THE BAGDAD FAILURE.

Northern Advocate, 14 October 1916, Page 4

THE BAGDAD FAILURE.

NO PROPER TRANSPORT

TROOPS ON SHORT RATIONS

LONDON, October 12

General Lake's dispatch of the operations in Mesopotamia from January 1 to April 13 is a depressing re. cord of most gallant efforts with an inadequate force t 0 cope with almost insurmountable difficulties. General Lake says the supply by the river steamers never equalled the requirements, and consequently it was never possible to concentrate on the Tigris front the whole forces available or sufficient transport to enable the forces to operate freely at any distance from the river. General Aylmer's unsuccessful attempt to force the Urn.el-Henna defile was carried out with splendid courase and dogged determination. The troops bivouacked in the driving rain, and three times advanced over flat country through deep mud, absolutely devoid of cover, against wellconstructed trenches manned by a brave and stubborn enemy. When General Gorringe succeeded to the command in March th c Tigris was in heavy flood. This caused extensive inundations. The remainder of the month was a strenuous struggle to prevent the whole country being flooded. Every available man was engaged digging embankments. Large Turkish reinforcements on April 20 enabled the enemy to make strong counter.attacks, which drove back th e British troops, many of whom were unable to reply to the enemy's fire owing to their rifles being choked with mud. The Kut-el-Amara garrison had then only six days' suplies, and General Gorringe's troops were nearly worn out. The same troops advanced time and again to the assault for 1 8 consecutive days upon a scale of inadequate rations, which wag due to the shortage of river transport. The failure of General Aylmer to reach Kut-el.Amara finally obliged General Townshend to surrender.