The Times WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 13, 1941. How Germans Cross Mediterranean

Manawatu Times, Volume 66, Issue 191, 13 August 1941, Page 4

The Times WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 13, 1941. How Germans Cross Mediterranean

Since the war with Russia began reports have credited the Germans with bringing back from North Africa a considerable proportion of the forces they had there. This brings to mind the fact that the Germans were able early in this year to send mechanised forces of very considerable strength to Libya. And at that time there was subdued outcry from public opinion at Home to the effect that the Navy “had not carried out its job,” i.e., of completely blockading Italian North Africa. It was in December, 1910, that General Wavell’s Army of the Nile drove the Italians out of Egypt and back for hundreds of miles to’the Gulf of Tripoli in a brilliant whirlwind campaign of about 11 weeks. This triumph we were able to enjoy for about one month and then unexpectedly powerful German mechanised forces appeared and we were forced back at an almost equal speed. This was very largely so because the African army had been so heavily drawn upon to aid Greece. Blit even so, the power of the German force gave very distinct surprise to even the best informed Britons. It had been generally assumed that the supremacy of the Mediterranean unquestionably held by the British fleet, would have so effectively closed the gap between Italy and Tripoli as to render any reinforcements to the latter impossible. It has since been learned that this was not so and that it was not so is no reflection whatsoever upon the British Navy for the task expected of it was an impossible one. In the words of a well-informed American correspondent, an expert on Italian affairs, “the narrow 90-mile channel between Sicily and Africa still remains what it has always been during this war, a marino no man’s land.” He explains that no one controls nor dominates this channel which he regards as one of the most important keys to German strategy in the Mediterranean. It is shown that Axis air scouts daily cover the Mediterranean throughout its length and note the position of every British naval ship therein. At a time when it is seen that no danger threatens from the British Navy, say on a relief between ships usually stationed about the Sicilian Channel, a convoy will.be embarked and setting sail at sundown will be protected by darkness. By dawn it will have arrived within the protection of Italian coastal guns across the channel. The writer considers that it would have been fatal to Axis plans had the British drive of last December-February pushed right on through to Tripoli and hence affected a junction with French forces in Tunis. Had that happened the Axis would have lost its bridgehead to Africa. It is told that the Germans had taken precautions against this, for even as Tobruk fell they moved two divisions of armed vehicles across to Tripoli. This is given as an explanation of the reason why the British drive stopped at a point 160 miles south of Benghazi. At the time puzzlement was felt, for it appeared almost certain that General Wavell’s army would go right on for another 400 miles and clear the Italians out of North Africa altogether.

It is apparent, therefore, that the Axis is still able to put a powerful army across the Mediterranean and make further attempts at the invasion of Egypt. They would suffer heavy losses in shipping, such as have been suffered all through the past eight months, not only whilst crossing but whilst in North African ports, both from naval attack and from aerial bombardment. It is evident, however, that for the duration of the war there will be required a powerful British army based on Egypt, and it is here to be expected that the majority of our Anzao forces will be concentrated.