30-Year Peace is Chamberlain's Aim

Manawatu Times, Volume 63, Issue 45, 23 February 1938, Page 5

30-Year Peace is Chamberlain's Aim

— * - A , Anglo-lfaiian Agreement as First Step Recognition of Abyssinian Conquest United Press Assn.—By Electric Telegraph.—Copyright.

London, i eb. 21. The Prime Minister, Mr Neville Chamberlain, in moving the adjournment of the House of Commons to enable discussion, said that Mr Eden’s resignation had come as a shock. None of his colleagues had anticipated any danger of such an event until a few days ago. When last week a section of the Press was declaring that there were serious differences, he was under the impression that there was complete agreement. The Government had not felt that the differences on the immediate question were sufficiently important to made Mr Eden’s resignation necessary. "My foreign policy," declared Mr Chamberlain, "is based on three principles:— "1. Protection of British Interests and of the lives of nationals. "2. Maintenance of peace by the settlement of differences peacefully and not by force. "3. Promotion of friendly relations with other nations who are willing to reciprocate and to keep the rules of international conduct, without which there can be neither security nor stability.” Mr Chamberlain did not believe'it impossible, with good will and determination, to remove genuine grievances, for which reason the Government had been seeking an opportunity for conversations with Italy and Germany to find whether there was any common ground on which they might build up a general scheme of European appeasement. After referring to the gentlemen's agreement with Italy in 1937 and the exchange of personal letters with Signor Mussolini last year, Mr Chamberlain said: “Unfortunately, certain incidents occurred in the Mediterranean which, in the British Government’s opinion, rendered it impossible that conversations at that time could have any chance of success.” , Relations Seriously Deteriorated. cmna not be denied, said Mr Chamberlain, that during the months since the interchange of letters with Signor Mussolini Anglo-Italian relations had seriously and steadily deteriorated. "It has always seemed to me in dealing with foreign countries that we do not give ourselves a chance of success unless we try to understand their mentality, which is not always the same as our own,” he added. .“I am informed that all this time, when it appeared that obstacles to conversations had arisen entirely from Italian action, exactly the opposite view was held , in Rome. All this time the suspicion , was growing in Rome that we did ’ not want conversations at all and i were engaged in a Machiavellian design to lull the Italians into inactivity while we completed our ; rearmament programme with the intention of presently taking revenge for tae conquest of Abyssinia. "It was in the steadily worsening atmosphere overhanging our relations with Italy that a fresh opportunity arose to break from the vicious circle when Count Grandi, the Italian Ambassador, after talks, called at the Foreign Office and said that the Italian Government was ready at any time to open conversations. Count Grandi said that his Government desired the conversations to be as wide as possible, embracing formal recognition of the Abyssinian conquest and not excluding Spain. “The Government replied that it was bound to act as a loyal member of the League and that the attitude of the League, and especially of the Mediterranean Powers, would be considerably influenced if Britain and Italy reached an agreement which would be a real contribution to general appeasement Abyssinian Conquest. "The Foreign Secretary emphasised that this wau a factor which would have great weight with public opinion in Britain and France, on the Mediterranean and in the United States,” MrChamberlain added. “In all this the Foreign Secretary spoke for the Gov-' ernment as a whole. “I have always taken the view that the question of formal recognition of the Italian position in Abyssinia would be morally justifiable only if it were found to be an essential factor in general appeasement.” (Opposition cries cf “Shame!” “It will never be!”) “That was the view of all of us, including the Foreign Secretary.” Expressing the view that Mr Eden in one point was not quite fair, Mr Chamberlain continued: “He represented to the House that the Italian Government called on us to enter conversations now or never and that we were being asked to submit to a threat There was nothing in any communication from the Italian Government which in my judgment would justify that description.” He added that Mr Eden had asked him not to commit the Government to anything specific in the conversations with Count Grandi, and he had abstained from anything of that kind. It was after the talks with Count Grandi that the differences between Mr Eden and himself had first become active. Italian Suspicions. "I am convinced that a rebuff to the Italian desire for conversations would be regarded in Italy as confirming the jusfijcions that we were never really, in earnest about the conversations,” Mr, Chamberlain said. ‘lf that were the impression, the result would be disastrous; it would be followed by intensification of anti-British feeling in Italy, rising to a point at which ultimately war between us might become inevitable.

