Use Of Air Power In Land Campaign

Northern Advocate, 14 December 1943, Page 3

Use Of Air Power In Land Campaign

(8.0. W.) RUGBY, Dec. 13.. General Montgomery’s revised treatise on the use of air power during a land campaign, unlike previous books by wellknown experts, is the l'ruit of. modern battle experience with direct application to present needs. General Montgomery believes that every army officer who aspires to a high commission must clearly understand certain basic principles of the use of air power. Its greatest asset is its flexibility which enables it to be switched quickly from one objective to another. The -weight of i all available air power can be used in selected areas in turn, and he believes that this concentrated use of atr striking forces is a battle winning factor of the first importance. He warns those who want to learn from Mediterranean experiences that control of all air power must be centralised and exercised through air officers. Nothing could be more fatal to hopes of success than to dissipate air resources into small packets placed under the command of army formation commanders, with each packet working to its own plan. Command of Force A soldier must not expect or wish to exercise direct command over an air striking force. Speaking generally, requests for tactical or immediate air aid pass through the air support link by radio to combined air and army headquarters, where priority targets are decided. Once a target has been selected, the air commander or his staff, decide how and when they shall be attacked, what force of aircraft shall be used and in what manner. General Montgomery makes clear his belief that the commander of an army in the field should have with him air headquarters which will have direct control of squadrons allotted to support his army. Because of the flexibility of air power, an army commander can obtain through air headquarters the support of a whole striking force at any vital point. Once this flexibility is destroyed or negatived, success of the plan to win the battle becomes endangered, and he believes that this will happen if a soldier attempts to exercise direct command over an air striking force. He believes it quite unnecessary for army commanders to command air units, though they must work alongside air commanders in complete harmony and with mutual understanding and confidence. Each service must understand the needs, limitations and possibilities of the other, but each should be allowed to carry out, as best it can, its own part of a joint plan. Except during an air attack, the army has one battle to fight. The air has two, for it must break the strength of the enemy’s air force before it can intervene in the land battle with maximum hitting power.