Nelson Evening Mail. WEDNESDAY. JULY 5, 1916. CHOICE OF OFFENSIVE.

Nelson Evening Mail, 5 July 1916, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail. WEDNESDAY. JULY 5, 1916. CHOICE OF OFFENSIVE.

UP to the present it can be said that the Germans have been in a position to choose the localities for their main operations. These have naturally been where the best results -were to be obtained, and- also where the Allies would be forced to fight at greatest disadvantage. The present, offensive, following closely on the Russian attack im the.East, it is apparent, is the deliberate choice of the Allies. Nor has it been undertaken', it would seem from latest reports, to relieve the pressure on Verdun, for the .French are holding their own and have succeeded in regaining Thiaumont- work and checking the Germans in their attempt to drive a dangerous wedge, into the French defences east of the Meuse. For some 'time past it must have .been- evident to the citizens of Berlin that all was not well with the army. German, reports have doubtless kept the i-eal truth from the people, but the course of events have been so different from what they ware taiught tio believe, that there .must be grave misgiving, and- it is not difficult to believe the report that a panic has broken out in- Berlin, although this will doubtless be quietened before it assumes dangerous proportions. The German nations is fighting -with" its back to the wall, and it will not give in without al struggle. It has been authoritatively stated that the Russian offensive was not undertaken- without consultation with the Allies —in fact, it has been declared that it j.« part of the tactics agreed; upon by the Allies in council, and it is highly improbable that -the Anglo-French troops -would make such an extensive offensive as the Arras-Royie drive apart from policy generally agreed upon.. Therefore, we have this ground for believing that the Allies have commenced a lasting offensive, but we think it would be unwise to conclude that big results will follow immediately. "We have in previous issues i given some reasons why this is so, and the cables have definitely warned the people against hoping for too much in the nea-r future. And further, it may ibe found that this offensive will be followed by others equally violent, but in areas where the possibilities of achieving definite l-esults are greater. The present- activity seems to have been undertaken mainly for the purpose of adding to the discomfiture of the Ger- : •mans at a time when they are hard j pressed. They have already sent large forces to the East, and the Russians will no longer be.able to record the remarkable progress of the past few- weeks ; but . the offensive has not been checked, and moreover, Hindienburg has jiot been able tio create a serious diversion, in the [ north. Tlliis, -together with the Russian j pressure in the south, meanns that more German troops are needed in the East. The continued progress of the Italians indicates that reinforcements are required in the Trentino, and -the Allied offensive in the West necessitates the removal of large forces to the region of the River Somme. Obviously neither Germany nor Austria, has* the available supplyi to hold their ground oni the three fronts, whilst the Bulgars and -the Turks must ha left to their own. devices. And the outlook for the Central Powers is anything but i' promising in the Balkans, with every indication of an overwhelming Ver.ezelist victory .at . the coming elections, and with everything favourable for Roumanian intervention. Before the Western- offensive, the Cermani people must have been looking for something goodi to turn -up to sustain their rapidly vanishing hopes, but instead tihey have seen a manifestation of .the Allied strength in" the West -that j must have caused- - .dismay in tihe heart lof the most optimistic of their countrymen.