To Be Secret Inquiry How Nazi Warships Sailed Home

Northern Advocate, 18 February 1942, Page 3

To Be Secret Inquiry How Nazi Warships Sailed Home

[British Official Wireless]

(Received 12.30 p.m.) RUGBY, February 17. MR. CHURCHILL, MAKING A STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE i!i OF COMMONS, SAID THAT IN MARCH LAST THE TWO GERMAN CRUISERS SCHARNHORST AND GNEISENAU TOOK REFUGE IN BREST HARBOUR, WHERE THEY WERE JOINED IN MAY BY THE PRINCE EUGEN AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BISMARCK. The position of these three ships became a serious pre-occupation for the Admiralty. They lay on the flanks of the main convoy routes to the East.. They could make a sortie at any time on the Atlantic trade routes or in the Mediterranean.

Accordingly, the Admiralty pressed for continued attack from the air in the hope of disabling them or preventing them from being repaired. This process continued for more than 10 months, during which time the ships were undoubtedly hit several times, and repair work was made very difficult.

4000 Tons of Bombs

No less than 4000 tons of bombs were dropped in bombing sorties over Brest by 3299 aircraft for the loss of 247 air force personnel and 43 aircraft. "As we were fiever in a position to know when some or all of these ships might put to sea, the situation entailed almost continuous naval precautions in the hope of being ready at all times to meet the various threats these ships constituted.” he said. Germany’s Choice A further serious feature was the very grievous subtraction from the bombing effort against Germany, The bombing of these ships was so severe that the Germans evidently came to a decision that they could not maintain them any longer at Brest, and thait they must return to Germany. "We do not know whether this was for the purpose of effecting final repairs or enabling them to work up full efficiency in the sheltered waters of the Baltic. However that may be. the Germans resolved to try to bring these ships back to Germany. This was a very hazardous operation. It could be done by sailing round the British Isles and returning via Norway, or by a dash up the English Channel. The Germans rejected the plan of returning by, the north route, and preferred to run the admittedly serious risks of the Channel passage. "In the Atlantic they would run a greater risk of being attacked by air. Extensive reconnaissances from the shore and from aircraft carriers, being slowed down by torpedo attacks or brought to action against overwhelming forces as was the Bismarck, would have to be faced. The Charnel route, on the other hand, was a run of under 24 hours, part of which could be made in darkness, possibly by surprise, and they had the opportunity of choosing the weather which would be most favourable. British Ships Not Stopped

“The whole way through the Channel and along the Dutch coast, they had the advantage of a powerful air umbrella. The danger of running past the Dover batteries under suitable weather conditions was not great. "Our slow convoys repeatedly traverse the straits of Dover and are repeatedly bombarded by guns on the French coast but this has not stopped our convoys. “The one great danger was mines and this they might hope to avoid by energetic sweeping.

“There remained, therefore, the action of surface craft and aircraft. Air reconnaissance would show the Germans that neither heavy cruisers nor even light cruisers were in the straits and therefore attacks by flotillas of destroyers and small torpedo boats were all that need be expected apart from the air. Some people seemed to think that heavy forces should have been stationed so as to have been able to intercept them in the Channel or North Sea. Had we done so, our ships would have been opened to the same scale of attack as the German ships at Brest. Never Conisdered Impossible “Further, such dispositions would dangerously have weakened the preventative measures we had taken to safeguard the convoys and guard the northern passage and deal with other heavy German ships. "The Admiralty did not consider the attempt to run the Channel would be an impossible operation under the conditions which prevailed, but this certainly was much less apprehended than that they should break out on to the trade routes or into the Mediterranean. "No one can doubt the vigour and courage with which the enemy squadron was attacked as soon as its movement was perceived, and. of course, everyone is very sorry that these ships were not sunk. Punishment of Guilty “The only questions which are open are: Firstly, why was their movement not detected shortly alter daylight; secondly, was contact and liaison between the Coastal Command and also other R.A.F. commands and the Admiralty as close as it should have been?

“At the suggestion of the Admiralty and the Air Ministry I have directed that an inquiry shall be held into these points. The inquiry will be secret and I doubt very much whether when completed its result will be suitable for publication. “I am not prepared to give any information about the inquiry or any undertaking that its result will be made public. If anyone is found guilty of dereliction of duty disciplinary action will follow.”