FRANCE AND GERMANY.

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume VII, Issue 175, 24 July 1872, Page 4

FRANCE AND GERMANY.

PROBABLE RENEWAL OF THE WAR. We have perused tbe following article which appeared in the Christian World of April 19 with so much interest that we now re-publish it for the benefit of our readers : — It is startling to find so judicious, wellinformed, and sober-minded a journal as the Spectator discussing the question whether war between France and Germany is possible within the present year; nor is the alarm which such a circumstance is likely to occasion lessened by the consideration that the Spectator is very far from alone in regarding this as a practical question. In point of fact, except with reference to time, opinion seems to be agreed upon the subject. A war between France and Germany is felt to be coming ! It may be this year • it may be the next ; it may be deferred for a few years ; but the persuasion that it is iDevitable seems, to be universal. We make this announcement with profound and unaffected regret, and yet we cannot say that it surprises us. Our readers know how repeatedly and emphatically we declared that the terms in which Germany made peace with France ensured the renewal of the struggle at no distant date. Prince Bismarck's avowed theory of breaking the strength and spirit of France so effectually that peace would be secured for at least a generation we pronounced imprauticable as well as inhuman. Pence bad been secured for a genera tion by the pacification of 1815; and why ? Because, in tbe first place, France, though extremely well beaten, was not deprived of territory, or subjected to a tribute such as had never been heard of in history, and, in the second place, because the general sisterhood of European nations assumed the guardianship of the peace concluded, and France very well knew that, if she wanted more war, she must array all Europe against her. Prince Bismarck discarded this method and adopted his own, which seemed more energetic and business-like, but was in reality far less thorough. Haughtily waving aside the Powers of Europe, not deigning to ask them either to sanction the peace or to guard it, he proceeded upon the method of punishing France so severely tbat she might be incapable of going to war. He annexed Alsace and Lorraine, made E_etz a German fortress, and imposed a fine which all the world has combined to call stupendous. The plan adopted in 1815 had this result ; that France, for forty-five years, under every possible form of government, remained at peace with Prussia, The plan adopted in 1871 has brought us back in 1872 to that state of suspense, amazement, and distress which befits those who look upon two great .Christian nations getting ready for a terrible conflict. The immediate cause which has called the atteiition of political observers in ibis country to the state of the relations be-

tween Frauce and Germany, is the announcement from Berlin that "the conduct of France for the last few months, under the dictatorship of M. Thiers, has given great dissatisfaction to those persons who really hold her fate for the meantime in their hands," that is to say, to Prince Bismarck and the German Emperor. This statement is, of course, not official, but the correspondent of the Telegraph, who makes it, is evidently acquainted with the subject on which he writes, and his words are borne out by recent facts connected with Ihe increase of the German army. The leading statesmen of Prussia believe France to be preparing for war, and they appear willing to let it be known that, if such is M. Thiers' intention, Germany will interpose to prevent the preparations being carried to completion.

M. Thiers has been cautious to observe on all occasions a prudontial reserve as to his purposes in relation to Germany. He has expressed in conventional terms his desire for peace, and bas exhorted the nation to pay off tbe indemnity, and to pu&h forward, the industrial development of the country. Nevertheless, from the commencement of his dictatorship, he has suggested misgivings to those whose hearts were set upon the maintenenre of European tranquility, and it has gradually dawned more and more clearly upon observers both in France and elsewhere, that be bad a policy of which he spoke nothing, but which he prosecuted with great vigor, and that this policy might be described in one word, as the military resuscitation of France. Every one knew — Prince Bismarck himself must in calm hours have admitted — tbat France would restore her shattered armaments; the only question was in what manner aud at what rate the restoration was to take place. M. Thiers was particularly careful to return no audible answer to this question; but the answer which he in his heart returned to it has become evident from this — that at the end of one year after the conclusion of peace, tbe French army is in such a position that France could, to say the least, present a formidable resistance to au attack fom Germany. In the suppression of the Commune he found an opportunity of enabling the soldiers of Metz and Sedan to divest themselves of the consciousness of defeat and regain their military pride. By quartering the troops in huts and subjecting them to thorough drill, he effaced the last influences of demoralisation remaining from the war. He received an army vote of £15,000,000. He made provision for the creation of a powerful reserve. He perfected the equipment of the troops, filled up the list of officers, supplied the lack of rifles and of guns. All this was done with a maximum of efficiency, and a minimum of noise — quite in the way which we have learned to consider not the French way. Meanwhile, the French, burning with a thirst for vengeance as intense as ever took possession of a people, seem to have apprehended with the quick intuition of Gauls, tbe drift of the President. While factions bayed at him, the great body of Frenchmen caught his secret, felt that it; was their own, and became firmer and firmer in his support. The recent addresses of confidence in M. Thiers sent in by the Councils-General afford conclusive evidence that he has been acting in accordance with the wishes of his countrymen.

The course pursued by M. Gambetta in the Assembly corroborates our views of M. Thiers' policy. The ex-Dictator was conspicuously quiet, conspicuously anxious to avoid collision with M. Thiers, and leave him scope for his military reforms. Whatever might have been thought as to the intentions of M. Thiers, no one could believe that M. Gambetta acquiesced in the permanence of peace with Germany on the terms arranged in 1871. Whether M. Gambetta had an express understanding with M. Thiers, or whether he trusted the President ou general grounds, he proceeded exactly as if the two men had been in concert. He has now, however we venture to think, occasioned distress and embarrassment to M. Thiers. In a fervently patriotic, and Republican speech, delivered on the 10th of this month at Angers, the unwary balloonist used, words which, if correctly reported, will certainly afford Prince Bismarck an opportunity of putting a few awkward questions to M. Thiers. M. Gambetta is declared to have said, with reference to Alsace and Loraine, " We have neither lost them nor ceded them," and the remark was rendered the more significant by the addition, " But on this subject I must say little." This admits of but one interpretation —M. Gambetta expects a renewal of the war between France and Germany, and seems to hold that the sooner it occurs the better. If M. Thiers is playing, as we have supposed, a deep game, he will not tbank M.. Gambetta for forcing his hand. At all events, there is reason to believe that war between France and Germany is among the possibilities of a not very distant future.