Nelson Evening Mail. THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1915. INVASION OF EGYPT.

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume XLVIII, Issue XLVIII, 18 February 1915, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail. THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1915. INVASION OF EGYPT.

IT -is evident that some brisk fighting is likely to occur in Egypt before very long, for General von Kressenstein will ! not bo in a position to lose any time, nor -will he be able to retreat in safety, if defeated. There is very little likelihood of many of his 120,000 troops !ever coming out of the expedition alive. This attack on Egypt has been classed as one of the most desperate enterprises Jin military history. This army has been ' transported by a specially laid raihvay from Jerusalem, via Gaza, to Rafa on the Turco-Egyptian frontier and has ' struggled from, that point, -a distance of j 120 miles, across the most • -waterless desert of the Sinai Peninsula to various points within a day's march of the Canal. The Turks must have accomplished a- wonderful march along the old I caravan route from 'EI Arish, near the \ Turkish frontier, to El Kantara, on the Suez Canal. It is stated that the expedi- , tlcm must have been supplied .with water I from the base at El Arish, which is |9O miles from the Canal. EVen when J they reached the Canal the troops would I not be able to : secure fresh water.. The ,' frosh water is on the Cairo side, and how are the unfortunate troops to get i across the Canal? How can they ad- ! vance over a space swept by the guns of i the ships in the Canal? And there is I the garrison protecting Egypt to be [reckoned with.-- And further, an army, I having communications through a desert l is iu a disastrous position. A writer in the "Argus'' 1 recently dealt in an interesting manner with the military conditions of the Turco-German advance. The sea is worse than barred to it. Horse, foot, artillery, and supplies must cross' the desert, and gain a firm foothold beyond it. More and still more men, guns, 'and food must be able, to continue to 'crocs to hold the "point, d'appu," rein- ' ft>rce, support, and follow up the at- » tack. This, as he points out, cannot fee I done. There is' neither safe water, nor ! secure resting places adequate to carry through 'the desert -and place in array against the British in fighting condition and strength, bodies of troops in numbers and equipment capable of driving the' Allies back, far less of passing and totally overthrowing, them. "Even on their line' of march •'the' invaders will be subject .to shells from the Allied 'Navy , or its subsidiary flotilla, and on arriving at their objective they must front the British, army/supported on each wing by strong naval squadrons." If the gigantic German army could not in the face of naval guns establish itself on the Channel coast j how, he asks, is it possible for the composite, unwelded TurcoGerman expeditionary columns cross a desert and seize T a waterway frontier defended by a warlike, fully equipped I army supported by powerful warships'on the right and left, capable of bisecting their advance or closing in behind them. Were it possible for the invaders' to gain an initial success, that success, the writer' points out, would inevitably entail Their total destruction. For troops from India and "the fleet would; overwhelm them from the rear ere they could move -on. The expedition, he thinks, is (perhaps persisted in with the hope that a desperate struggle near the Canal may do some damage to the waterway capable of being spectacularly lied about for the gratification and bej guilement of Constantinople and Berlin, J even though' every ~ Turk and German j engaged perished.