THE MEANING OF AMERICA.

Northern Advocate, 9 February 1920, Page 4

THE MEANING OF AMERICA.

(By G. H. Pern's.)

Now that the position of tho American Senate is defined, now that the attitude of the American peoplo towards international business is made as clear as a series of negative decisions by an imperfectly representative body can make it, British and European statesmen will have to work cut for themselvees the deeper meaning oi what has happened, and adapt their conduct to the new state of things, as they sec it. Throe conclusions appear to me plain and important. The first is that which I stated briefly .at the outset of these letters: America will have to be reckoned with not less, but more, than in the past. A natural annoyance on our part should not be allowed to obscure the fact. Whether at this moment they themselves understand it or not, whether we like- it or not, this people will in the future iiavo a word in the world's affairs corresponding more and more with their immense material and moral power. To-day it is their trend to isolation, what we think their evasion of responsibility, that is most , apparent. Yet, in the very act of reserving this, that, find the other matter from the competence of the League of Nations, except n.% Congress may please in each case as it arises, large groups in the Senate are t.sserting their views of what should be the future in China, in Egypt, in Ireland; and to a considerable extent Ihe isolation sentiment is a feeling that tho United States can exert a stronger inilueneo alone than in combination with other States supposed generally to be more selfish and reactionary. History never completely repeats itself. The present isolation sentiment dilTers from that of 20 years ago. Tho aloofness of a strong man is not. the same as the suspicion and shyness of a hid. Whatever the sceptics may say, the, war has profoundly changed things. America has stood for i moment on the summits of power and pride. The grandeur of her decisive intervention is a little smirched, but only a little. Everywhere I am begged rot to confuse the Senate with the people; everywhere 1 am assured that, if any occasion arise, America would again throw her weight in the scale, but more promptly —indeed it is one of the most persistent criticisms of President Wilson that he kept the United States out of the war so long. The I'rijice of Wales enjoyed a reception such as no previous guest on these shores ever had. Although there is a petty minority of tuft hunters and snobs, I. believe, the vast majority of the American people are genuinely scornful of rank, genuinely convinced that it is a fundamental virtue of their country to have none. The Prince came claiming to share tin' faith in democracy, anil was welcomed on that ground, for which Mr ];<>o( called "the common ideals which bind Great Britain and America in a hiendship such 'is exists between no other nations." His visit, at tho height of the Treaty crisis, might well 1 aye seemed a risky venture. In fact, it was a stirring and memorable success. Youth did it —youth invincibly good-

natured and sure of the future. A fresh, honest English boy came, and laughed in all the solemn faces till they laughed back. This sort of magic could only succeed for a rare moment, and cannot be commanded by Whitehall. But there is a hint in it pertinent to my second conclusion. Kngland i? not, like France, doomed to misunderstanding on this side of the ocean. Relationship in blood, language, tradition will always give us an advantage, if we are at pains to use it aright. Irue, that is a pretty big "If." It (Mils for what. we ourselves regard as best in British manhood.

To that ideal the American will always and nearly unanimously respond. He is vastly intrgiicd by the spectacle of a peaceful Empire governed in a liberal spirit, and the faKying of the Doniiuions to the Mother Country in the war greatly deepened that impression. The settlement of the recent railway strike was hailed as one more instance oi a mysterious quality called "British commonsensc." The heritage of German scholarship can be ours for the. asking. The dominance of British literature here is i<early absurd. Iv the handling of material and in routine organisation, the American counts himself an easy first; in most of the affairs of the mind he looks to London as the ancient Roman looked to Athens, or as Regent street, looks to Paris. Despite appearances to the contrary, pnd momentary lapses, this is a nation of rather sentimental idealists. Half of it, perhaps, is tired of President Wilson as apostle and Mr Wilson as too far, but because it was (or is thought to have been) doctrinaire, autocratic, and partisan, and, moreover, because it is thought to have failed, and to have left, that abominated, mythical power "the Old Diplomacy" in command of the iield. The American people have not gone 1 ack on the League of Nations idea, but on the general mess left by the Paris Conference. Our fidelity to the League will draw them steadily, as nothing else could. It is our strong, sober, experienced liberalism that they admire. Every advance we can make in treating such problems as those of Ireland, India, Egypt, will confirm their belief. We have but to keep straight on along modern democratic, lines, and the United States will stand with us. There are things of the war time to bo eternally remembered —among them the splendid generosity of the American effort; and others best finished and forgotten —the flattery of Allies, the censorship of opinion, and the artificial propaganda. One other thing. The political constitutions of the two countries differ very greatly. The British Constitution is understood here imperfectly, but better than we know the American Confeiitution. Perhaps when the chaotic circumstances are recalled, it is not surprising that the Allied statesmen in Paris forgot to distinguish between Mr Wilson as apostle and Mr Wilson as President under n rigid constitution. "They confused his official status and his moral authority," says the New "¥ork "Tribune," and,, though exaggerated by an anti-Wilsonian bias, the passage contains a certain truth. "Europe accepted Mr Wilson as the bearer of a mandate from the American people. It supposed, wrongly, tlint in accepting his leadership it was accepting the leadership of the United States. That was the tragic error committed at the Peace Conference." The country had had only one oppor\iiiity of expressing its opinion "And at the election of November, 1918, it did an unexampled thing. For the first time in our history a party conducting a war was voted out of power in both branches of Congress, and that in spite of a pre-election notice from the President that such a vote would greatly hamper him in his conduct of foreign affairs. "If we were living under Parliamentary government such as Great Bri: tain, France, and Italy have, Mr Wilson could not have gone to Paris, because he Mould not have been in office. As it was, the country didn't want him to go He went, taking only figurehead associate with him. "When he returned in 'February the Republicans in the Senate published a round-robin warning him and the Conference that his policy in Paris was a personal one. He ignored this danger signal," and so tin* misunderstanding proceeded to the present climax. This is far from boing the whole story, but the moral for us is a sound one. It is useless and mischievous to carry the preconception? of our own political system into our dealings with the United States. In those we must lave the peculiarities of the American Constitution steadily in mind. it 'may lie the worst in the world — the division of power between the President and the Senate is irreconcilable wilh our own idea of responsible Go- \ eminent, and is, in practice, a most difficult arrangement.. There is, however, no likelihood of its being soon or considerably changed, and the rest of the world must make the best of it.