THE BATTLE OF GAMBRAI
SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCH. . WHY THE ATTACK WAS CONTINUED. REASONS FOB THE LATER SETBACK. SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES AVERTED. BY BRAVERY OF THI TROOPS. (Aft&traliait and N.Z. Gable Association * and Router.) (Rec. March. 5, 10.20 a.m.} LONDON, March 4. Sir Douglas Haig's despatch to the War Office dealing with the Battle' of Cambrai, mentions that it was proposed to stop the attack A3 hours after its commencement or sooner, if "'the results did not justify continuance. __lll detailing the reasons for its continuance after the ex/piryi of this period, Sir Douglas Haig states that the positions captured north of Flesquires (7£ miles south-west of Cam'brai) were completely commanded by Bourbon Ridge (five miles west of 'Cambrai, with a wood a square mile in extent and the highest ground for many miles around 1 ) and must be abandoned unless the ridge was gained. On the other hand, the enemy showed signs of withdrawing, and' the loss of the ridge would probably cause the Germans to abandon carefullv-preparedi defence systems' for a considerable distance northward. The enemy was not yet too strong in the Bourlon region to "be overcome by the numbers' at Sir Douglas Haig's disposal. An additional important argument for continuing the attack was the enemyoffensive in Italy: moreover, two divisions, under orders for Italy, were -placed at 'Sir Douglas Haig's disposal. Therefore. the prospect of securing Bourlon Ridge seemed good. In dealing with th P enemy counterattack on 31st November, Sir Douglas> •Haig says: At the northern end of Bonairs Ridge and. the Gonnelieu sector (about nine miles south-southwest of Cambrai). the swiftness of th P enemy's advance, after the openinor bomhardL ment, appears to have overwhelmed our troops, both in the line and in the inisupport almost before they realised that the attack had 'begun. The
nature of the bombardment contributed 1 to the success of the enemy's plana. No •steadily advancing barrage gav e a warning of the approach of the man assault columns, whose secret assembly was assisted by th© formation' of the ground and the morning mist. A great number of low-flying German aeroplanes rained machine-gun fire upon our infantry, while the extensive use of smoke shells and bombs made it dif-, ficult for our troops to see 11 what happening on other parts of the- battlefield. There is little doubt that although the attacks extended generally, yet these' were as a battle. While this assault effected* a local surprise, Sir Douglas Haig says the greatest credit is due to the troops at Masnieres' (south of Cam'brai), Bourlon (five miles west of Cambrai) and Moeuvres (eight miles west of Cambrai) for gallant services on this day. Their steady courage and staunchness saved possible serious consequences. Dealing further with the results of the Cambrai Battle, Sir Douglas Haig says there is little doubt that it was of considerable indirect assistance to the Allied forces in Italy, where large demands were made upon the available German reserves at a time when a great concentration of German divisions was still being maintained in Flanders. Evidence is available that German divisions, intended for the Italian theatre, were diverted to Cambrai. It isprobable that a further concentration of German forces in Italy was necessary at the most critical period, when the Italians were making- t'heir first stand on the Piave. The partial success of the enemy's attack may tend to show that the garrison on this front was insufficient, either owing to want of numbers or lack of training, or exhaustion.
Sir Douglas Haig emphasises the point that captured maps and orders proA'e that the enemy aimed at far greater results than he achieved. Three convergent attacks were to be made on the salient formed by the British advance. Two of these were delivered approximately simultaneously near Gonnelieu (nine miles south-southwest of Cambrai) and Masnieres (south of Cambrai), followed by a still mor e powerful attack on Bourlon Wood. The objectives of these attacks extended to the hieh. ground at Beauttamp and Troscault. The enemy hoped to capture or destroy the whole of the British forces on the Cambrai salient. This bold, ambitious plan was foiled over the greater part of th e front by the splendid defence of the British divisions- engaged. Though the defence temporarily broke down, the recovery made byweak forces still left there within immediate reach was most praiseworthy. After paying a tribute to the manner in which General the Hon.. Sir Julian Byng conducted. the operation, Sir Douglas Haig states that the great offensivevvaleu e of the tanks was conclusively proved. In view, of the experience," the enemy will hesitate to deplete any portion of his front in order to free troops for decisive action elsewhere.
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Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LII, Issue 55, 5 March 1918, Page 5
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783THE BATTLE OF GAMBRAI Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LII, Issue 55, 5 March 1918, Page 5
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