Reasons For British Withdrawal in Burma

Manawatu Times, Volume 68, Issue 85, 10 April 1943, Page 5

Reasons For British Withdrawal in Burma

Japs Nervous About Growing Strength of India (By Telegraph—Presß Assn.—Copyright.) Received Friday, 7.50 p.m. LONDON, April 8. In view of the development of the attack against the narrow lines of communication behind them and the impossibility of clearing the Mayn Peninsula before the monsoon, our troops, to put it bluntly, abandoned their Donbaik positions, says the Times’ New Delhi correspondent. Our troops are now in the area from 15 miles north of Donbaik to a point east of Rathedaung. Fighting is reported to he still going on and the British and Indian troops continue to receive assistance from the air. The correspondent adds that the withdrawal is hound to increase the general disappointment over the Arakan campaign, which has largely arisen from an imperfect appreciation of its limitations and supply difficulties. The originally-planned attack against Akyab had to be given up through unforeseen delays in the arrival of necessary equipment. Indeed, it is remarkable that the Japanese have not shown more initiative, because we put out our neck and were allowed to draw it back. The Japanese, despite their losses, are characteristically operating in the jungle with numbers of small detachments, but the much shorter British lines at the moment seem capable of resisting the assaults. While it is often vaguely assumed that the reconquest of Burma would radically improve China’s military supply situation and allow a great number of Chinese troops to become active, the Manchester Guardian’s Chungking special correspondent, now visiting India, is of the opinion that this is unfortunately incorrect. “It seems that the supply of assistance to China cannot exceed a few tens of thousands of tons monthly, even after the reconquest of Burma, until the decisive weakening of the Japanese navy permits the Allies to use the ports of Indo-China and South China.” The correspondent points out that the small number of British and Indian forces engaged in the present minor operation at Arakan need regular monthly supplies equivalent to several times the highest freight total ever carried over the Burma Road to China. While authorities in New Delhi show the keenest interest in the earlier possible reconquest of Burma in view of its moral and strategic values, and oil and rice resources, they conceive that the task of the Indian war effort is to develop India as quickly as possible into a great general supplies base for operations wherever they may occur. The correspondent adds that the perfecting of the Indian defences has been virtually completed and there is a growing threat from the quickly developing strength of the Allied base in India which is evidently making Japan more reluctant to dissipate her forces for major drives inside China.