The Times. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1937. Will Japan Dominate Asia ?

Manawatu Times, Volume 62, Issue 298, 16 December 1937, Page 6

The Times. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1937. Will Japan Dominate Asia ?

Now that Nanking Ims fallen, the question will be asked again: Will Japan embark on a further career of world conquest, strengthened by China’s man power and natural resources'! This idea is not new. One can find support for it by digging into the writings of some of the more flamboyant Japanese advocates of Pan-Asianism which, in its Japanese version, is little more than a thinly disguised scheme for Japanese domination of Asia. Some years ago Mr. Lloyd George mentioned the possibility that Japan’s expansion on the Asiatic mainland would lead to the creation of “a great Mongol empire,” with a population of 500,000,000. This apprehension has naturally been enhanced by Japan’s present large-scale military operations in China. Chinese spokesmen and sympathisers have endeavoured to foster it, with a view to generating in western countries a mood favourable to intervention in the present conflict. So Dr. Wellington lvoo, China’s able representative in the League of Nations, recently asserted that the conquest of China was only the first step in a Japanese programme of conquering the whole world. But the idea does not survive the test of serious political anti economic analysis, according to Mr. W. H. Chamberlain, one of the leading authorities on Oriental affairs. One of the professed Japanese war objectives is the eradication of antiJapanese feeling in China. And it is surely the most naive of militarist fantasies to believe that “anti” feeling can be eliminated or diminished by modern warfare, with its accompaniment of air bombings, summary shootings of actual or suspected snipers and wholesale destruction of homes by artillery shells. No Communist or Kuomintang agitator, it is safe to say, could have been so successful in creating “antiJapanese feeling” as the Japanese Army and Navy have been. Japan’s wdiole colonial experience speaks against the likelihood that the Island Empire, if it emerges victorious from the present struggle, will be able to exploit China’s man power for future conquests. There is a Manchoukuo army, but it is not regarded as a serious military addition to the Japanese military power. At best It is considered useful for internal police functions. The warning of Tungchow, where Japanesetrained Chinese soldiers and police took the first opportunity to rise in revolt and slaughter all Japanese on whom they could lay hands is still fresh in Japanese memory. Even in Japan’s older colonies, Formosa and Korea, there has been no effort to raise military units among the native populations. Japanese rule has brought unmistakable material benefits to both these countries.. But it has been harsh, bureaucratic, unimaginative. Never for a moment has it tended to obliterate the distinction between the Japanese, as the governing class, and the Koreans and Formosans, who were being governed. So the idea that Japan’s man power would be increased by victory over China seems quite fallacious. If Manchoukuo can be taken as a precedent, Japan’s available forces for other adventures will be reduced because of the necessity of leaving a large permanent army of occupation in whatever part of China may be brought within the Japanese orbit. It is also questionable whether Japan will greatly increase her economic strength as a result of the present conflict. What can North China, where the Japanese arms have made the greatest progress, offer Japan? It can give an abundance of coal but only a very moderate quantity of iron. Cotton plantations may be extended, although it has yet to be proved that the coarse, short-staple North China cotton will provide a satisfactory substitute for the American and Indian product. It offers no solution whatever for Japan’s lack of oil, of all non-ferrous metals except copper, of rubber and other tropical products. To say that Japan’s undeclared war in China is not likely, under any circumstances, to prove the first step toward Japanese world empire is not to minimise its grave implications for the precarious structure of world peace. A new equilibrium that had been gradually forming in the Far East has been upset. But world empire is a chimera. No country in the world possesses sufficient human and material resources to impose its will on all the five continents. Decisive victory for Japan in China will upset the previous balance of strength in Asia, but is not likely to pave the way for Japanese hegemony in any other part of the world. And even decisive military success may not lead to the expected fruits because of the economic and financial price which Japan will have to pay. ' O oE 'emKi'l