Jap. Armada Was Bound For Java

Northern Advocate, 9 March 1942, Page 6

Jap. Armada Was Bound For Java

The following article by Thomas Dunbabin, written for the “Sydney Daily Telegraph,” is very interesting despite subsequent developments, which it forecast reliably:—

Japan’s first major set-back in this war has been the mauling of a large Japanese convoy in Macassar Strait, between Borneo and the Celebes. Since last Friday night Dutch and United States warships and aircraft have battered and smashed at a Japanese armada of transports—some of them 20,000-ton liners—and escorting war vessels.

The transports carried troops intended for a landing in Java.

Not only is Java the very heart and centre of the Netherlands Indies, but also the headquarters of General Sir Archibald Wavell, Allied Commander-in-Chief in the south-west Pacific (excluding Australia). The importance of this force is shown by the fact that it is the strongest that Japan has yet used in her southward drive, except for the armies thrown into the Philippines and Malaya. The pounding still goes on. The tally of Japanese losses is not complete. At least 35 vessels have been sunk or damaged, including a battleship or battle-cruiser, and an aircraft carrier.

Estimates of enemy losses in men run from 10,000 to 25,000.

The number is probably greater than all the Japanese losses so far in Malaya and the Philippines. Though the enemy had strong aircraft protection, our only known casualties are one Dutch aircraft lost and one American destroyer slightly damaged.

“Jugular Vein of Indies

The Dutch have had their eye on Macassar Strait, “the jugular vein of the Indies.” ever since Japan made war in the Pacific certain by signing, on November 25, 1936. the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany. They watched the growing strength of the Japanese colony at Davao, in the Philippines, on the northern side of the Celebes Sea. The interest of the Japanese in the chrome, nickel, and other deposits of the Celebes the subsidising of Japanese shipping services poking, into unprofitable little ports, and the Japanese infiltration into British North Borneo were all danger signs to the Dutch. When the Nazis overran the Netherlands in May. 1910. the Dutch mined' Macassar Strait, in case Japan should seize the chance to drive south. The Japanese hesitated, and lost the chance. Instead of striking, they entered into tlic long-drawn-out economic talks in Batavia, in which Dr van Mook easily out-manoeuvred Kobayashi and Yoshikawa. This Japanese mistake gave the Indies Dutch another 18 months to prepare. They strengthened their air force with the American planes which have hit the Japanese hard in the Gulf of Siam, ofl the Sarawak and Biunei coast, at Jolo in the Sulu Sea, at Menado in Minahassa, and now in Macassar Strait.

What Might Have Been

If Japan had attacked in 1940 the Dutch would have yielded the. outer islands the whole range of islands from Borneo to Dutch New Guinea, both included, as well as the southern islands from Bali to the Arus, including Dutch Timor. They would have concentrated solely on the defence of Java and Sumatra, with.the tin islands of Banka and Billiton. This would have given the Japanese a clear run to Timor-laut, 250 miles from Port Essington, and to Butch New Guinea, which has a long' common frontier with Papua and comes within 150 miles of Cape York. There might still have been a battle in Macassar Strait, as part of the defence of Java, but it would have been a very different kind of fight. The Dutch would probably have fought alone, without the strong United States sea and air forces which joined them in the battle. There would then have been no R.A.AF. detachments ready to operate, as they do today, from Amboina in the Moluccas, the chief Dutch base in the eastern islands, and to join, as they did, in the defence of the Celebes.

Macassar Strait is a funnel 400 miles long, leading down from the Celebes Sea to the Java Sea. It broadens from 80 miles at the northern entrance to 150 in the south. The Celebes Sea is almost enclosed by Mindanao,-the Minahassa limb of the Celebes, and the north-east coast of Borneo.

Subject to the disturbance of air attacks the Japanese for the moment dominate the Celebes Sea from the bases they have sneaked and seized at Davao, Jolo, Tarakan, and Menado. Sandakan, the capital of British North Borneo, still holds out. But it is encircled.

Balik Pa pan's Lure

On the Borneo side of Macassar Strait the great oil wells of Balik Papan, second only in importance in the Indies to the Sumatra oilfields, have gone up in flames, fired and blasted by the Dutch. Balik Papan, by the way, is the nearest source of oil supply for Australia. On the eastern side of the strait the Japanese are trying to occupy points on the Celebes coast with the object of securing the port of Macassar, the chief shipping and trading centre in the eastern islands.

On the map Macassar Strait seems to offer a broad and easy entry into the Java Sea. It looks easier, for instance, than our Bass Strait, with its eastern end nearly blocked by islands.

The appearance is deceptive. Vast shoals, reefs, and islets fill up much of the strait on the Borneo side, especially towards its southern, and wider, end. Here the channel practicable for ships of size lies close to the Celebes and is only 15 miles wide —onetenth of the full width of the strait. Currents are strong and tricky. Many Channels

The Java Sea is a long oblong, bounded on the south by Java and the string of islands from Bali to Flores, on the north by the south coast of Borneo, on the west by South Sumatra, and on the east by the Macassar Peninsula of Celebes and a string of islands through which passages lead into the Flores Sea.

From the Flores Sea many channels lead to the Arafura and Timor Seas, which wash the Australian coasts. Macassar Strait leads into the northeast corner of the Java Sea. Once you emerge from it there is a clear run of only 450 miles, two days’ sailing and two hours’ flight, to Sourabaya, the chief naval base of • the Netherlands Indies and the second port and city of Java.

Java’s Importance

Java, with its 40,000,000 people, is 'he strategic and economic heart of the Netherlands Indies.

It lies right on the air route from Australia to Singapore and beyond. It flanks all our sea routes across the Indian Ocean.

In Tjillitap. on its south coast, il has a fine port which is an idea base for action in the Indian Ocean.

Java provided most of the 505,000 tons of rubber which the Netherlands Indies produced in 1940, when the Indies, Malaya. Thailand, and French Indo-China yielded 88 per cent of the world supply. It produces 3,000,000 tons of sugar, 95 per cent of the world’s quinine—which the Japanese badly need for their troops in Malaya, the Philippines, and New Guinea —some oil, and vast supplies of tea, coffee, and fibres.

Against Java the Japanese Were sending a force not much smaller than their striking force in Malaya.

The task of this force was to seize a bridge-head into which Japan could pour more troops, as they have done in Luzon (Philippines). Meanwhile, the game of infiltration and flanking movements was to have gone on.

The mere fact that Java has 40,000,000 people means no more than the fact I bat Malaya had 5,000,000 non-Euro-pean inhabitants. The position would have been most serious if the Japanese had made good their landing, as they did in the Philippines and in Malaya. Ho doubt they will try again, but the battle of Macassar Strait has set back the clock. And somewhere in Java General Sir Archibald Waved works out plans for a counter-stroke against the Japanese in which Australian, Dutch. American, British, Indian and Chinese forces will join.

Java is the base for the amphibious section of that counter-attack. Burma is the obvious base, if the JapaneseTliai assault can be blocked, for the onset by land and air.

If Allies Hold

Apart, therefore, from its immediate effect, the battle of Macassar Strait plays a notable part in our wider strategy in the south-west Pacific and the Indian Ocean

The Japanese may conclude that the longest way round is the shortest in the end and try the Molucca Passage, east of the Celebes. This leads into the Banda Sea and so to the Flores Sea. Persistent air-raids on Amboina and other points in the Moluccas are straws in the wind.

But if the Japanese can be held from Java for another two or three months they may wonder what has struck them.