Japanese Alinister of War, published in our cablegrams yesterday. First of all the Japanese Alinister said that Japan has no intention of apologising for her recent acts of war in Alanchuria and China, and then, as if to excuse those acts, lie bitterly attacked Western diplomacy for “its lip-service of peace.” Next Air Araki denounced those international agreements and accords which have been framed for the purpose of preserving, and have preserved, peace in Europe for ten years and more, but which, lie said, had been of no help to Japan “in her times of need,” by which presumably he meant to refer to China’s unsuccessful acts of self-defence when striving to repel Japan’s recent aggression and rapacity. Next, this Japanese Alinister complained of Great Britain’s refusal to renew the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, in 1922, and complained that tlie people of his nation “are practically barred from migrating to vast semifilled spaces” in Canada and Australia; and finally he spoke of the existing naval agreements in such a manner as to leave no doubt that Japan will demand naval equality with the United States, when the Washington and London Treaties terminate in two or three years’ time.

It will be observed that this somewhat extraordinary statement —extraordinary because there was no need to make it — was an intimation to the United States that Japan claims naval parity, and'a hint that, when such parity is attained, | the British Empire may expect Japan to claim the right to send its emigrants to Canada and Australia. Of course the Japanese Government knows its business best. But it seems that what its Minister of War has done is to warn the English-speaking nations to prepare to meet Mongolian aggression on the seas and in North America and Australia and New Zealand. It would have been thought that for quite a long time the

newly-acquired territories in Alanchuria and Jehol would occupy the energies and ambitions of Japan, but apparently so great are those energies and ambitions that tlie Alikado’s Government may he expected in due course to enter upon a trans-oceanic policy which ultimately may bring it into conflict with the Eng-lish-speaking nations. It will be noticed that Mr Araki said nothing in reference to tho American States of the Pacific Slope—California, Oregon, and Washington—which the Japanese so greatly affect, but from which they are so largely debarred, yet, when talking so freely of his nation’s obvious transmarine ambitions, the Japanese Alinister of War might just as well have included the liree great and beautiful Western States in his description. But of course the real point of his remarks was in his insistence on Japan’s right to possess a navy equal to America’s.

It is difficult to understand what advantage Air Araki hoped to gain by thus exposing his Government’s hand. Perhaps he imagined that by revealing Japan’s ambitions he might be able to ascertain America’s reactions thereto. Ilis remarks were framed in such a manner as to indicate that those ambitions are directed chiefly, if not entirely, towards British territories, and with a view to separating Great Britain and the United States in the matter of their naval policies. But the British and American nations know on which side their bread is buttered, and if Air Araki imagines that he can say or do anything which may weaken their reciprocity and community of interest, he is doomed to disappointment. Long before the Naval Treaties come up for discussion, amendment, renewal, or abrogation, the Governments of Great Britain and the United States will have discussed quietly, per medium of their Ambassadors and other representatives, the policy which they will adopt for the purpose of maintaining in their hands the naval domination of tho world. Of course the Japanese Government might refuse to he bound by another Naval Pact, and might rereserve the right to build what navy it might think fit, hut, in any armament race which would ensue, it would not have much hope of success against the two nations which are best equipped in every way to maintain that naval supremacy which they have shared in common for the last ten years.

Whatever object the Japanese War Alinister had in making the remarks to which reference has been made, it is as well that he made them, for now the British and Americans know what to expect from Japan when the next international conference is held to discuss naval armaments. If, as has been dearly indicated, Japan insists on parity with tlie greatest Naval Power (whether that Power ho Great Britain or the United States) she will incur great expense and create conditions which will somewhat resemble those which existed in pre-war days, when tho German Emperor challenged Great Britain’s naval supremacy. The result is that to-day there is practically no German navy. With Great Britain and the United States acting in concert, their conjoint navies would represent so formidable an armada, that no single Power could hope to challenge it successfully. Of course tlie attempt could be made, hut the hazard would be so great that the challenging Power would do well to hesitate, lest, when the issue should be decided, it should find itself, like Germany, reduced to a condition of hopeless naval inferiority.