Fractured Thigh From Cycle Accident

Manawatu Times, Volume 61, Issue 279, 25 November 1936, Page 2

Fractured Thigh From Cycle Accident

CIVIL CLAIM AT FEILDING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE . ALLEGED Decision was reserved by Mr. R. M. Watson, S.M., at tho Feilding Magistrate’s Court yesterday in the civil action in which George Henry Grindrod, contractor, of Feilding, suod Laura Coleman, law clerk, of Feilding, for £252 IGs for damages, medical and hospital expenses, arising from a eyclo accident allegedly due to the negligence of defendant. Both tho parties wero riding bicycles and a collision occurred in which plaintiff sustained a fracture of his right thigh. Outlining tho circumstances, counsel for plaintiff said that on the evening of May 6 last plaintiff, who was a contractor employed at the Feilding freezing works, was leaving his homo in Kimbolton road at about 6.30 p.m., intending to return to work. He mounted his bicycle in the back yard and rode down tho drive to the gate, intending to cross tho footpath to tho road. Just as ho reached tho gate he was struck by tho cycle ridden by the defendant. Tho accident occurred on the asphalt footpath and not on tho cycle track which ran parallel with the footpath. Two days after tho accident defendant admitted to tho wife of plaintiff that she was .late for Technical (School anu was cycling with her head down along tho path. She had swerved to avoid water on tho eyclo track when tho col lision took place. Tho plaintiff said that the accident occurred on the centre of tho asphalt footpath. lie was knocked off his bicycle and by catching hold of tho wires of the fence he had managed to reach his feet and had thon struggled along the path to his house. It was later ascertained that his right thigh had been broken. He was a contractor at the freezing works and his net earnings for tho 12 months prior to the accident amounted to £290. He had not been able to do any work since tho accident and medical opinion held that it would bo three months before he could resume work again.

To counsel for defendant: He had finished work at 5.30 for tea and was due back again at- 0.30 and although he left home at the last-mentioned hour he was not in a hurry. His intention when riding out from his home was to cross the footpath and go on the bitumen road. He had used the cycle track previously and there was no particular reason why he decided that night to go on the road other than the fact that it was raining. Ho admitted that there wero fairly deop wheel ruts in the grass betwoen tho culvert and tho bitumen. Later ho said he was not certain whether he intended to uso tho cycle track, tho footpath or the road. He had no idea of the speed at,which he cycled out on to the footpath. from his gate but would say it was equal to that of a brisk walking pace. There was a high hedge on his left and it would have been difficult to see a pedestrian approaching from that direction. Had there boon someono approaching from that direction he would probably have collided with them, coming through his gateway at such a speed. His memory of what happened satisfied him that it was the front wheel of defendant's bicycle that struck the rear of the front wheel of his machine. Tho defendant did not appear to fall off her machine but he fell to the footpath. 110 was unable to say how far defendant travelled after the collision. She was It standing on the cycle track holding his bicycle when he looked up. Counsel suggested that plaintiff's front wheel hit the rear extremity of defendant’s bicycle but plaintiff domed this. Counsel went on to say that defendant rode on after the collision, then stopped and dismounted and returned. Plaintiff was unablo to agree to this and he was unable to say whether Miss Coleman had been knocked off .her bicycle. He remembered, on reaching his feet, rubbing Uis knee and attempting to walk towards the house. lie agreed that defendant asked him if he was all right and if she could do anything and that ho had told her he was all right and that she should go home. He had to travel between 20 and 30 feet before he reached the house but he denied that as ho reached tho verandah he fell heavily and that it was this fall which was responsible for the fracture of his thigh. Tho light on his bicycle was electric and was generated from tho front wheel. The degree of light from the lamp depended on tho speed of the machine. Tho faster one travelled the brighter the light. Counsel: It foliows then, that if you were riding your bicycle at less than walking pace there would bo no light! Plaintiff: Oh, yes, you would havo a light. Counsel: How much? Nothing better than a cigarette glow! Not enough light to see Miss Coleman approaching!

Witness: No. Counsel: Had Miss Coleman been a pedestrian, .you would not have seen her! Plaintiff: Yes. Counsel: But you did not see hor on her bicycle! Plaintiff: Because I was going the other way. Counsel: But you say you would have seen her had she been a pedestrian and yet you did not see her on a bicycle. Plaintiff: Because she had no light. Counsel: I put it to you that you did not see her because you did not have a sufficient light? Plaintiff: I had a proper light. In answer to further questioning, plaintiff said that defendant was travelling very fast. Counsels And you say the force of the

blow was such as to knock you off your machine, yet Miss Coleman did not come off!

