Nelson Evening Mail. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1914. THE FIGHT IN FLANDERS.

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume XLV, Issue XLVIII, 17 December 1914, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1914. THE FIGHT IN FLANDERS.

IN view of the great battle that is being fought in Flanders, it is exceedingly interesting to observe what Mr Hilaire BeUoc has to say concerning it. Tho value of tho comments lies in the fact that the author presses the failure of tho German plan of attack, and offers an interesting theory to account for it. He points out that the principal characteristic of the campaign up to the present moment —that which seems to differentiate it from every other great campaign of the'past, and a characteristic probably proceeding from the wholly novel conditions of modern universal conscript armies and modern machines—is that these critical positions have never developed beyond a certain limit. They have never matured. They have never led to a decision. Nevertheless, he is tempted to say that, what with (1) the violence of tho struggle; (2) the large reinforcements involved on tlie German side); (3) the concentration of all main interest on- to this one point—the state of affairs does look more like a decision than anything we have had before. The German commander, it is evident, is fighting, not in expectation cf falling back on a defensive position, but to win or lose.

The writer then goes on to estimate J the elements which. may lead to the] expectation in this field of success or j failure upon either side. The first element is the separation of objectives | which the German Government has im posed upon the German forces. j clearly, has prescribed an advance along : the coast from Ostend towards Calais as one of the objects to be obtained by the, German army. As clearly, some other j person has proposed another effort (ano very vigorously maintained it) south and west of the town of Lille. The ,two may be co-ordinated by some agreement;' they do not come from one head. Mr. Bellock then goes en to examine what this duplication of. objective means. In this case he is'positively of "opinion' there, can be no question ofj "clawing roond" ; that is, of out-flanking-, because* the effort is being made at the end of a ! long, and; tenacious line which reposes on the sea and then stretches away indefinitely southwards. The other end of therm c—the far northern end on the German right—reposing on the sea, there is no outflanking there; for through the sea no troops can march. In ' other words, what the Germans must do if they succeed;, and the only thing they can possibly do,, is to tear a hole. But, lie says, when* you want to tear a-hole through a line you naturally put all the" strength' you have on one supposedly, weak spot. You must of course have troops all along the line to "hold" your, enemy, but you mass a "bolt" of men on some one comparatively narrow point, and, you launch it at that point where you think the- opposing line, from the pressure of bad or few forced, or difficult ground, can be broken. If the Germans massed all the men they could .spare for their "bolt"?in front of. Lille and hurled them against the point of La Basse; and. if by so doing they tore a hole through the* Allied line there, they would achieve, a result large in proportion •to their success. If their success were overwhelming and they poured, through in great numbers and very rapidly, they would probably cut off that great body of their enemies which fills up the remaining 50-milc line between. Lille and the sea. But even if they failed to cut off that northern group, with its hundreds of thousands of men, even if they failed to take them prisoners'and destroy them as a military force, .they would, even in case of that incomplete success, compel this advanced northern i portion to fall back very quickly. They would "uncover," as the phrase jgoes, all the sea coast well past Dunkirk*'to the neighbourhood of Calais.•.., To win in the Lille region by using there, at the Le Basse'e point, air the men they have free, would be in itself to win Calais.

; The answer, he says, must, be political. There is no other answer. Someone in control of German affah\s has said:—"lf we can occupy the sea coast quickly we shall 'have a certain political effect which wc desire,, .and which an ultimate ■. victory farther south will not subserve.". Someone else, more military, has said: — "I regret this waste of men upon a political object. Our only chance of breaking the enemy's line is to go for the main point west of Lille. I insist upon having, at any rate, great masses of men for that main point (the neighbourhood of Lille). Use 'what you think yon can spare to the north." Whereupon a compromise has been effected between the politician and the soldier. The ■ effect of this division of power has been ' to leave a large body of the Allies well advanced between both attacks, threatening at Ypres and to the east of Ypres, the flank of each German push. All those strong bodies in the neighbourhood of Ypres and to the east of that town, occupying country nearly up to Roulers, threaten the southern German advance by Lille somewhat, and threaten the sea coast advance very gravely indeed. Now, he asks in conclusion, what was the German political object in this inarch along the sea coast? To that a- simple ;md true answer con be given. The object was to frighten England .' This political move had, Mr Belloc admits, also some strategic value, though quite out of proportion to the strategic loss itinvolved. But first, *he asks liis readers to note another political object which may have been held in view by the

enemy, and thai- is the complete holding, of Belgian soil: The power to say that they were technically the masters of all thai hud once been Belgium may have attracted some German statesman or J. prince. At any rate, neither this nor any larger object was worth the diversion of men from the critical point cf Lille. It is tint diversion which puzzles every critic and student of the campaign in its present phase. It only puzzles him, says Mr BeUoc, if he forgets how often the most urgent military considerations have been sacrificed in the clash between the politician and the soldier.