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Anglo-American Policy On Atomic Bomb

NO SHARING WITH RUSSIA LONDON, Nov. 8. The important statements made by Messrs Bevin and Churchill in the House of Commons are receiving very careful attention. The general first reaction is that, taken collectively, they mean that British and American policy is not to share the secret of the atomic bomb with Russia, at least not y et - Mr. Churchill, despite Ins opening eulogies of Russia, was stronger in his language in this respect than was Mr. Bevin. There was no room for doubt that he supports President Truman’s stand. On the other hand, Mr. Bevin while frequently referring to the bomb, indicated rather than proclaimed that the Government’s policy is one of: “Let the United Nations organisation build up and furnish evidence of its capacty to ensure peace, but until that is done no undue risks must be taken with the atomic bomb.” It is noticeable that both speeches were heard largely in silence by the Government benches and that most approval seemed to come from the Opposition. Mr. Churchill’s speech was something of a surprise. Public opinion in recent weeks has been taking the line that since Russia sooner or later would discover tne secrets of the bomb it would go a long way to dissolving suspicion and cementing international friendship if , the atomic knowledge were to be pooled from now. The fact that Mr. Churchill opposes this policy will carry considerable weight with the country, not only because of his intimate knowledge ot the events leading up to the present situation, but also bocause, as tne Manchester Guardian’s Parliamentary correspondent observes, “he has not been entirely unsuccessful in deducing the larger trends of contemporary history. ’ ’ More Optimistic. Mr. Bevin also supported the American point of view on the atomic bomb and placing its control ultimately in the hands of the United Nations, but he took a rather more optimistic view of the general situation than did Mr. Churchill. The general opinion, as a result oi the debate, is that Mr. Attlee, when lie meets President Truman, will press the view that ultimately the use of atomic energy should come under international control, for both warlike and peaceful purposes. The Times, commenting on the speeches, remarked: “It is well to emphasise the patent truth that no partnership between Great Britain ana the United States, or even among all the English-speaking nations, could by itself possibly form an exclusive bulwark or guarantee of world peace. Such a notion has always in the past been decisively rejected by American opinion and is unlikely to appeal to it now. It is equally opposed to the essential requisites of British policy, which, as Mr. Bevin clearly showed, cannot 'll4interest itself in the affairs of the European Continent any more than in those of the world overseas. From this point of view, anti lasting friendship with the United States forms one of the main pillars <-i British foreign policy. The other mam pillar is the Anglo-Soviet alliance, which is one of the legacies of tlus war and the necessity for which Las been demonstrated by it. Both arc indispensable if the United Nations organisation is to be more than a name. 11 Discussions on the future of the atomic bomb and of the use of atomic energy must be viewed in this broader perspective. The issue is not really one of secrecy; the real issue is whether the manufacture of the bomb and the exploitation of atomic energy are to oe the subject of international collaboiation and joint control or whether every country is to be encouraged to forge these devastating weapdus to the best of its ability for itself in an endeavoiir to secure some kind of primacy or advantage over its neighbours, near or distant.” t n Servant or Destructor? The Times added that the suggestion that the development of atomic ® ner ®-'' will wait until thero has been time to build up the United Nations Orgamsationfor its peacetime efforts may savour of optimism. Mr. .' pressed an incontestable truth when declared that the “great goal, the only goal” and the only way was uic |S^and ery and make it a servant of man and not his destructor.” The Manchester Guardian sajs. “\VP should make it clear that we are ready to share the secrets ot the bomb wUh Russia, France and China but only as permanent members of the Security Council and only it they clear' ! Council a the bomb tlfe^world—should be able to reduce their separate armed forces. • ‘ “ When the United Nation., Orgnmsation has failed, wo can look eh* Mr! honour of this country. remedy After the candid,^healthy ho°pe a f n o g r e ea°rly Bigns a of a new approach to a world partnership.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/MT19451110.2.111

Bibliographic details

Manawatu Times, Volume 70, Issue 266, 10 November 1945, Page 10

Word Count
791

Anglo-American Policy On Atomic Bomb Manawatu Times, Volume 70, Issue 266, 10 November 1945, Page 10

Anglo-American Policy On Atomic Bomb Manawatu Times, Volume 70, Issue 266, 10 November 1945, Page 10

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