Nelson Evening Mail. TUESDAY, JULY 4, 1916. POSSIBILITIES IN THE WEST.

Nelson Evening Mail, 4 July 1916, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail. TUESDAY, JULY 4, 1916. POSSIBILITIES IN THE WEST.

ACCORDING to the cables it has been proved' that there has .been n o withdrawal of Gferman troops facing the British front to take part in attack on Verdun'. The r/umber 'given at the time of tho concentration was 800,000, <ind so -uncertain, were the Germans regarding the point of attack that i\vould be selected ibyj the Allies that they were forced to keep the main .portions of the line carefully defended.. This choice of offensive is one of the- main advantages any attacking force possesses., for if he can obscure his intentions to a certain extent, as for instance the British have done by bombardiment on the whole fronit, he is able at the last moment—the old l time surprise tactics are well nigh impossible now—to concentrate large forces at the point selected for attack. Andi further, it is stated in regard, to the present offensive, that the j Germans expected the attack to be made further north-, in the vicinity of Lens. The Germans realized', of course, that great -possibilities presented themselves to the Allies if they could advance from Lens and reach, say, - tihe railway linefrom Lille somewhere in the neighbourhood of 'Douai. Sir ODouglasfHaig would then not oi»ly cut direct communication between Arras- and Lille, hut cut the railway running l from the former position towards t-lie Meuse Valley-—the railway along which the' German supplies come for the German front south of Arras to the Aisne river. One of the main disadvantages of such an offensive -would be- that the Germans would be aMe to attack the two sides of the wed'ges from the "Lille and Arras strongholds^ There are four outstanding features in tho position- on the Western' front ■which, it is thought, will very largely determine the nature of the Western

campaign. It is well to keep these in mind, for whether the- Allies attack in these directions or not, the features in tho . general position indicate in .so&ie measure 'what may be expected. These, and in their order from the north, are —the British thrust out towards the German line of communications along the Ttiver Meuse. Opposing this are the two main buttresses of the German line in the North—Arras and Lille. They are very strong, and success, as stated above, ds more likely to be gained' by the 'British forces in this- region, by a flank attack, against the two positions rather than by a frontal .movement. T'ne next point of interest is the plateau ot Ardennes, an impassable tract of forest [ country lying ibetweieni the tsx> main German lines of communication northwards of the French line, about midway between Verdun, and Soissons. follow this plateau the scteondi line, of com- i munication to the Glerman front runs through a neck of country 'between the foreste of Argonne and Wdevre on the south and the Ardennes on the north. Alone the ridge of the Argon-ne the French have advanced to t'he region west of Vauquois, and are to some extent threatening, the Luxemburg line of communications. At present # thv most northerly point of;, the French line near Vauquois is about'ls mile's as the crow flies "south of the Luxemburg Hue, and), for many months the Germans have fought desperately -to prevent the French from advancing a-nyl further. If the French made a strong advance heie t..sy -would dielfiniitely cut the long German, line into two parts, and the section in France could) only -hold communication with the- section ' im- Germany by going round- the plateau of the Ardeiuies to

the north. Through, this breach tho French could -drive along the Luxemburg line into Germany, widening still further the gaip and. threatening the southern German line in Lorraine and A isaco from the northern flank. Onthe other hand the French are threatened by the German attack on Verdun nearby and) also by the German salient at St. Mihiel. -If the Germans can force through either of these two places to any extent, the French wjll be compelledl to withdraw from the positions now threatening the 'German' communications. Great progress 1 would' have, to be made by the French before they could reach the Luxembourg line, but the result would make heavy casualties worth while. 'Success here, as stated above, would throw the task of supplying the whole of the German line in- France ■upon the -Meuse communications in the north, which are already- heavily taxed. In the .present Arras-Rove, offensive the Allies do not seem to have chosen a line of attack immediately! threatening important points in the German communications. On the other hand, after careful observation', they have selected a wade front in undiulating country, which is not so heavily defended. The pimpose, it is stated, is to inflict the •greatest number of casualties on: the enemy ait 'the least possible cost. Instead of a sudden thrust forward on a narrow front the attack has beien delivered oni a broad front of some 25 miles-. This indicates that the offensive is the beginning of a big movement, for especially after the experiences inthe 'Ohamipagn'e last year,' where an advance was made on a narrow front, no comprehensive movement would be car-' ried on a front less than 25 or 30 miles in width. The danger of the narrow front is that it simply creates a salient in the line which is subjected' to concentratedl fire from, the enemy. Only the first and) second Gierm an lines have been;' taken. The third, the strongest of all,: remains yet to ;be stormed. The taking of a third line, as was pointed out yesterday, is impossible without- fresh artillery concentration, and doubtless we will next hear of further bombardments by artill'eryi that has been brought up to deal with the third line. If the Allies are able to continue inflicting heavy casualties on the Germans they will cause greater uneasiness- in Berlin, for the Central powers have all—or more — •than they can) d'o in stemming the Russian advance: and the Italian offensive in the Trentino.