SCHEER OF JUTLAND.

Manawatu Times, Volume XLII, Issue 1737, 12 February 1921, Page 2

SCHEER OF JUTLAND.

JELLIOOE’S ‘‘.MISSED CHANCE,” TURNED AWAY INSTEAD OF ATTACKING. Admiral Scheer’s letter to the Kaiser describing the battle of Jutland has been published in thp Chicago Tribune, which says that the letter was accompanied with diagrams of tlie positions of the two fleets during the battle. The first diagram showed the British Fleet in a great semicircle, with the German Fleet drawn out in a horizontal lino tending to bisect the British formation. / “Realising my desperate situation,” Scheer wrote, “and hoping to save the German fleet, 1 sent out torpedo fleets to attack the enemy. Jellicoe turned away. Had he attacked at this juncture he might have picked off the German ships one by ojie because of his spearhead formation, and the German Navy probably would have been destroyed. “At 5.49 (English time) the enemy, judging the situation rightly, attacked with torpedo-boats, forcing the German advance to give way to the south-west, while the main German fleet was compelled to give way to the east. “The loaders, realising the seriousness of the situation, then attacked, being taken under the fire of numerous battleships.” The foregoing situation, says the Tribune despatch, was the result of Scheer’s error in mistaking Beatty’s ships for the main British fleet. A SURPRISE ATTACK. (“About this time,” Scheer continued, “the fleets of Jelicoe and Beatty were united. In order to avoid unequal battle our armoured cruisers were forced to give way so much that I was necessarily forced to turn our line westward. It was too early them to begin the night march away. The enemy before darkness came might have forced us to stay, and thus have taken from us the liberty of decision, finally blocking the way to the German coast. There was just one way to avoid this dash, a reckless attack giving the enemy a second blow by using our torpodoboats violently. Such a manoeuvre must take the enemy completely by surprise, destroy bis plans, and, if successfully carried out, facilitate separation from him during the night. “Our torpedo-boats took upon themselves the heavy fire of the enemy, which had been directed upon our cruisers,” he wrote, ‘and took the attack within 7000 yards of the middle 'of the British spearhead formation, which was composed of more than twenty Dreadnoughts. It was only by such a surprise attack I could hope to throw the enemy on a wrong scent, and provide our ships with a doorway to safety. “The attack realised my object, with the loss of only one torpedoboat. My line was again, therefore, taken back to westward, and finally to the south-east, in order to avoid the vast encircling movement already undertaken by the enemy who ceased fire when the German ships swung off in a new direction. It seems certain the British fleet must have turned away after our surprise torpedo attack.” ’ COMPARATIVE LOSSES. “We were attacked almost all night from the east, sometimes by light, sometimes heavy forces. On the morning of June Ist Zeppelin No. 24 observed 12 British super-Dread-noughts and many cruisers proceeding southward. The main German fleet, however, by this time could see nothing’ of the enemy on account of the weather. 'lt was deemed unwise and impossible for us to attack the enemy reported southward of us. I therefore renounced further operations. “The enemy’s losses in the engagement amounted to 169,000 tons, and the total German loss was only CO.000.”