Plaintiff: I don’t know. Further evidence called on behalf of plaintiff was confined to conversations between plaintiff’s wifo and defendant two days after the accident. At the conclusion of tho plaintiff’s case counsel for defendant submitted that plaintiff could not recover as there was ample proof of contributory negligence on his part. Counsel recalled plaintiff’s admission that had a i>edostrian been walking along tho footpath ho might have collided with him and further that ho did not see Miss Coleman. At a slow pace it was agreed that his light would have been an admittedly weak one and on plaintiff’s own admission he was riding his bicycle across the footpath which was contrary to the borough by-law. Tho evidence of plaintiff had been that tho collision took place on the asphalt footpath but tho evidence of defendant would bo that it occurred on tho cycle track. Counsel went on to suggest that tho light on plaintiff's bicycle would not bo much more than a flicker and defendant would say that she saw no light at all. Grindrod, ho submitted, was under a greater duty to take every care and precaution seeing that ho was emerging from his gateway on to a footpath. The defendant gave evidence to the effect that she was a law clerk and on the evening of May G had loft her office and proceeded up Kimbolton 'road wheeling her bicycle. It was raining at the tiino and when sho arrived at Denbigh Square she crossed tho highway and then mounted her bicycle, riding along tho cycle track. As she was passing Grindrod’s gato sho felt a bump as if something had struck tho back wheel or mudguard of her bicycle. She wobbled about a bit but kept her balance and continued on for eight or ten feet and thon dismounted. She was positive that nothing struck hor front wheel. Sho felt tho bump on her bade Wheel. Defendant admitted that she knew that there was a puddle on tho eyclo track near Grindrod's gato but did not avoid it. As she rode through it sho lifted her legs to avoid the splash, as she had done on sovcral occasions previously. She was not riding fast as she had only just a moment before the collision got on her bicycle and further, it was a narrow track and it was raining as well as dark. Her speed would probably be between six and seven miles per hour. There was no sign of any light. She was keeping a good look out for traffic, and. while plaintiff might have had a lamp on his bicycle there was certainly no light and had there been a light showing there was nothing to prevent her seeing it. Defendant had no recollection of having said to Mrs. Grindrod and Mrs. Herrington that sho had ridden past the gate with her head down. When sho dismounted from her bicycle and went back sho saw plaintiff lying ou the grass track between the cycle track and the asphalt footpath. Ho was groaning and endeavouring to struggle to his feet. As ho got to his feet ho commenced to rub his.knee and then he slowly walked over to the fence, stopping by the big gato which he caught hold of. Defendant asked if she could help and plaintiff replied that he was all right and that sho had better go home. Sho did not leave right away but remained to volunteer help but as he said ho was alb right she then left. She did not loarn until the following evening that plaintiff had been seriously hurt. On the Friday following tho accident she met Airs. Grindrod and discussed with her tho accident, Airs. Grindrod romarking that she knew that there was something wrong when sho heard "an awful crash or bump ou the verandah.” To counsel for plaintiff: Witness was in no particular hurry that night although it was raining and she had to go to Technical class. She denied that she rode on the asphalt footpath. She had not made a statement to tho police because she had been advised not to do so. Had she had a light on her bicycle it would have been visible to anyone coming out from Grindrod’s place. Defendant was uuable to say whero Grindrod was when sho passed his gate. She did not see him but fancied he must have been on the footpath between tho gate and the grass. Defendant was positive that when sho returned after tho bump she saw Grindrod getting up. She stood near holding his bicycle. Ho slowly got to his feet and then walked to the fence. It was a struggle for him. Sho maintained that she did not ride on the footpath. This concluded tho case, and on the Alagistrate intimating his desire to reserve his decision, counsel for plaintiff asked permission to reply to the point regarding tho riding of a bicycle over a footpath. Counsel contended that his reading of tho particular by-law quoted by counsel for defendant was that it referred to any vehicle, including a motor-car, and if the contention of his friend was correct then it meant that a person could not take his car on to his property. Such a by-law would bo held to be unreasonable and counsel contended that no breach had been committed by Grindrod and further that his aot of riding across the footpath was not evidence of negligence. Decision was reserved.

At the hearing Air. A. M. Ongley, of Palmerston North, appeared for the plaintiff and Air. D. C. Gullinanc for the defendant.