The Nelson Evening Mail. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1866.

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume I, Issue 201, 26 October 1866, Page 2

The Nelson Evening Mail. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1866.

In applying the impressive lesson of the German War, says a London paper, a careful observer of events would at once conclude that the military strength of Prussia must depend upon a secret. What is this country which has just crushed a strong Confederacy with one arm and smitten down a powerful monarchy "with the other ? It is a population of 18,500,000, or less than the population of England and Wales alone. It has a revenue of £20,000,000, or less than onethird of our own revenue. Out of these resources it maintained au army on a peace footing of 210,000 men — as nearly the number of our own regular forces as possible. Thus far, then, we see that the military establishments of Prussia were not larger than ours, though they were far cheaper; and we may even proceed further in these calculations and comparisons without finding any material contrasts on the surface of the figures. Ev-ery reader knows that Prussia had an enormous force in reserve, but perhaps every reader does not know that the reserves of our own army are at least as large. The Prussian army, on a war footing, was reckoned at 609,000 men, while there were still available in the last resort about 100,000 more. These 700,000 troops constitute, it must be owned, a most formidable array; but we find in an official publication issued from the Statistical Department of the War Office that the war establishment of our own army amounts to no less than 769,680 men ; so that in regular forces and reserves together we have the advantage even of that power which has just astounded Europe by the magnitude of its armaments. But would our armaments prove as effective ? We leave that question without reply; but if it is to be answered in the negative, as nobody would consider a British army inferior to «. Prussian army soldier for soldier, it follows at once that the difference between the two establishments must consist in the quality of the reserves. Here, indeed, lies the true secret of Prussia's military strength, and a secret in its origin it really was, though it has been employed so long, and with snch notorious success, though it ought to be neither a mystery nor a monopoly any longer.

Sixty years siuce, after the famous battle of Jena, Napoleon imposed on the defeated Prussians the obligation of limit : ng their military establishments to a strength of 42,000 men. It was impossible to contradict the Emperor, and not easy, as might be thought, to deceive him, but the device was accomplished by Scharnhorst, the War Minister of the time, who not only evaded the decree of Napoleon, but laid the foundations of that military strength which has just been displayed in a career of unexampled triumph. Seharnhoi'St did restrict the actual or visible army of Prussia to the specified numbers, but he kept this army in a state of perpetual change. Its constitution never remaiued the same for twelve mouths together, but resembled the waters of a lake which receives a river at one end and discharges it at the other. As soon as a recruit was thoroughly drilled, aud had become an effective soldier, he was dismissed to his home, and a fre^h recruit was received in his place, to be again disciplined and again dismissed. The result of this system was that the standing army became but a specimen corps of a nation of soldiers. For every soldier in the ranks there were iive as good as he in the body of the people, all ready at the first call of tho trumpet to re-enter the line of the army. When, therefore, seven years after her great defeat, Prussia once more rose, a force of 200,000 men, admirably disciplined, appeared in the place of an army which Napoleon beleived he hud cut down to a fifth, of that .number. The Prussians were not ungrateful

to their benefactor. To this day the statue of Scharnhorst in white marble stands by the side of the great guard-house in the great thoroughfare of Berlin — a record of military sagacity, as well as national fame. The secret, then, of the Prussian strength consists in this, that the reserve force is practically as good as the force in the field. The regular army merely represents a portion of the entire army on duty for the time. The reserves are simply troops not on duty, but just, as competent for duty if their services should be required.

By this light let us examine our own reserves. In British Militia, British Volunteers British Yeomanry, and British reserves generally, we have a force of between 300,000 and 400,000 men actually within the limits of these isles. There is certainly, at first sight, no reason why this force should not be made as effective as the Landwehr or Landsturm of Prussia. A Prussian soldier is made by a service of five years, commencing at the age of 21. But of this short term of service one half only is passed in the regular army, the other half being spent in the army of reserve. No doubt, this is more training, or, at any rate, more effective training, than is given to our Militia ; bnt if the Prussian Landwehr could, at a few weeks' notice, fight their way from their own country to the very walls of Vienna, the British Militia should surely bo as competent for the less trying work of a home campaign. We say that such Volunteers as have just been reviewed at York and in Hyde Park cannot be the inferiors of these men, and that our Militia can need but little to make their training just as efficient. Is there not a method by which this littlo could be added? We are disconcerted now, year after year, at the loss of Some of the best soldiers from the regular army. A recruit enlists for teu years. At the expiration, of that time he may claim his discharge, and about fifty per cent, generally do so. We make every eiFort to retain these men and prevent their retirement ; but would it uot be a better plan if we encouraged such retirement even at an earlier period, on condition that the retiring soldier entered our army of reserve — that is, the Militia? Service in the Militia is certainly not onerous, and it might easily be made attractive. Here is the secret of Prussian strength. Short service, to le resumed if necessary. If such a secret has beaten Austria and conquered Germany, it may well suffice to defend Great Britain.