The Prime Minister disclosed that Count Grandi that morning had conveyed a message from the Italian Government accepting the British formula concerning the withdrawal of foreign volunteers from Spain. Amid jeers from the Opposition, Mr. Cham' berlain was understood to add: “And the granting of belligerent rights.” ~ The Opposition several ""times interrupted Mr Chamberlain as 'he added: “The Ambassador intimated that the communication was a gesture on the part bf the Italian Government indicating the spirit of goodwill in which she wished to begin the conversations.” Mr Will Thorne (Labour) interjected: "They knew Mr Eden had gone.” The Long-Range Plan. Mr Chamberlain said that Count Grandi had informed him that the communication was received from Rome on February 20. That was before Mr Eden bad resigned, said the Prime Minister amid Ministerial cheers. Mr Chamberlain said he had told Count Grandi that the settlement of the Spanis;h question must be regarded as an essential feature of any agreement. He added that he was not there to say that the actions of Italy in the past had been satisfactory. He was concerned with the future. There was good hope that, with goodwill, the negotiations would be brought to a successful con elusion. _ "Vfe are seeking general appease* ment throughout Europe,” he explained. “Peace in Europe must depend on the attitude of four Powers—ltaly, Germany, England and Franco. Are we to allow these two pairs of nations to continue clam ouring at one another across the frontiers, allowing feeling to become morb and more embittered until at last [barriers are broken down and a conflict begins which many think woul d mark the end of civilisation? Or can we bring them to an under-, standing of one another’s aims and objects and to such discussions as may lead to a final settlement? If we can do this we shall have saved peace in Europe for a generation.” LORD HALIFAX NEW FOREIGN SECRETARY RUGBY, Feb. 21. It is officially announced from No. 10 Downing Street that Mr. Chanberlain (Prime Minister) has asked Lord Halifax to take temporary charge of the Foreign Office BRITISH PRESS OPINIONS BREAK FROM LEAGUE THEORIES

“Mr. Eden, on the contrary, wanted to wait for the substantial withdrawal of volunteers, but made it clear that objections would still remain evqji if : acceptance of th© British formula for withdrawal were obtained from Italy.’ 9

“OCCASION TRAGICALLY UNREAL” Received Tuesday, 6.30 p.m. LONDON, Feb. 22. The News-Chroniclc, in an editorial declares that Mr. Eden is right, as there is nothing to show that Signor Mussolini will not again deceive panicky Britain to secure his own terms. The Daily Mail applauds Mr. Chamberlain’s decision as the turning point in Britain’s foreign policy, involving ti break from League theories, which is inevitable in order to maintain peace. The Daily Telegraph, believes the debate will dissipate misunderstanding in Britain and misrepresentation abroad. The Opposition’s exultation is enough to make Mr. Eden reflect that acquiescence might be more serviceable to the causes he cares for than refusal. The Times, in a leader, says: “The immediate occasion of Mr. Eden’s break with Mr. Chamberlain is tragically unreal and increases the regret at Mr. Eden’s departure, but there is no doubt regarding the Premier’s right to take a real share in defining major ob jectives of foreign policy, the success of which is crucical for the maintenance of general peace. It is clear the Italian invitation did not contain a threat. Mr. Chamberlain is entitled to the viev. r , most people share, that an opportunity will come to explore the possibilities of settlement without in curring the reproach that he is more timid of war than anxious about peace.’’ The Times pays a tribute to Mr. Euen and Lord Cranborne, and adds: “Many believe that the Premiership is not ultimately beyond Mr. Eden’s grasp. They will be the last to regard the present break in his career as a catastrophe.’ ’ The Associated Press says the most important factor in the House of Commons debate was Mr. Chamberlain’s declaration of Britain’s new foreign policy. This emerged as a direct approach to European settlement by, firstly, talks between England and Italy; secondly, talks between England and Germany; and, thirdly, a four Power t act.