IN SEARCH OF THE NORTH ISLAND

Manawatu Times, Volume 61, Issue 231, 30 September 1936, Page 9

IN SEARCH OF THE NORTH ISLAND

The War in the Waikato

(Part 3-16). (Copyright). Tha Maori did not wish to light the Pakeha. His desiro -was for peace and 3io particularly ■wished to be left to himself upon tho land of .his ancestors where life for him, secluded from any interference by the soul-destroying influences of Pakeha civilisation, would spend it's colourful courso down the path of time. The Pakeha was no longer to be trusted. The implicit confidence, so heroically engendered in the Maori by tho missionaries, had given way to mistrust and suspicion, so, with tho military road from Auckland slowly lengthening out to draw ever nearer their lands to assume, in the eyes of the metaphysical Maori, the twisting form of some monster reptile intent upon devouring all within its path, the conviction grew that this was but the preparation for tho invasion of their country and tho seizing of their lands. “Your roads are not simply for fetching food from a man’s farm. ... At Taranaki, the roads being there, your guns reached the pa. This is our fear lest that strong, strange cart —the cart of terror —should travel on it. But for this fear your roads would have been allowed long ago," said a supporter of the Maori King in reply to the urgings of Sir George Grey that tho work of road building should bo allowed to proceed. Grey had returned to New Zealand after an absence in South Africa to find the country in a condition of turmoil once more and whilo he was unquestionably the' greatest Pakeha friend the Maori ever had he was to find them no longer as confident of his word.

There were many at To Awamutu who regretted the necessity for the departure of Gorst for he was held in very high esteem by the Maori generally but, as he represented tho Government of the Queen which was at logger heads with the Maori and his desire to Tetain possession of his land, he had to depart. Soon after his departure the British forces under General Cameron, who had been specially sent out from India to handle the so-called “rebel- 1 lious” Maori, moved south to cross the Mangatawliiri river just east of Pokeno to bring slaughter and bloodshed among the children of Tane. It was expected that General Cameron’s vast experience would result in settling the so-called war-liko attitude of the Maori, “but,” as Saunders records, “it soon became evident that, whatever the General might have been in India, ho was no match for the Maori chiefs. ’ ’ Incidental skirmishes along the threshold of the Waikato country where the brave descendants of the Tainui canoe, thinking little of the cannon’s roar, tho bayonet, or the musket shot, ax>plied their industry in feverishly building defensive points, not in any provocative attitude but purely with the idea of defending their land, soon Remonstrated to the British forces that the so-called rebels, ‘ ‘were far more than a match, in common sense and sagacity, for General Cameron, of whom they much early have formed a very low opinion.” The first trial of strength ended in more or less of a fiasco as far as the British forces were concerned. They had prepared to inflict a telling defeat on what was believed to be "the flower of the Maori Army” but were badly hoaxed. Costly and extensive preparations were made to meet the anticipated opposition. Tho Waikato people carefully watched the gathering of soldiers and the storing up of supplies and when at the end of fifteen weeks the British forces were ready to launch the attack they quietly with-, drew "and escaped without leaving Mm -(General Cameron) a blanket, or losing a hair of their heads.” It was no “bloodless” victory to the General but it -was a terrifically costly affair to the country. The real joke of tho proceedings lay in the fact that the General, impressed by the appearance of the Ma'ori defences, assumed that they were secure in every part and therefore demanded of the Government "expensive material which was piled up in confusion.” He did not know that by an encircling movement he could have taken this stronghold; no, it was to be a frontal attack without risking any flanking movements which would involve his forces in travelling too far -afield. When the force of 500 trained soldiers entered the abandoned camp of tho Maori they found it to bo particularly strong “rifle pitted and trenched over a space of 100 acres.” Backed up by gun-boats specially adapted for the Waikato river General Cameron's forces slowly advanced until . they arrived at ltangiriri where they met with a serious check. Of this engagement-we quote Saunder’s “History, of New Zealand:” ‘‘They (the Maori) had probably expected the ' Ueneral to take a few months in making preparations to attack them, and had therefore not completed their backdoor escape when he came upon them with 4 gun-boats, 1300 men and 2 Armstrong guns. Entrenchments had been -constructed across the isthmus and a line of rifle pits parallel with the river at right ■ angles to tho line of entrench- . ments were far too extensive for the small force (about 400) inside, and the Maoris were soon driven into a large central redoubt where th,ey were protected by trenches nine feet deep and a parapet twenty-one feet above the bottom of the ditches. . . . Once driven into the redoubt, they might have been left to surrender when they pleased, as they had no means of subsistence, and the Genera], with all his paraphernalia, had no scaling ladders or platforms. Consequently tho many good men who obeyed the order to mako the attempt to scale the parapet simply -threw, their.lives away, and were shot . down- like so many partridges. In this way 135 officers and men were Idled or wounded, without the slightest advantage being obtained by their sacrifice.” The then Native Minister, Mr (afterwards Sir William) Fox, reporting on the affair, said: “The redoubt was defended with desperate resolution. The 65th having failed in tho

attempt to carry it, tlireo separato assaults were made upon it; one by 36 men of tlio Boyal Artillery, led by Captain Mercer and two by 90 men of tlie Naval Brigade, led by tbe Commander of JI.M.S. Eclipse. But all attempts to carry tbe- works by storm • were unavailing, while the assaulting parties wero literally mowed down by heavy fire which was poured upon'them.-” The defenders of this pa surrended-next day and for a while were imprisoned on a hulk in Auckland harbour- but were subsequently transferred to Kawau Island from which they later escaped. The British Army moved on to Ngaruawahia where it marked time for two months waiting for supplies from Auckland. (To be continued)*