Nelson Evening Mail SATURDAY, JULY 14, 1928 N.Z. IN THE LATE 'FIFTIES

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXI, 14 July 1928, Page 6

Nelson Evening Mail SATURDAY, JULY 14, 1928 N.Z. IN THE LATE 'FIFTIES

IT is diflieult to write of the period which preceded tho second Maori war, which began in 1860, because, during tho years 1855-60 history’s skein is tangled and difficult to unravel. But two or three facts seem to stand out clearly, and help to explain how i.t was that the friendly relationship which existed between the two races when Sir George Grey left the Colony, at the end of 1853, had been changed into a feeling of distrust and animosity five years afterwards, and ultimately made war unavoidable. The King Movement; the Maori Land League; the repeal of tho Arms Ordinance. Those are the outstanding facts which seem to indicate tho course of events, and explain the reasons and causes which underlay tho growing racial antagonism. Colonel Gore Browne, the Governor, certainly did not desire war; on the contrary, he visited the Maori King with a view to preventing it. The New Zealand Government, at whose head was Mr Edward Stafford of Nelson, did not desire war; as is proved by its inaction as regards any proper arrangements to meet such an emergency. The settlers had nothing to gain, and much to lose, by war; they certainly did not desire it. There were in tho towns small sections of people who were antiMaori, and thought that the only way to settle the land question was to precipitate war; but they were not in a position to do anything more than talk, and they did not express, in the early stages at least, the great body of public opinion. When we turn to examine the Maori attitude, we find the true cause of the trouble. One who lived in those days, and watched with anxiety the growing truculence and enmity of tho Maoris of the Waikato, has left a description which is worth quoting:— The King possessed a formidable army—if it might he called so—of from eight to ten thousand fighting men, scattered over the country, but organised so that large numbers could be rapidly concentrated at any one pojnt; large accumulated supplies of food, of arms and ammunition, and a position iri the centre of the North Island from which a descent could be made in a few hours on any of the European settlements. The King prohibited roads being made through two-thirds of the Island; the large rivers were barred against steamers, so that nine-tenths of the country was closed against ordinary means of travel and transport. The Queen’s law was defied; her Magistrates treated with supercilious contempt; her writs torn to pieces and trampled under foot. Europeans married to Native women were driven out of the King’s districts, \vhile their wives and children were taken from, them if they refused to recognise the King or pay an annual tribute to him. Ait this was accompanied by the exhibition of outrageous arrogance and undisguised contempt for the Queen, the Governor, and the Queen's loyal subjects, whether Native or European. ... It was impossible for the Governor to procure reinforcements or to take any precautionary military step without precipitating a war and Bringing down on his devoted head the wrath o? Exeter Hall. As for the colonials, the situation was simply ruinous and disheartening in the extreme. Moreover it was humiliating as well as menacing. . . . The military resources of the Governor were absurdly inadequate. The term of service of the Royal New Zealand Fencibles (old Soldiers who had been settled on land immediately south of Auckland) had expired, and they were no longer liable to military service, except in the Militia, so far as regards men under fifty-five. The 58th Regiment (which Colonel Wynvard commanded) had gone Home. The only regiment in the Colony, the 65th, had been suffered to fall far below war strength, and at this period did not number more than about 750 bayonets. . . .”

. Such, then, was the position just prior to the outbreak of war at Taranaki ; the Maori King had at his disposal some eight or ten thousand wellarmed warriors, and the Governor had one weak regiment of the line, which was distributed between Auckland, Wellington, Wanganui and New Plymouth, and in addition a ' number of newlyraised Militia and Volunteer Companies, armed well, but without training and fts yet unproved. It was a situation which should not have been allowed to develop. It is safe .to say that, if Sir George Grey could have continued to fill the Governorship, it would not have developed ; bo would have arrested the King Movement by means of the supreme influence which he possessed over the Maori mind; he would have shown the Maori Land League to be unnecessary while the buying and selling of Maori land wove vested solely in him; he certainly would not have repealed the Army Ordinance, which was one of the* primary means of preventing war, since it. prevented the acquiring of weapons wherewith to make war. But Governor Gore Browne, staunch, steadfast, and honourable as he was, appealed neither to the imagination nor to the heart, of the Maori. He possessed no expedient for counteracting or arresting the King Movement. He seems tc have regarded the formation of the Maori Land League as tantamount to a hostile act. Acting on the advice of his Ministers, he repealed the Arms Ordinance, partly because he could not enforce it, and partly because the nonenforcement tended to reduce the authority of the Crown. So by proclamation in the Government Gazette, 1857, Governor Gore Browne gave the Maoris permission, in certain circumstances, to buy arms and ammunition. Immediately on the promulgation of this proclamation,, wo are told by

one who lived through those tunes, gun-shops were opened by Europeans in different settlements, and before the expiration of six months several thousand stand of arms and much powder were sold to tho aborigines. Every vessel from Australia brought cheap guns for tho Maori trade, and Government was deceived as to tho quantity actually sold. . . . During the early days of New Zealand the introduction of fire-arms promoted peace anil civilisation —[though the writer does not explain how this anomalous conclusion is arrived at J—but, in its present state, the Natives would be better subjects, and the. Queen’s law would run better through the land, if tlicy were entirely without them, a consummation Governor Grey’s Act was doing much to promote. . . . Tho first step to civilise turbulent men is to deprive them of the means of injuring others. Wc who disarmed Ireland directly should never hesitate to disarm the New Zealunders indirectly, when the smell of powder is associated among them witll legends of rapine anil murder. No country can prosper with a few petty armed tyrants; and there must always exist a feeling of insecurity, so long as a hundred Natives possess more fire-arms than tho thousand settlers.

That was printed in 1859. There is no doubt whatever that the repeal of the Arms Ordinance was one of tho principal contributory causes of tho outbreak of war in the following year. We have read the pros and cons relating to this repeal, and have no hesitation in concluding that it was a grave error. N'oither the Governor nor tho Ministry had any clear idea as to how tho Native Question should be handled. Indeed, I hey had no well-defined Native policy. If they had a policy, it was one of drift; and that in face of the fact that, less than a hundred miles sputh of Auckland, (hero was growing into being a hostile combination which had but one object, namely to dispute tho authority of the Crown and to make war on .the Pakeha, if thereby the Maoris of the King Country might possibly retard tho encroachments of the white race.