JAPAN’S NAVY

Manawatu Times, Volume XLIX, Issue 2340, 9 January 1926, Page 7

JAPAN’S NAVY

THE EXPANSION PROGRAMME. ADEQUATE FOR DEFENCE. GREAT STRENGTH IN SMALLER SHIPS. An authoritative survey of the pre. sent position of the Japanese Navy, from the pen of Mr Hector C. Bywater, an acknowledged expert on Pacific naval questions, appears in the November number of the “Nineteenth Century.” Mr Bywater is the author of “The Problem of the Pacific,” and “The Great Pacific War,’ ’and has devoted much time to a study of internal conditions in Japan, and particularly to naval development in that country. The article shows that Japan was Initially the aggressor in the present naval competition between the Powers, analyses the character of her naval programme, and praises the great efficiency of the personnel of the Fleet. c The article goes on to refer to the Singapore Base, the reinforcement of the British China and East India Squadrons, and the choice of Malta as headquarters of the strongest battle squadron, and to the alarm expressed in Japan as a result of these things, followed, as they were by the American Fleet’s voyage to Australia, “To what extent these misgivings are genuine,” he says, “it were difficult to say. In Japan, as in other countries, the ruling powers are not above enlisting the aid of the Press when popular support Is desired for official policies. Since 1921 the Navy Department has had to fight hard in defence of its annual budget. All attempts at at further reduction of the naval budget have been’ vigorously and, so far, successfully resisted by the. department in question, - Naval Expansion. “At the moment of writing ’ the Navy Department la urging upon the Cabinet a new shipbuilding pro. gramme tof considerable magnitude, involving an outlay of some £16,000, 00*0. On its first introduction this project was coldly received by the Press, blit of late the chorus of dissent has appreciably moderated, and the most popular organs are •now’ explaining at great length that additional ships are needed to restore the balance of pdwer, in the Pacific, which is men. aced by current British and American activities. . . At first glance, therefore, It would seem as if Japan were, being reluctantly forced into a policy of naval expansion toy the rivalry of other Powers, a conclusion which the facts, when looked into more closely, fail ,to support.” After the Washington Conference.

Japan reduced the size of her Navy. “It is time that many vessels disappeared from the programme,,” adds the writer. “On the other hand, those that remained were all re-designed to larger dimensions, with the result that the net reduction in total ton. nage is comparatively small. Taking cruisers and destroyers first, thereby 32 ships of 102,000 tons were allowed for under the revised programme, in place of the 46 ships of 101,856 tons which had been projected before the Conference. So far, therefore, as these ships lire Concerned, the aggregate displacement was actually increased by 144 tons, notwithstanding that 14 i vessels were dropped. Only in.regard to submarines was a real diminution In strength accepted, 24 of these boats being cancelled, with a consequent reduction of 13,539 tons. : “We find, therefore .that while the amended building plan embraces 54 ; vessels, in place of the 92 projected ' originally, the net decrease in total ! displacement is only 13,395 tons equivalent to two light cruisers. It will be seen .also that the argument of Japanese., publicists, that their country alone has abstained from new schemes of naval expansion dur. . ing the past three years, borders upon sophistry.” Singapore Base. After a discussion of Pacific strategy,, and of the result of the W ash- . ington Conference in preventing the creation of United States naval bases ' in the Western Pacific the writer ■ declares • ;■ “Japan Is therefore beyond reach • of serious naval attack. . • As for , Singapore, this place is obviously 1 much too remote ever to serve as a I place for aggressive operations ■ against Japan. . . The actual time * occupied by a fleet in steaming from Singapore to Formosa (the nearest Japanese possession) would be nearer five days than three.” Reverting to the matter of ship : construction, Mr Bywater ’ gives the i following table showing warships laid ' down since the Armistice and up to : last April:— Cru’rs. Des’trs Sub’s

“Due to the effect of the Washington Treaty in sweeping so piany capital ships from the board,” he continues, “the relative value of smaller craft has materially increased. In a future naval war admirals will be chary of exposing their battleships . . . Attempts will probably be made to dominate the -war zone by means of lighter forces—that is, cruisers, destroyers and submarines. “Formerly a satellite of the battle-

ship, the cruiser must henceforth play a leading role in naval operations, and it is conceivable that a large fleet of such vessels will more than balance a deficiency in heavier ships. That, apparently, is the view held in Japan, , where an exceptionally powerful ' cruiser force is being built up. “Once dependent on foreign try for all her naval material, Japan is now able to produce everything she requires from'a complete battle, ship to the latest torpedo. The fleet is maintained in a thoroughly efficient condition. Its ships spend as much time at sea as those of any other navy, not excepting the Brltlsn. Immediate Readiness. “The Japanese naval officer has little time or inclination for any pursuit outside his profession. The lower deck seaman, if superficially less alert, mentally, than the British bluejacket, appears to be zealous and well-trained. Although conscription is resorted to, the navy is manned for I the most part by volunteers, who enlist for a term of six years. A largo percentage of time-expired men sign on for a further period of service.” The writer concludes of a reassuring note: — “What, then, is Japan’s motive for maintaining this imposing and costly naval armament. Are its functions essentially defensive, or is it designed as an instrument of aggran. disement? The present composition of the fleet and the nature of the new shipbuilding now in hand cannot , be reconciled with the theory of an aggressive purpose. The battle fleet is much too weak to engage in ambitious operations overseas; its ancillary craft are sufficiently numerous to conduct a geuerre de course with telling effe'et, but they would certainly not be capable of covering a military expedition against territory remote from Japan. Only Local Influence. “Supreme within its own waters, 1 an d enjoying all, the advantages < f position, the navy could count upon repelling the largest hostile force which could possibly be deployed in the north-western sector of the Pacific under existing conditions, in which case Japan’s vital lines of communication with the mainland would be secure. “But for an operation of such mag- • nltude as the invasion of Hawaii or Australia, the present and prospective ■ naval forces of Japan would be al--1 together inadequate, without consid- ■ erlng the military and logical difficuli ties «of such an enterprise. We may ; say. therefore, that Japan’s sea power exerts only a local Influence, and has been developed mainly with a view to the protection of local interests including, of course, her stake in Ghihai”

Brit Empire 5 2 2 Japan 19 54 46 France 5 24 23 Italy 2 21 4 U.S.A. 10 94 33