Manawatu Daily Times MONDAY, MARCH 13, 1923. ARMS, POLICY AND STRATEGY.

Manawatu Times, Volume XLVI, Issue 2593, 12 March 1923, Page 4

Manawatu Daily Times MONDAY, MARCH 13, 1923. ARMS, POLICY AND STRATEGY.

Tho announcement by Die Prime Minister of Great Britain that a com- 1 mittec is to be appointed ‘‘‘to inquire into the co-operation of the three services from (he point of view of national and Imperial defence,” opens 1 up a wide vista. It suggests problems! of tactics and strategy of the highest I importance. Until 1914 Britain always waged war in two elements; but, con-1 sidering what, success or failure meant, to the Motherland and the Empire, | the amount of study given to the i question of co-ordination between sea and land plans was surprisingly small.) jit was left to Admiral Mahan an I | American, to write the classic work on the importance of sea-power. When the. Great War came the plan of forcing the Dardanelles—strategically! sound and even brilliant—failed primarily because adequate co-ordination | of thought and data between Admir-i '.ally and War Office was lacking. Now, I there is a third element, the air,! operations in which threaten to revolutionise methods of warfare. There are experts who declare that it, is useless to build battleships, yet the Em-i pire’s lirst line of defence is still based ; upon the capital ship. The new | 'committee will have its hands full. ! One of its first inquiries—much will depend upon the order of reference! and the rulings of the chairman—may be into tho Dominions’ part in Imperial defence. The whole question is still in a very unsatisfactory state, and ' the plain warning- of Britain that she cannot go on bearing a disproportionate share of the burden, has not! been retracted or modified. The com - ; mittee may go further and consider tho relation of policy to strategy, and attempt to lay down rules for the guidance of future Governments in their dealings with military and naval commanders. Sir Frederick Maurice raises this question in a very important contribution to the “Spectator.” | He says that despite our recent ex-1 periences, the principle that should j govern the relations between the statesman and the fighter remain unsettled. It is essential, he contends, ■ that strategy should be controlled by policy, .that the combatant should be : controlled by the statesman, but it is ! equally essential that the statesman j should know where his functions end i and those of the soldier and sailor be- j! gin. History is strewn with disas-l. ters that had followed violation of , these sound principles. The teaching ~ of history is plain, yet in every war it j is ignored. Sir Frederick Maurice admits that while the principles are' <

simple their application is difficult, and he pleads for a thorough and non-party study of the problem in the light of our experience in the GreatWar. For example, in his opinion the Asquith Government was justified in sending Lord Kitchener to France to “clear up the situation” when Sir John 0 French retreated out of the Allied line, but in certain of his inferences Mr Lloyd George was not justified. Sir a Frederick Maurice lays it down that if a Prime Minister loses his confidence in his generals, he should remove them, but Mr Lloyd George actually declared his lack of confidence in , Haig publicity, but did not remove him. Moreover, according to Sir Frederick, he interfered before the • offensive of March, 1918, in a purely technical question on which he had , no right to any opinion. Sir Frederick contends that all this is a vital matter, and that the same kind of mistake has been made since the war. He would have the Prime Minister a call the leaders of the Opposition to the Committee of Imperial Defence 1 and get that committee to formulate r principles governing such civilians’’ military relations, which principles * should be made public and accepted by the services and by both political parties. Perhaps Mr Honar law has something of the kind in his mind.