AIR COMMITTEE FINDS THAT FORCED LANDING WAS UNPREMEDITATED

Manawatu Times, Volume LIV, Issue 6944, 25 June 1929, Page 7

AIR COMMITTEE FINDS THAT FORCED LANDING WAS UNPREMEDITATED

Errors of Judgment

ulm and McWilliams SEVERELY CENSURED LACK OF INITIATIVE. Catted Press Association—By Eloetrie Telegraph—Copyright. Received Monday, 5.5 p.m. SYDNEY, June 24.

The Air committee’s report was issued to-day. It states thcro was no evidenco placed before the committee of inquiry which would support rumours and public allegations that the forced landing of Southern Cross on April 12 ivas premeditated. Thero was nothing to impugn tho honesty of the crew or any member thereof.

The evidence showed the crew intended to fly to Wyndhain on March 3.1 and made every effort to do so and although through certain errors of judgment and defects of organisation, they failed to accomplish their object, thero was nothing to lead the committee to the belief that the forced landing was the result of a prearranged plan. The committee expressed the opinion that that aeroplane ran into adverse weather, depriving tho crew of every means of ascertaining the exact position, which resulted iu their being completely lost and tho exhaustion of tho petrol, necessitating an immediate landing. Contributory causes were insufficient weather reports and their inability to receive, during their aerial flight, advice of Captain Chateau’s warning message of March 30, recommending their immediate return.

The committee considered it was an error of judgment that Southern Cross had not carried tools, such as hatchet and hammer, as the possession of a hatchet would have enabled them to start their friction drives several days earlier and would have enabled them to make larger smoke fires. The crew should also have used their 18 gallons of oil for the purposo of supplementing the fires. Their failure to make use of this valuable medium was inexplicable. The committee found the crew was justified in remaining with the machine, rather than iu sending oilt parties to search for the Port George mission station. McWilliams Blamed. The committee said it was satisfied that Southern Cross was in first-class order and' tho condition of the instruments thoroughly efficient. In regard to McWilliam’s claim that the loss of the receiving aerial tvas not of material importance, as ho could not alter ten hours' flying, receive messages owing to deafness, the committee could not accept this explanation. Evidence was produced that for the last seven hours of the New Zealand to Australian flight and the PerthAdelaido flight, numerous messages were received by this 'piano on an inferior radio set. Tho committee felt the real reason for not returning to Richmond after losing the aerial was the reluctance of the commanders to clump the bulk of their petrol in order to make such a landing safe and anticipating no trouble on their journey, they took the risk of proceeding without any means of reception. This proved an error of judgment, because they ran into adverse weathor, about which they could have been advised had the receiving set been intact. Reasonable care was not taken to ascertain whether emergency rations were on the machine bofure departure. Such rations would havo enabled the crew to maintain full vitality after the forced landing and to make greater efforts to communicate with tho outside world. The committee considered certain adjustments to the receiving set could have been made on tho spot, which would havo enabled it to havo been used as a transmitting set. Thcro was an alternate mothod of transmission available by connecting tho receiving batteries to the transmitting sot. The committee was surprised at McWilliams’ lack of knowledge as to the adaptability of the apparatus under his control, particularly in view of his recent position as an instructor in the Union Company’s school in New Zeal laud.

The committee attributed the failure of the crew to communicate by wireless after tho forced landing to ignorance and lack of initiative on the part of McWilliams. Ulm Unreliable.

Concerning the evidence of three witnesses as to Flight-Lieutenant Ulm’s alleged suggestion of getting lost in Central Australia as a means to publicity and finance, tho committee expressed' the opinion that some such remarks were made by Ulm but probably wero not made as a serious business proposition.

This opinion, together with misleading evidence regarding wireless reception in the air, had caused the committee to regard the evidence of Dim with some suspicion and particularly so in the matter of his diary, which contained internal evidence, it was no daily record but obviously written for publication. The committee considered Ulm’s account of the crew's weakness was exaggerated. There was, however, no evidence from which the committee could infer the crew of Southern Cross took any steps to conceal their position to avoid being found.

The report dealt with the Kookaburra tragedy and paid tribute to the gallant efforts of various Air Force and private aviators to find the lost crows. The committee submitted a number of recommendations for the future eoutrol of longdistance flights. The committee also |!|s||sessed the opinion that Kookabuti»*ffeaS unsuitable for long flights, primary cause of the tragedj^|fKfV.- ft faulty compass, causing AndefjpOk to lose ■vi* if

direction, engine trouble, necessitating a forced landing and inability to rise again and lack of equipment to clear a runaway.